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Editor’s Introduction
Even though issue 9.1 is not a special issue, the first three papers have a thematic focus. The
anthropologist Greta Uehling, the political scientist Stephen Blank, and the social psychologist
Karina Korostelina employ different disciplinary perspectives to analyze the historic and ongoing
violence against the Crimean Tatars in the Soviet Union and today’s Russia.
Between the 1930s and 1950s, the Soviet government under Joseph Stalin’s direction forcibly
removed entire national groups from strategic areas of the Soviet Union.1 These groups included
the Balkars, Chechens, Crimean Tatars, Finns, Georgian Kurds, Germans, Ingush, Kalmyks,
Karachays, Khemshils, Koreans, Meshketian Turks, Poles, Pontic Greeks, and many others. More
than two million people from these groups were deported from their traditional homelands and
forced to resettle in other parts of the Soviet Union under the pretext that they were inherently
treasonous. Hundreds of thousands died along the way, and thousands more died in exile of
hunger, disease, and exhaustion. The forced deportations of these national groups accompanied
state-initiated attempts to starve to death other national groups, from Ukraine to Kazakhstan;
state dekulakization polices intended to liquidate the imagined class enemies of prosperous and
exploitative peasants; Stalin’s notorious political purges; and the extrajudicial execution of over
one million citizens.2
Uehling, Blank, and Korostelina take up the case of the Crimean Tatars, who were deported
from Crimea in May 1944, one month after the German army retreated. Within two days—without
knowing where they were going nor why—nearly 200,000 people were loaded into cattle cars
and transported to Uzbekistan, the Volga basin, and Siberia. In June, Bulgarians, Greeks, and
Armenians were also accused by the Soviet government in Moscow of collaborating with the
German occupation during the Second World War, and were forcibly removed from Crimea
too. Historians have estimated that forty percent of the Crimean Tatars who were deported died
during the forced evacuations, or died in exile within twelve months. For the next two decades, the
Crimean Tatars were given special settler legal status—which prohibited them from returning to
Crimean lands.3
The cannon of genocide studies has not widely considered Soviet genocides. Indeed, until
recently, even the most deadly cases of Soviet horrors, such as the Ukrainian and Kazak state
orchestrated famines, easily could have been termed forgotten genocides. Crimean Tatar political
activists, however, first began using the term “genocide” in the 1970s to describe their treatment
at the hands of the Soviet state, to qualify their suffering as an international crime, and to lend
credibility to their international human rights campaign.4 Outside this community of Crimean
Tatar activists and the international Tatar diaspora, the case of the Crimean Tatars was not widely
considered a genocide. For this and many other reasons, the plight of the Crimean Tatars has been
under-studied in our field, and beyond.
In 2014, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea called attention to the
importance of studying this historical case. As Uehling, Blank, and Korostelina each argue, the
unsettled legacy of Soviet-era genocides against the Crimean Tatars has had lasting consequences
that shape the present situation the Crimean Tatars face in Russian Crimea. Together, the articles
make clear that the social and political implications of how this history of genocide is remembered
in Crimea, Ukraine, and Russia—and the complicated and contested relationship between the past
and the present—is necessary for understating the social, cultural, and political dynamics of the
current repression faced by Crimean Tatars in the wake of the Russian annexation of Crimea.
The following four papers in this issue illustrate perfectly the wide range of disciplines and
topics the research on genocide comprises. However, all of them cover topics that are central for
every serious attempt of preventing extreme collective violence. As different as they might appear
on the first view, three of these articles offer different perspectives on a very similar topic. Namely,
how a social and psychological environment is created that leads to or enables the killing, robbing,
and raping of defined groups. Paul Morrow, a political scientist, adds to the literature on norm
transformation, which is being discussed as a crucial factor of all genocidal processes. Morrow
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sees social norms as not only highly relevant for individual and collective action, but argues that
norm changes should be taken into account when assessing legal and moral accountability within
the context of mass violence. Rhiannon Neilson, an expert on international relations and peace
and conflict studies, introduces the concept of “toxification” as a crucial aspect for the escalation
towards genocidal violence. This discursive branding of the victims to be seen not only as enemies
or non-human(s), but an imminent danger for each individual and the national group as a whole,
is presented as a more precise warning sign for such violence than the often used concept of
dehumanization. The anthropologist Anthonie Holslag explores the explanatory usefulness of the
social anthropological concepts of selfing and othering in regard to collective violent behavior. This
issue concludes with a paper by Kelly Maddox on the UN Genocide Convention and the failure to
prevent genocide. The historian is concerned with the political bodies and mechanisms that should
help to stop extreme collective violence but, so her depressing conclusion finds, has failed to do so.
It seems worth mentioning that the concept of genocide used in many of the papers in this issue
focuses not so much on the physical destruction of a people, but rather on the violent transformation
of societies as a whole by collective and organized action. Or, in the words of Daniel Feierstein, the
authors have chosen not to define genocide as a single event, but as a social practice.5
Christian Gudehus
Douglas Irvin-Erickson
Melanie O’Brien
Endnotes
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Genocide’s Aftermath: Neostalinism in Contemporary Crimea
Greta Uehling

University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI, USA

Abstract: The Crimean Tatars’ genocide is one of the clearest, and yet least studied of twentieth-century genocides.
This article explores that genocide’s aftermath, beginning with the Crimean Tatars’ attempts to reinscribe their
presence in their historic homeland following the 1944 deportation. The ongoing contestations over the past are
examined here as a historical habitus informing attitudes and behavior in the present. Drawing on unparalleled
interview data with the Russian-speaking population in Crimea, I explore the durability and ontological resonance
of constructions of Tatars as traitors both past and present. Ethnographic insight into the local understandings
that feed exclusion, discrimination, and hatred enhance our understanding of genocide as a social process. Given
the lack of either guilt or shame regarding the 1944 deportation, I suggest that Crimea currently lacks the cognitive
and affective foundation to create a more inclusive future.
Keywords: Genocide, Stalin, Crimea, Crimean Tatars, ethnic cleansing, commemoration, deportation, ontological
resonance
The Crimean Tatars’ genocide is one of the clearest, and yet least studied twentieth-century
genocides. The definition used here is an inclusive one, best summarized by Alexander Hinton as
“the more or less coordinated attempt to destroy a dehumanized and excluded group of people
because of who they are.”1 The death toll as a result of the 1944 deportation was catastrophic: 46
percent of the population is believed to have perished at that time.2 In addition to this physical
destruction, efforts were made to cleanse all traces of them from the Crimean landscape, and to
ensure the assimilation of survivors in places of exile. Analyzing these and subsequent events
within the framework of critical genocide studies reveals the treatment of the indigenous Crimean
Tatars as an ongoing social practice and technology of power on the part of first the Russian and
then the Soviet regimes.3
The systematic erasure of the Crimean Tatars was holistic in nature. Crimean Tatar place
names were changed to Soviet ones; mosques were turned into movie theatres (or worse); homes,
livestock and gardens were given away; and mention of Crimean Tatars was deleted or abbreviated
in reference works. Crimean Tatars were not allowed to reside in, or speak of, their homeland.
It wasn’t even possible to preserve a Crimean Tatar identity in personal documents. In Central
Asia, before efforts to assimilate the survivors were underway, Crimean Tatars lived in a Special
Settlement regime in which tens of thousands died of malnutrition, dehydration, and disease. They
were also demonized. To give but one example, Crimean Tatars describe how children’s heads
were checked for horns by their Central Asian school teachers.
This article unfolds in several steps. Considering that one component or aftermath of genocide
is the attempt to erase the group from official history, I explore sites of memory, especially
public commemoration. Although the ability of Crimean Tatars to commemorate their past as
part of independent Ukraine at first suggests resilience, their efforts to reinscribe their presence
on the peninsula and regain their rights have been met with opposition and resistance. Public
commemorations interest me because they are one way in which competing interpretations
of history become audible or legible and are then contested. Two insurrections of subjugated
knowledge as part of independent Ukraine, billboards and a film, demonstrate these contestations.
That the Crimean population, for the most part, does not recognize the treatment of the Crimean
Tatars as genocide at all calls for deeper analysis. In the next part of the paper, I explore the
thoughts and emotions behind the antipathy that continues to be directed at this indigenous
people. Ethnographic insight into the local understandings that feed exclusion, discrimination,
and hatred will enhance our understanding of genocide as a social process. My approach extends
the work of other scholars of genocide by suggesting there is a historical habitus, or ingrained
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way of interpreting and embodying the past. These interpretations are fortified by what Hinton
has called the ontological resonance of genocide. In Crimea, this ontological resonance manifests
in categorical distinctions of Crimean Tatars as dangerous Others. Finally, I show how the postannexation treatment of the Crimean Tatars by local and Russian Federation authorities shows an
effort to restructure relations among the living yet again, in part by circumscribing interpretations
of the past. Taken together, this exploration leads me ask whether we are witnessing what scholars
of genocide would call an extended aftermath, or priming for a new round.
Methods
This article is based on long-term fieldwork conducted in Crimea in 1995, 1997-98, 2001, 2004,
and 2011, when I lived and worked among the indigenous Crimean Tatar population. During the
1997-98 fieldwork, I lived in both Central Asia, where the majority of Crimean Tatars remaining in
diaspora and their descendants reside, and in Crimea. The ethnography published in 2004 did not
delve deeply into the views of Russians in Crimea. This article begins to fill that gap. I returned in
2013 and, struck by signs of neo-Stalinism, collected the data presented here.
The ethnographic fieldwork carried out in May and June 2013 sought to better understand
how and why Tatarophobia, or xenophobia had become so prevalent on the peninsula. During the
fieldwork, I gathered several kinds of data, interpolated here. First, unstructured interviews with
political and cultural leaders, school teachers and principals, newspaper editors, journalists, and
civil society monitors enabled me to begin tracking the ground level processes through which
shared interpretations were being formed. Second, taped, semi-structured interviews conducted
with a stratified sample of sympathizers with the Russian Federation4 (ethnic Russians and mixed
Russian and Ukrainians) using visual images of Stalin to elicit responses provided another layer
of information. These data are not intended to be representative: my objective is rather to reveal
some of the deeper layers informing the abysmal treatment of the Tatars that are obscured in
other accounts. I used visual prompts because as Plamper has shown, reverence for Stalin was
“overwhelmingly a visual phenomenon, tailored to a population whose mental universe was
shaped primarily by images as opposed to written words.”5 The deep psychological and spiritual
importance of images of the so-called father of peoples is clear considering that Stalin portraits
were often hung in the corner of the home that had previously been reserved for icons.
In 2013, I also drew on a third source of information: participation in a number of commemorative
activities related to the Day of Mourning. The interviews and participant observation in Crimea
upon which the core of my argument is built are supplemented by ongoing communication with
consultants in the region, as well as close attention to Crimean Tatars’ news reporting available on
the Internet today.
Aftermaths: Independent Ukraine
Any country emerging from a totalitarian, genocidal, or war-torn past must confront questions
about how to frame and incorporate that past while designing a better future. As Nanci Adler has
argued, “The process of fashioning a good future out of a ‘bad past’ is tricky and may require the
creation of a ‘usable past’ for the national narrative.”6 The field of reconciliation studies suggests
there are multiple layers and approaches here, including acknowledgement, apology, truth, justice,
and reparations.7 And yet, post-Soviet Russia only made limited efforts to confront its Stalinist past,
seeming to prefer to suppress memories of repression.8 As a result, surviving victims of Stalinism
have been insufficiently acknowledged. Adler sees the prevalence of the state-sponsored narrative
over the victims’ counter-histories as part of a larger failure to create adequate transitional justice
mechanisms and move toward full-fledged civil society. From her perspective, Russia has not yet
created a space for what she calls “engaging dialogues,” that could lead to inclusive history.9
Within a framework of critical genocide studies, we can go farther. Not only has their been
insufficient acknowledgement, but the Crimean Tatar genocide is treated first by Soviet and now
Russian Federation authorities as something the Crimean Tatars brought upon themselves. Locals
allege the Crimean Tatars’ punishment was justified, even though there is no morally or ethically
sound justification for the treatment they received. In part, this is a result of diametrically opposed
interpretations of history. Russians and those of mixed Russian and Ukrainian heritage who are
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pro-Russia tend to deploy an idiom that legitimatizes their presence by referencing the fact that
Crimea was a part of Russia from 1783 until 1954, and reiterate the charges of treason during the
Nazi occupation of Crimea. The Crimean Tatars counter this by pointing to what the charges elide,
which is that members of all ethnic groups contributed to the Nazi occupation, and that these are
not the people who were punished by the 1944 deportation, which carried away innocents. That
Crimean Tatars soldiers fought (and gave their lives) on the Soviet front and were demobilized
into exile is of course a moral outrage. They also emphasize their autochthonous origins on the
peninsula, long before Ekaterina II annexed the peninsula. Thus it is important to recognize the
extent to which different ethnic groups—and here I will focus on the pro-Russian contingent
and Crimean Tatars—have competing idioms for relating to, and when necessary justifying their
presence on, the peninsula they share.10 While their idioms overlap on concern with the meaning
of homeland, patriotism, and treason, they have very different reference points.
It is worthwhile to contrast the situation in the Russian Federation with post-genocidal settings
where transitional justice mechanisms, however imperfect or limited, have been established. For
example, Molly Andrews has argued the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
created a national narrative and ultimately a common framework for the whole country to
understand the past.11 She suggests that (again, in spite of many shortcomings) the South-African
commission managed to forge a dialogue between official and personal narratives, and to formulate
an inclusive history. A rich line of research into the reconciliation process explores the nuances of
this process in a variety of countries.12
As a part of Ukraine, Crimea occupied a volatile and yet fertile position between these two
variants. An insurrection of previously subjugated knowledges led, while the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea was part of Ukraine, to writing the 1944 deportation back into history books, putting
the minarets back on the mosques, and erecting multiple public monuments to commemorate
Crimean Tatar military heroes and cultural leaders. While the process was far from complete, and
characterized by failures and frustrations, it is important to recognize the extent to which Crimean
Tatars were able to reinstate their rightful presence on the peninsula, and reinscribe their history
on the landscape they hold sacred.
Even as they became legible on the Crimean peninsula, however, it became a landscape of
hatred and distrust as monuments and memorials were marked with swastikas or other xenophobic
graffiti, and groups clashed over such matters as placing a market on a Crimean Tatar sacred site.
As part of Ukraine, hostility against Crimean Tatars included attacks and pogroms against Crimean
Tatar settlements and property in 2004. An attack on a Crimean Tatar settlement backed by special
Ukrainian Berkut riot police in January and November, 2007; the attack and beating of Crimean
Tatars on the Ay-Petri plateau in November 2007; and vandalism of Crimean Tatar cemeteries
and memorials in Zaprudne, Zuya. Saq, Bagcasaray, Nyznohirskyi and many other locales. The
Foundation for Research and Support of Indigenous Peoples that tracks these activities concluded
vandalism is more the rule than the exception.13
How to understand these contestations? Within the framework of critical genocide studies, a
Foucauldian genealogy with its concepts of counter-memory and counter-history helps to decipher
the struggle over commemoration and competing visions of the past.14 This approach is relevant
because as part of Ukraine, cross currents of power and resistance appeared to be reshaping the
field of commemoration and expanding the space for remembering different, sometimes painful
aspects of the past. By way of background, counter-histories try to undo the silences imposed
by official histories, and to undermine the unity and continuity that dominant histories produce.
The ability to identify omissions and to fill discursive gaps previously imposed by authorities is
an important component of exercising agency and resisting both hegemonic power/knowledge
frameworks and, at a more concrete level, sociopolitical subjugation.
My 2004 ethnography detailed how activists in the Crimean Tatar national movement such as
Mustafa Cemilev, Reshat Cemilev, Aishe Seitmuratov, Rustem Khalilov, Izzet Khairov and many
others, clearly articulated a counter-narrative explicating how the 1944 deportation violated the laws
and principles of the Soviet regime, and subjected the Crimean Tatar people to decimation. They also
make clear that by the time of the deportation, the Crimean Tatar people had survived not just the
initial colonization, but confiscation of their property, state-induced famine, purges of clergy and
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intellectuals, and Nazi occupation.15 In a personal interview, this was aptly summarized by Mustafa
Cemilev as being caught between to hegemons, neither of whom promised any protection or relief.16
What I am concerned with presently is less the historical scholarship and activism facilitating
the Crimean Tatars mass return in the 1990s, than the public spaces where ordinary Crimean Tatars,
Ukrainians and Russians are now interlocutors. These sites demonstrate that there is no single
aftermath of genocide: it becomes a plural noun. Pro-Russian and pro-Crimean Tatar versions of
the past are diametrically opposed. The differing perspectives on the past led, unquestionably, to
different perspectives on the future. We now see each group has very different access to rights and
resources on the peninsula as a legacy of the deportation.
The Contested Past
In spite of attempts to erase and assimilate them, the Crimean Tatars survived their exile, launched
a powerful national movement, and mobilized sufficient personal and political resources to
repatriate.17 Since they began returning, Crimean Tatars have struggled to reverse the effects of the
literal and discursive cleansing.18 Examples show the slow movement of a previously marginalized
Crimean Tatar past into the Crimean imagined community.
One example is the commemoration of the 1944 deportation, referred to in Crimea as a “день
память и скорби” or day of memory and mourning. In a move that would certainly have been
quashed 20 years ago, some twelve billboards calling participants to observe the occasion were
positioned across Crimea. One billboard calling for observance of the day showed an image of
several intersecting lines of barbed wire and a message about the 69th commemoration, bringing
knowledge that was previously disqualified and excluded into the public space. Another billboard
brings home the point even more clearly.

Figure 1. Billboard of Iminov painting calling for commemoration. Source: Author’s photograph.

Rustem Iminov’s painting of a crowded train car, once concealed in his private studio on a
quiet street in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, was suddenly enlarged many times and thrust into the visual
field of all drivers in Crimea, whether Russian, Ukrainian, or Crimean Tatar. The billboard makes
visible how women, children, and the elderly were carried away in cattle cars, not to mention the
soldiers’ unfortunate demobilization. Thanks to the artist’s willingness for others to use this image,
it has become iconic of the Crimean Tatars’ deportation. I turn to the billboards because they are
one way that the Crimean Tatars can speak to other residents of Crimea with whom they might not
otherwise exchange views.19
I first met Iminov and saw the painting in 1998, when he was living in Central Asia. I learned
that whereas Iminov’s father, also a painter, was forced to communicate his ideas cryptically in
symbolic codes, Iminov succeeded in putting his mother’s individual memories of deportation in
public, pictorial form.20 The trajectory of this painting from a private Tashkent studio to a Simferopol
billboard indexes the Crimean Tatars’ own journey from silenced and exiled, to repatriated citizens
of independent Ukraine. The billboards constitute an intervention into the hegemonic conception
of the past that failed to register the Crimean Tatars during their absence.
A second example of the insurrection of previously subjugated knowledge, and one that
generated a great deal more epistemic friction21 is provided by the 2013 release of a feature film
about the 1944 deportation, Haytarma.
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Figure 2. Promotional flyer for the film Haytarma. Source: The image is taken from the jacket of the CD, and was the
flyer for the showing of the film as well.

The film is structured around the life of the half Crimean Tatar fighter pilot, Amet-Han Sultan.
The film follows the protagonist through his service when he was stationed in Crimea. The major
turn in the plot comes when Amet-Han Sultan is given leave to see his family on the eve of the
deportation. He and two friends find themselves in Amet-Han’s native village on the night of the
mass deportation. We then experience a filmic representation of that terrible night.
The film has been criticized on the grounds that it uses the language and iconography of the
colonizers to communicate its message.22 Admittedly, we see a colonized people taking on, and
quite literally acting in, the uniform of the oppressor. While this reading of the film is valid on
formal grounds, a more nuanced reading is possible if we listen to the conversations about the film
among Crimean Tatars. Recalling that Crimean Tatars were banned from speaking of Crimea in
exile, and that no images of the actual deportation are known to exist, the film elevated previously
silenced and submerged memories of war and deportation. While perhaps not a counter-history in
the sense of a full-fledged denunciation of the Soviet regime, the film does critique the Soviet’s 1944
deportation. By portraying Amet-Han’s bravery and patriotism fighting on the Soviet side, the film
also attempts to deconstruct the racist categorization of Crimean Tatars as solely collaborators with
the German occupiers, and shows ethnically-integrated villages. Like the billboards, the film fills
a visual lacuna.
For younger Crimean Tatars, parents’ and grandparents’ stories were finally in a visual format.
Crimean Tatars who acted in the film describe participation as an intense, even cathartic experience.
At the premier I attended, the film was followed by stunned silence and muffled sobbing. The film
also received many standing ovations by audiences in Crimea and Kyiv. It is fair to say the film
punctured the silenced history of deportation and brought Crimean Tatar patriotism into public
view. If respondents in my fieldwork were correct in their assessment, a page that had been left
blank, and that had long complicated the mourning process, was now filled, helping to resolve
some emotions about the event.
The film’s release generated a great deal of epistemic friction concerning how to most
accurately portray the Crimean past. The controversy began when the Consul General for the
Russian Federation in Crimea, Vladimir Andreev, admonished the Russian generals trained by
Amet-Han Sultan not to attend the Premier. Six of the eight surviving generals took his advice.23

©2015

Genocide Studies and Prevention 9, no. 1 http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-0359.9.1.1273

8

Uehling

Mr. Andreev clarified his position publically on Crimean television. Resurrecting a trope from
the Second World War (referred to as Great Patriotic War in Crimea), Andreev stated that Russia
should not be represented at the premier of a film that falsifies the truth of this war. His primary
argument was that the film did not grapple with the ostensibly salient theme of collaboration on
the part of Crimean Tatars with the fascist occupiers. Public discourses like these are a primary way
that ideologies and cultural stances are not just created, but maintained. Andreev’s remark seems
designed to create cultural continuity at a moment when it was threatened by change in postSoviet Ukraine. By resurrecting the old categorizations of Crimean Tatars as somehow disloyal to
the homeland, Andreev re-polarized the field of commemoration in a move seemingly intended to
inscribe the Soviet-era social hierarchy.
Based on the reaction in the family I was living with at the time, Andreev’s comments left the
Crimean Tatars feeling angry and emotionally bruised. One of my hosts stood and paced, another
turned red in the face, and all three raised their voices to talk back to the TV. Andreev’s remarks
also set off a series of demonstrations that were publicized on the nightly news. Holding Andreev’s
portrait flanked by pictures of Beria and Stalin, Crimean Tatars countered the slur by pointing out
the symbolic isomorphism between the present Consul General and past Soviet leaders. There
were also a series of verbal duels that ricocheted through social media like Facebook.
While the Crimean Tatar contribution in the Second World War remains hotly contested in
Crimea, Andreev’s intolerance was not accepted, even by authorities. Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry
immediately requested Russian Federation authorities to evaluate the statements. In an address
before the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, then Vice President of the
Crimean Tatar Mejlis Refat Chubarov demanded the Russian Federation deplore the intolerant
statement. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation did indeed acknowledge the
statement was inappropriate, and Andreev resigned. As we can see from the conflict over Andreev’s
remarks, references to collaboration with the Nazi forces are particularly toxic in Crimea where,
even though all the ethnic groups collaborated, Crimean Tatars have been consistently singled out
as responsible. Ukraine rose, however feebly, in the Crimean Tatar defense.
While a great deal of the contemporary friction is generated by the issue of Second World
War collaboration, the roots of mistrust lie deeper in the colonial past. The Russian Empire saw
Crimean Tatars as uncivilized, inferior to Russians, and potentially disloyal. This references events
during the Crimean War. Raids on Muscovy in the Middle Ages are also often cited today.24 In light
of these analyses, Tatarophobia has less to do with the Second World War than the Crimean Tatars’
long term positioning on the peninsula. Views of the peninsula’s past have remained in separate,
diametrically opposed, silos. While ethnic Russians see themselves as the original inhabitants of
Crimea, and argue the Crimean khanate had a weak economy and was only a vassal of the Ottoman
Empire, Crimean Tatars assert that the Crimean khanate was a highly civilized state in which
all faiths were accepted, ethnic groups flourished, and the economy thrived. Both are of course
simplified interpretations. What is more destructive is the view (whether embraced by ethnically
Russian or ethnically mixed individuals) that Russian culture is superior, supranational, and
provides a consolidating function. There is also an essentialism that Crimean Tatars are inherently
hostile and cruel, another justification for their removal from Crimea. From a broader perspective,
then, the Crimean Tatars were prefigured for predatel’stvo or treason.
Neostalinism
To reestablish the Crimean Tatar presence on the peninsula would require restructuring the worlds
of meaning in which Crimean Tatars are cast as traitors or villains. Efforts during the Ukrainian
period marking the anniversary of the 1944 deportation, erecting monuments to the Crimean
Tatar past, and writing the 1944 deportation back into history, re-politicized space and time.25 As
if obeying Newton’s Third Law, for every Crimean Tatar action there was an equal and opposite
reaction. A paradigmatic example is the counter-movement revalorizing Stalin in Crimea. In 2012,
an organization named Essence of Time held an exhibition commemorating the 133rd anniversary of
Stalin’s birth. They combined about 150 images with laudatory comments about Stalin. These were
presented on large placards in the center of the capitol city where descendants of the victims of
genocide would be sure to look on. The Crimean Tatar executive body, the Mejlis, spoke out during
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the planning stage, pointing out such an exhibit would be profoundly disrespectful to victims of
Stalin. The exhibit took place nonetheless.

Figure 3. Stalin lauded in capitol of Crimea, 2013. Source: Информационное агентство «е-Крым» http://www.ecrimea.info

On the opening day, the Head of the International Relations department of the Mejlis went
to the exhibit with the head of the Secretariat of the Crimean Parliament.26 They called on the
organizers to take down the images, pointing out that Stalin was found guilty of the death of
millions of people, and had personally ordered the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, a criminal
act. When the organizers refused to remove the exhibit, the offended visitors dismantled the stands
themselves.
Several dozen law enforcement officers present at the rally did not intervene. The authorities’
non-response, effectively allowing residents of Crimea to battle for commemorative space
themselves, reveals official ambivalence, or perhaps uncertainty about how to effectively moderate
competing claims. As one respondent put it, “the Mayor who allowed it knew it was against the
law, but in the depths of their souls, they don’t want to see us here, they hate us. They know they
have taken other peoples’ places.”27 The exhibit took place in a time and place when Stalin enjoyed
fabulous public ratings. Levada Center polls showed that among other things, people credited
victory in the Second World War to Stalin himself, and felt that the importance of the victory far
outweighed any mistakes that were made.28 Another survey suggested that respondents saw Stalin
as one of the “most eminent figures of all time.”29
How could Stalin enjoy such a long political life? Considering there was not one but two
intensive efforts de-Stalinize the Soviet Union and facilitate political liberalization, this at first
seems remarkable. The first attempt was after the 20th Party speech by Nikita Krushchev, which
broke a silence about Stalin’s repressive regime and called for the removal of Stalin from public
spaces. The second effort was part of President Gorbachev’s reforms. Gorbachev recognized the
need for the Soviet government to give consistent financial and moral support to people who could
speak openly. Gorbachev’s de-Stalinization in the 1980s faced many of the same problems that
Krushchev’s had in the 1960s.30 Polly Jones suggests the enduring criticisms are that de-Stalinization
is a form of “de-heroization,” “falsification,” and “ideological deviation.”31 The psychology that
keeps Stalin alive aligns with the work of Freud, Derrida, and Gilroy on melancholia, helping us to
understand neostalinism as an inability to distinguish between past and present.32 Freud’s famous
delineation of melancholia from mourning is useful here.
Why wasn’t the Soviet government more successful in de-Stalinizing the country? Jones
suggests that what is blocking genuine de-Stalinization is what she calls the “mutual interference”
of memories of terror and memories of war victory.33 This is to say that there is a central, seemingly
irresolvable tension at the core of public memory: how to celebrate the Soviet victory and confront
its failures, so as to recognize the victims too? In Russia, organizations like Memorial have tried to
grapple with this issue, and their work has resonated with tens of thousands of people. This is an
especially fraught issue in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, where the problem is ethnicallycharged.
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Ontological Resonance
The outward struggle over this field of commemoration is energized by what Pierre Bourdieu
would call a habitus or durable disposition. Habitus is Bourdieu’s notion of a “system of lasting,
transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a
matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions.”34 Habitus is eminently historical: “The habitus, a
product of history, produces individual and collective practices—more history—in accordance with
the schemes generated by history.”35 We can understand this as something that is simultaneously
micro and macro-sociological: a neo- or pro-Stalinist disposition is acquired through a gradual
process of inculcation at the same time that it reflects the social conditions in which it was acquired.
A habitus is never independent of its field, what Bourdieu saw as a set of objective, historical
relations, anchored by power.36 Along similar lines, in Why Did They Kill, Hinton argues that
genocide is complex and involves a certain “ontological resonance” of local cultural knowledge
that, through a variety of factors, rises to the level of having motivational force. Like Hinton, I am
interested in the role of the patterns of being-in-the-world that are constituted over time as people
engage in social practices that ultimately come to inform acts of political violence, whether the
Khmer, Russian, or Soviet.37
To better understand the disposition informing the exhibit to rehabilitate Stalin in Crimea,
and to glean insight into ongoing antipathy towards Crimean Tatars, I interviewed a stratified
sample of respondents from the roster of the Russian Society.38 I used images of Stalin collected in
Corbescero’s research in Russia as prompts to elicit informants’ feelings about the leader.39 The first
image was a famous portrait of Stalin in uniform.

Figure 4. Portrait of Stalin by Aleksandr Laktionov. Source: Corbescero (2011).

The second was the same portrait remade as a vodka label, a third depicted the same Stalin
image writ large on a bus to celebrate the 9th of May,40 and the last image showed demonstrators each
carrying an individual Stalin portrait in a demonstration. The images elicited reactions both verbal
and visceral: respondents laughed and cried when they viewed the images. Their reactions suggest
deep emotional connections to the past and a durable disposition integrating past experiences and
present perceptions.
Neither guilt nor shame
Veneration for Stalin reverberated throughout the interviews with Russians and individuals
with mixed Russian and Ukrainian heritage but embracing a pro-Russian perspective, in Crimea.
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Presented with images of the leader, respondents used expressions like “gratitude that we are
alive,” “pride for the activities he carried out,” “empathy,” “neutral,” “accepting,” and “this is the
image of a good person,” to describe their feelings. Sometimes, the thinking had twisted logic: “If
he was such a tyrant, they would have shot him!” This respondent clearly had not thought through
how tyranny works, or the way in which it is the very tyranny of the tyrant that protects him.
One strategy that seemed to help respondents maintain a positive image of the leader was to
minimize his crimes:
How do you feel when you look at this portrait?
Respondent: How to put it into words? Empathy. Empathy that he may have overplayed his
leadership somewhat. True, he was on the cruel side.41

In a dizzying moral inversion, this respondent chose to empathize with the leader, rather than his
victims. In making the comment, this respondent used the word жестоковата, using a qualifier
to say Stalin was “on the cruel side,” shrinking massive crimes against humanity into a minor
attribute. It is only in the context of this frame of mind that the crude and ultimately inaccurate
binary between Russian patriotism and Tatar collaboration can be maintained. Officially sanctioned
amnesia of Crimean Tatar patriotism, and willed forgetting of the true level of Stalin’s crimes
perpetuate this outlook.
Minimization went hand in hand with justification. Part of the justification appeared based
on survival. Respondents hypothesized that what Stalin did was necessary for victory, and linked
their personal survival to his tactics:
How do you feel when you look at this portrait?
Respondent: Gratitude that we are alive [starting to cry] During the war, we had nothing,
nothing [explanation of things eaten to survive]. Then, after the war, my mother and I had
tea with sugar in it and I will remember that tea for the rest of my life, it made such an
impression after going for so long with so little.42

The survival of extreme deprivation understandably elicits gratitude. But if we juxtapose
the sweetness of the tea with the death toll from Stalin’s regime, the “cost” of that tea, and the
respondent’s apparently complete emotional disconnection from the magnitude of the crimes
committed in the name of her homeland, becomes evident. Due to the secrecy surrounding the
camps, the length of time that has elapsed, and the variety of means to eliminate people, an exact
death toll is difficult to calculate. However, representatives of the Soviet security services gave
the figure of 18 million.43 These facts are lost to residents of Crimea when focused on reliving and
recognizing victory. The neostalinist views expressed by non-Crimean Tatar informants suggest a
durable disposition or habitus cultivated for decades.
Justifications for deporting innocent women, children, elderly, and war-wounded residents of
Crimea were also based on the idea that the Crimean Tatars somehow deserved and, in thinking
that stretches credulity, even benefitted from the deportation. Russian justifications tend to be
dissociated from the reality of genocide. As one example:
If Stalin decided it, then that means it was necessary. And the thing is, they [Crimean Tatars]
slaughtered whole villages under the fascists. He [Stalin] cast them out, but he sent them
to a warmer climate! It was a radical measure that was correct at the time. See how spiteful
[Crimean Tatars] are to complain? They left a place where life was good.44

The place they left is of course Central Asia in the 1980s and 1990s. The sentiments expressed
here are widespread in Crimea, where the non-Crimean Tatar population often alleges that it
was “humanitarian” to deport the Tatars to a warm climate rather than exterminating them. The
acceptance of Stalin’s act emerging in these interviews reveals the affective and cognitive substrate,
the habitus informing events like the commemoration of Stalin in the center of Simferopol in 2012,
and subsequent events.
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Writing about Crimea, Rory Finnin explores the potential of poetry to shift one’s perspective
from focusing on the victor to a more empathic position in relation to victims. He explores how
two poems, one by Chichibabin and one by Nekipelov, create receptivity to perceive the mass
deportation of innocents (collaborators are believed to have been evacuated with the retreating
German army) as one of Stalin’s greatest crimes. Thinking of more tolerant and empathic segments
of the population than I spoke with, Finnin suggests that a deep reading of the poems can engage
a reader in “an act of guilt-processing conducive to committed activism.”45 Finnin thinks literary
works can prompt recognition of the complicity of Soviet citizens in the deportation. The twist is
that the process is more likely to succeed when hearing from some subject positions rather than
others: if the literary work comes from the victimized community, it is liable to evoke shame,
which is apt to prompt to avoidance. Guilt, on the other hand, tends to mobilize efforts to repair
and make amends.
It is unlikely that the affective and cognitive recognition of Stalin’s act as a crime will occur
in a Crimean society overshadowed by accusations of treason. In the 2013 fieldwork, Crimean
Tatars frequently lamented the absence of anything resembling guilt. On the contrary, informants’
statements seemed to re-sacralize46 Stalin’s authority, perhaps as a way to maintain a dominant
position in Crimean society and to reanimate the sense of victory and empowerment that came with
his rule. Articulating her response to the picture of Stalin in uniform, a Russian informant stated:
He was, is, and will always be forever a great leader. It’s like he is sacred and you can’t just
erase that from your heart. Millions of people died with his name on their lips. How can you
throw that away? It’s too late to change anything now [weeping]. I am sorry about the tears
but this is the life I lived.47

The reverence for Stalin surfacing in certain segments of the population suggested ongoing
enchantment with the leader. I asked this respondent if she thought Russian or Ukrainian residents
of Crimea who were not deported or were brought in after the war to take Crimean Tatars’ places
felt a sense of guilt.
Me personally? No! Why would I feel guilty? I understand many Russians and Ukrainians
live in Tatars homes. I myself live in a Tatar’s home! But it was vacant at the time we came.48

What this informant had disassociated from is why the home was vacant when she and her mother
arrived. As actors on a field of public remembering, these respondents used victory to rationalize
the price paid by the Crimean Tatar people.
It is not coincidental that the statements made here were uttered in the Simferopol headquarters
of the Russian Society. Respondents spoke under posters of Sergei Aksyonov who was then head
of the Russia Unity party, and was elected Prime Minister in March 2014. In other words, these
are the sentiments of some of his constituency. What I did not know in 2013 was how accurately
they foreshadowed the poor treatment of Crimean Tatars accompanying the annexation. An
anthropological approach is valuable here because it reveals the ontological resonance of Crimean
Tatars as Other, both past and present. The constructions of Crimean Tatars as traitors demonstrate
the ontological resonance of categories established in the Russian colonial period. It also
foreshadows the treatment of the Crimean Tatars following annexation. The time period following
2014 annexation was marked by a range of human rights abuses: Crimean Tatars were banned from
assembling, and threatened, imprisoned, and exiled when they dared to express dissent. Crimean
Tatars were harassed with searches and seizures in their homes, schools and mosques. Even worse,
there have been arrests, arbitrary detentions, and disappearances.49
Reflecting on this pocket of disavowal and amnesia, I asked Mustafa Cemilev what explains
the lack of empathy for Crimean Tatars. His insights suggest links between the official history and
popular sentiment, and between denial and fear.
Tatarphobia is understandable given the kind of propaganda that people were stuffed with
since the Crimean Tatars were deported. Plus, this propaganda gave them some spiritual
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peace considering they were living in our homes. There is also a fear that maybe what
happened to the Tatars will happen to them.50

The characterization of Crimean Tatars as ‘traitors who sold the motherland’ has proven impervious
to change. It provides an expedient phrase that encapsulates the ontological resonance prefiguring
Crimean Tatars as different, as guilty, and as deserving of punishment.
The challenges associated with acknowledging the genocide are not unique to Crimea: we see
very similar issues arising in other settings. Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer provide
important thinking on this topic by suggesting it was a complex defense mechanism against
memory that prevented Germans after the Second World War from experiencing feelings of guilt.51
These scholars saw the disavowal of any complicity, as well as admiration for Adolf Hitler, as the
core of a constellation of psychological symptoms including antisemitism. Psychoanalysts have
developed this line of thinking to explore how guilt and shame, as well as defenses against them,
are passed inter-generationally.52 Katharina Rothe suggests that antisemitism should be considered
a defense against empathizing with the victims in the Second World War.53
This idea presents rich possibilities for understanding dynamics in Crimea, where local
residents’ distrust of Tatars often seems based more on fiction than reality,54 and where, as Refat
Chubarov noted in front of the Crimean Parliament at the time of Consul General Andreev’s acerbic
remarks, xenophobic statements have become almost fashionable in public discourse.55 I suspect
a similar defense may be animating ongoing anti-Tatarism in Crimea. For some residents, it may
be less painful and, as Cemilev pointed out, more expedient, to valorize Stalin and disavow any
benefit from his crimes. It is far more difficult, for us all, to see events from another’s perspective.
The demonization of Crimean Tatars enables those who make allegations of depravity or treason
to elevate Stalin, fear Tatars, and avoid both guilt and shame. While some would argue against a
sociocultural use of psychoanalytic concepts, I would contend, with LaCapra, that psychoanalysis
is misunderstood as a psychology of the individual. He argues that its basic ideas actually connect
individual and society. A strict opposition is artificial—what happens to the individual is bound
up with larger social, political, and cultural processes.56
Genocide as Social Practice
There are a number of markers we can use to predict the future of the past in Crimea. I have already
described how the Crimean Tatars were able to publically commemorate the 1944 deportation
when Crimea was a part of Ukraine. If symbolic forms such as these help create and maintain
social hierarchies, the billboards announcing the commemorative event in 2013 were particularly
significant: the Crimean Tatars leveled, if only temporarily and incrementally, the commemorative
field when they publicized their past alongside the Russian one. Russian annexation brought a
very different reality to Crimea.
On one hand, Putin assured Crimean Tatar representatives who went to Moscow in May
2014 that Russia will take measures to protect Crimean Tatars and make them feel they are “full
fledged masters in their own land.”57 At the same time, Crimean Prime Minister Sergei Aksyonov
issued a decree that banned all mass gatherings in the region, effectively outlawing the 2014
commemoration of the deportation. Aksyonov used a kaleidoscope of shifting reasons, mostly
centered on national security, for his decision.58 The central square where Crimean Tatars would
have gathered was fenced off, guarded by ranks of Russian riot police as well as pro-Russia so
called self-defense units, and lined with armored personnel carriers. Avoiding conflict, Crimean
Tatars gathered in a field near their mosque in the Ak Mechet district, just outside the capitol
city of Simferopol. There, a foreshortened commemoration was carried out under the whirl of
helicopter blades.
This attempt to reorganize relations among the living by banning commemoration of the dead
was a way to begin the process of reordering community in post-annexation Crimea. Scholars of
genocide are increasingly recognizing how technologies of power such as these make genocide not
a discrete event with a beginning, middle, and end, but a social process.59 Clearly the change in
power, and the status of the peninsula as part of the Russian Federation, is reconfiguring more than
geopolitics. Leaders like Sergei Aksyonov, the Prime Minister and Head of the Supreme Council,
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and Natalia Poklonskaya, the chief prosecutor confirmed by President Putin, are now engaging
and intervening in the social process in which the living in Crimea must struggle with the war’s
legacy: how, when and who to honor?60 How, when, and who to mourn?
The current authorities’ aims within this emotional substrate are clear in light of the ample
space afforded to those wishing to commemorate Victory Day: shortly after the Crimean Tatars
were banned from mourning their loss, Putin flew to Crimea to publicly commemorate Soviet
victory over Nazi Germany in Sevastopol. Tens of thousands were allowed to flow into the
streets, and there was a parade with over 60 military vehicles and 70 aircraft.61 The contraction of
commemorative space accorded to Crimean Tatars relative to Russians (and Russian-Ukrainians)
throws into bold relief the very real imbalances of power on the peninsula that are papered over by
official pronouncements of equality before the law.
The Crimean Tatar response to being banned from carrying out their usual commemoration
brings us back to the link between genocide and historical memory. Genocide can be understood as
an act that is directly aimed at destroying ethno-national-religious diversity and altering the social
fabric of societies so as to remove unwanted traces of undesired peoples.62 This requires removing
people from any sites that would physically register social memory. Refat Chubarov described
the decree banning commemoration as an inhumane act, pointing out that the Crimean Tatars had
essentially been forbidden to mourn their ancestors. A popular TV talk show host, Lilia Budjorova,
asked rhetorically whether the authorities fully understood the meaning that the day of sorrow and
remembrance has for the Crimean Tatar people. She warned that the ban would be remembered
for many years, and can’t be compensated for by any amount of government spending on Crimean
Tatars.63 Budjurova’s comments suggest that if Aksyonov wants Crimean Tatar support to secure
his rule, the ban may actually be counterproductive to his aims:
Today, like tens of thousands of my compatriots, I have been banned from coming into the
center of my own town to stand next to those who have lost mothers, fathers, and children. I
have been banned from sharing their pain. You have taken away my right to make sure that
my grandchildren know that this tragedy must never repeat itself.64

Budjurova suggested that pain can only be reduced with empathy and understanding. With
this, she suggests more empathy would have set a very different tone to relations between
the new authorities and the indigenous Tatars. This also jives with what we know about
transitional justice. In the repertoire of effective mechanisms, the commemoration of victims
is widely considered a crucial part of reconciliation with a repressive past.65 In 2014, the new
Crimean administration headed by Aksyonov missed an opportunity to be more accepting of all
members of the society and move to a less polarized future. If the 2014 commemorations are any
indication, Crimeans will again be confined to a single narrative that elides the Crimean Tatar
experience.
In spite of assurances on the part of President Vladimir Putin and Aksyonov, what has
transpired since annexation hardly amounts to protection of the endangered group. For one
thing, there has been a rash of disappearances. In one case, a witness reported seeing two men
forced into a mini-van by men in black uniforms before they disappeared. Accounts vary but
according to Human Rights Watch there have been at least seven and potentially as many as 18
disappearances.66 Officials only acknowledge four. Searches of Crimean Tatar homes became
almost routine in during summer 2014. These were carried out in the name of “protecting” the
people. There has also been harassment of mass media outlets: self-defense battalions comprised
of men in camouflage gear and balaclavas have searched and seized broadcasting equipment at
some of Crimea’s major television channels. The systematic attempt to weaken the community
has included banning Crimean Tatar leaders from residing in Crimea among their people. First
came renowned defender of human rights, Ukrainian parliamentarian, and former Head of
the Crimean Tatar Mejlis, Mustafa Cemilev. Then came the elected President or Chairman of
the Mejlis, Refat Chubarov. In February 2015, acting Chairman of the Mejlis, Akhtem Chivgoz
was arrested and imprisoned. These practices amount to the gradual weakening of this people
through discrimination, harassment, and isolation, over time.
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Conclusion
As a result of this analysis, I hope to have contributed a deeper understanding of the Crimean
Tatar genocide. I have argued that while Crimea was part of Ukraine, it experienced a volatile and
yet fertile insurrection of previously subjugated knowledges. Public commemorations became a
lightening rod, channeling contestations over the recent and distant past. While previous gaps and
omissions were made visible, hegemonic power/knowledge frameworks continued to make one
group appear better than another.
These contestations are difficult to fully appreciate without a greater understanding of the
historical habitus of individuals in Crimea. Using fresh and now virtually unobtainable data, I
provide an ethnographic exploration into the thoughts and feelings of a subset of the non-Crimean
Tatar population, showing a durable disposition that informs interpretations of the past. This
perspective on the past gains its emotional valence in part from the categorical thinking, the
ontological resonance of imagining Crimean Tatars as a threat. Based on the interview data, it
seems Crimea lacks the cognitive and affective foundation to formulate an inclusive and civil
society. Here, the lack of both guilt and shame with respect to the 1944 deportation are significant.
If we place the Crimean Tatar experience in the framework of critical genocide studies, we
see the struggle over the past in Crimea as a technology of power that has an ongoing capacity
to restructure relations among the living. I have exposed part of the process through which the
aftermath of genocide has become attenuated. More ethnography can clarify if we are witnessing the
aftermath of genocide or its prelude. The desecration of graves, the graffiti on historic monuments,
hateful discussions on Facebook and other social media, searches of homes, mosques and schools,
and the exile and imprisonment of Crimean Tatar leaders beg that question.
The question of what will become of public memory in post-Ukrainian Crimea is an urgent
one: will Crimea be obligated to exclusively valorize the Soviet past, or will it “unhide” the human
and social costs associated with past victories? In the aftermath of genocide, the contents of
Crimean Tatar memory and history continue to be eclipsed, and neostalinism thrives. Any attempt
by the new authorities to see only one side of the historic coin will result in a flat and ultimately
unsatisfying account of the past.
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Abstract: Genocide and genocidal political processes have been used by the Russian state for decades—if not
centuries—as a technique of self-colonial rule intended to eliminate “dissident” ethnic identities. Within this
context, the historical fate of the Crimean Tatars is surely a unique one. Despite Soviet obstructions, the Crimean
Tatars eventually returned to their homeland in Crimea after suffering forced deportations and genocide at the
hands of the Soviet government. Now, 70 years after their deportation and genocide by Stalin, the Crimean Tatars
are still fighting for justice. Defined as an autonomous group in their own land under the Ukrainian government,
the Tatars found themselves in an even more precarious position when they were forcibly transplanted back into
Putin’s Russia after the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea. In a Russian state that continues to resort to the
deportation and the repression of “dissident” or otherwise politically suspect ethnic minorities, Crimean Tatars
risk not only new repressions and injustices but a continuation of genocidal political and social repression.
Keywords: Crimean Tatars, Crimea, Russia, Ukraine, genocide, foreign policy, Ukrainian War
Norman Naimark, “Ethnic Cleansing and even genocide remain a dangerous possibility.”1
Bertolt Brecht, “and the bitch that bore him is still in heat” –The Resistible Rise of Arturo Ui

These two quotations highlight for us the ensuing drama of what can only be called the second
or double dispossession of the Crimean Tatars. The Tatars’ historical fate is surely a unique one.
Having returned to their homeland in Crimea despite Soviet obstruction, and still fighting for justice,
defined by autonomy on their own land under the new Ukrainian government 70 years after their
deportation and genocide by Stalin, the Tatars have now found themselves forcibly transplanted
back into Putin’s Russia. As the two quotes above suggest, the forces that made for their first
deportation and genocide after a century and a half of encroaching Russian dispossession after
1783 are still very alive. Indeed, those forces dominate today’s Russia. Consequently the Crimean
Tatars risk not only new repressions and injustices but also a second or double dispossession, as
Naimark suggests above. And they are probably not alone in being at risk given the Russian state
chauvinism and repression that characterize today’s Russia.
This is not an excessively inflamed assessment. Neither is Naimark the only Western observer
who warns that this outcome is again possible. Carol Weaver has also written that, “the Black Sea
region is still an area where people are afraid of invasion, ethnic cleansing, and general oppression.”2
The forces that made for the first dispossession, Russian autocracy, imperial mythology, greed,
xenophobia against Muslims, and national security concerns are still quite alive in Putin’s Russia.
Indeed, they are currently thriving. A careful examination of contemporary Russian politics
quickly reveals that the Putin regime has decisively opted to restore something akin to Nicholas
I’s “official nationality,” an ideological formation that glorifies the Tsar (in this case Putin) and
Russian autocracy, the dominant role of the Russian Orthodox Church and the glorification of the
Russian nationality and culture, against what is supposed to be a decadent but also encroaching
and hostile West.3 Under that kind of regime no ethno-religious minority—especially one where
Moscow has an acute consciousness of its previous guilt in the first genocide of 1944, and where
the Tatar minority itself continues to assert its demands for historical (and economic) justice—
can be said to have favorable opportunities for asserting its consciousness and for redressing
historical crimes. Indeed, much evidence already shows that the Tatars’ demands for autonomy—
not separatism—are already being repressed along with their other human rights.4 Thus they are
already being subjected to systematic oppression and disenfranchisement, necessary though not
sufficient stages on the road to ethnic cleansing and genocide.5 And we have already seen that.6 The
evidence below shows that it is quite possible that they may not only not get their land back from

Stephen Blank, “A Double Dispossession: The Crimean Tatars After Russia’s Ukrainian War” Genocide Studies and Prevention 9, 1
(Spring 2015): 18–32. ©2015 Genocide Studies and Prevention.
http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.9.1.1271

A Double Dispossession

19

Putin’s Russia but even lose it again. At the same time, Russian history since the inception of the
Russian state up to the present, suggests that deportation and worse still remain options available
to the rulers of Russia.
Dispossession, Genocide, and Russian Statecraft
Indeed, throughout Russian history deportation has been a “constant operating factor” in Russian
statecraft, beginning with Ivan III’s takeover of Novgorod in 1478 after which he promptly
deported the entire population. Since then, mass deportations have remained part of Russia’s
“instrumentarium” of approaches to ethnic or other minorities deemed insufficiently loyal. Scholars
such as Norman Naimark have demonstrated clearly that ethnic cleansing—indeed, genocide—
has been used as a instrument for consolidating power in the Russian state, through the Tsarist
regimes, through Stalin’s time, and to the present.7 These examples throughout Russia’s history
reveal similarities in tactics and strategies with later practices, such as mass deportations to Siberia,
or into serfdom, or in the case of the Circassians to Turkey in 1863, up through Stalin’s genocidal
campaigns to the recent Chechen war and beyond.8
As the nineteenth century ended and the twentieth century began, the Russian state
continued to use mass deportations—which were always accompanied by mass death—as a way
of consolidating power in the Russian empire. This process has been termed “self colonialism”
by many observers, and created a situation where the ethnic identity of national minorities was
interpreted as a form of dissent and a political impediment against state power. This violent
repression and removal of national minorities in the Tsarist, and later the Soviet state, was the
historical and political context that gave rise to the concept of genocide.9 Raphael Lemkin, who
was born in Imperial Russia and an expert on Soviet criminal law, coined the word genocide
between 1942 and 1943, but he developed much of the theoretical concept of genocide during his
work with the League of Nations in the 1930s when he attempted to outlaw state terror that was
intended to destroy national minorities physically and culturally and remove them from a given
society.10 As Terry Martin has found, “between 1935 and 1938, at least nine Soviet nationalities—
Poles, Germans, Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Koreans, Chinese, Kurds, Iranians—were all subjected
to ethnic cleansing.”11 Indeed, he found that territorial resettlement of suspect socio- political
groups began in the 1920s and was then based on Marxist-Leninist categories of social class only
to mutate in the 1930s to a form of what amounted to ethnic cleansing.12 Furthermore, Martin also
commented that, “therefore, as with most cases of ethnic cleansing, the Soviet practice included
substantial levels of intentional murder.”13
Lemkin defined genocide as “a coordinated plan … aiming at the destruction of essential
foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.”
Lemkin explicitly referred to genocide as a form of colonial practice with two phases: “One, the
destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group; the other, the imposition of the national
pattern of the oppressor.”14 While common definitions of genocide are often very different, this
definition of genocide is useful for understanding the long-standing logic of Russian statecraft and
the current situation of the Tatar people. Scholars who use Lemkin’s definition of genocide not only
see genocide as a form of colonization or self-colonization, but a technique of state power intended
to destroy ethnic identities and create new ones within a society, to reorganize relationships within
a society to fit the political needs of the regime in power—through mass killings, but also through
acts such as terror, deportation, severe repression, the abduction of children, and so forth.15
With this historical understanding of genocide, as a technique of self-colonial rule intended to
eliminate “dissident” ethnic identities, it becomes apparent that genocide is a long-standing aspect
of the practices and policies of the Russian state. In this context some may also cite as genocide,
or genocidal, the huge fall in Chechnya’s population since 1994 as either an intended example or
unforeseen by-product of the Chechen wars after 1994. Indeed, Naimark suggests on the basis of
Russian evidence that the Chechen wars since 1994 led to the official reconsideration of programs
of mass deportation for the Chechens:
Serious evidence indicates that the Russian government developed plans to deport the
Chechens once again in the mid-1990s if they had lost the war. During the outbreak of the
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1999 war, the Chechens seemed unwilling to accept the borders cut out for them after their
return (from deportation by Stalin-author) in the 1950s; thus they carried the fighting into
Dagestan. But again evidence has turned up indicating that the huge number of Chechen
refugees in Ingushetia may be sent off to the Altai region, a solution presumably not of the
Chechens’ own choosing. There have also been episodic suggestions in the Russian press to
disperse the Chechens throughout the Siberian north and east. Ethnic cleansing and even
genocide remain a dangerous possibility.16

In our own time,
In the fall of 2006, Russian officials rounded up more than 2,300 Georgians and deported
hundreds of them in cargo planes. The operation, which hit amidst an embargo on Georgian
wine, water and fruit and vegetables, was largely seen as retaliation against former Georgian
President Mikheil Saakashvili’s administration for detaining and deporting four Russian
military officers on espionage charges. Georgia filed a complaint against Russia in Europe’s
senior human-rights court in 2007, but it took nearly seven years for the ECHR to pass
a verdict. “The Russian authorities had implemented a coordinated policy of arresting,
detaining and expelling Georgians nationals” violating international law that bars the
“collective expulsion of aliens” and “inhuman and degrading treatment,” the ECHR said in
a press release on the July 3 verdict.

The continuing resort to deportation of “dissident” or otherwise politically suspect ethnic
minorities underlines the continuity of the present regime with its Tsarist and Soviet predecessors.
Thus it is clear that as long as the Russian state remains an updated version of the patrimonial
Muscovite Tsarist regime as it is today no ethnic, religious, or other minority of any kind in Russia
is safe, and none of them can repose any confidence in Russian guarantees and promises for
Ukraine if not earlier examples have shown the value of such guarantees.18 A regime that can coldly
consider and countenance the deportation of masses of its citizens offers no safe harbour to any
one of its subjects. Neither can we truly call the subjects of this state genuine citizens in situations
where the most basic human rights count for nothing and can be abrogated at a moment’s notice
on a whim.
Moreover, although war may be the ultimate argument of kings (ultima ratio regum); violence
as such is seen by some scholars as the alpha and omega of the state. Thus Russia also can be
envisioned as what North, Weingast, and Wallis call a “limited access state.”19 Such orders are based
on personal or personalized norms of rule are weakly developed in regard to social organizations
and cannot therefore rely on third-person enforcement of legal norms or contracts. Long-term
economic growth in such states approaches zero meaning that for every period of growth there
is one of decline in per capita income. The deficiencies of such orders with respect to forming
impersonal and binding institutions also mean that they are much more permeated by violence
unless potentially violent elements are bought off by rents. As the authors note,
Systematic rent-creation through limited access [to assets-author] in a natural state is not
simply a method of lining the pockets of the dominant coalition; it is the essential means
of controlling violence. Rent creation, limits on competition and access to organizations are
central to the nature of the sate, its institutions, and the society’s performance. Limiting the
ability to form contractual organizations only to members of the coalition ties the interests
of powerful elites directly to the survival of the coalition, thus ensuring their continued
cooperation with the coalition.20

Consequently “war is the health of the state.” Violence is inherent in the nature of the state.
And the desire of Russian elites to possess the assets and lands of Crimea that hold a privileged
place in the mythology of Russian imperialism was a powerful motive for the first dispossession of
the Crimean Tatars, beginning from Catherine the Great’s takeover of the area in 1783. Although the
main motives for the current occupation were probably political rather than economic, Moscow’s
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unseemly haste in trying to annex Crimea and deny those fields to Ukraine indicates the Russian
elite’s alertness to the seizure of economic assets here, and their denial of those assets to those
living in Crimea.21
Thus the very nature of the state as such offers another necessary precondition for concern
about the Tatars’ future. Alternatively one could argue, as do Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson,
that political decisions determine the nature of any country’s economic institutions and that in
Russia’s case governments have historically decided for extractive rather than inclusive economic
and political institutions.22 Further adding to these authors’ argument we can bring in the insight,
brilliantly expressed by Alexander Etkind, based on Kliuchevsky’s observation that Russia’s
history is one of self- or internal colonization. Russian rulers related and, as Etkind observes, still
relate to their subjects as if they were the masters of a colonial government ruling over subjects
who were both alien to them and not to be regarded as autonomous human beings. Furthermore,
borrowing Hannah Arendt’s term of “imperial boomerang,” he notes that the practices of colonial
administration employed by these rulers in Russia’s peripheries were often particularly brutal,
corrupt, and then imported back into Russia’s heartland, bringing tragic and systematic misrule
to Russia’s heartlands.23 The deportation of ethnic minorities practiced by Stalin comes close to the
apogee of such brutal colonial practices. But Naimark and Weaver’s warning and the nature of the
Russian state today suggests that less catastrophic though still brutally repressive measures are
still the order of the day in Putin’s Russia.
A Return to Fascism and the Consequences for a Tatar Ethnic Minority
At the same time, and equally alarmingly, apart from its resemblances to past Russian autocracies,
Putin’s Russia increasingly resembles a fascist system like those of Mediterranean fascist regimes
from Mussolini, Vichy France, Franco’s Spain and Salazar’s Portugal to the Colonels’ Greece
of 1967-74, all of which were intrinsically notoriously hostile to the claims of minorities. Vichy
France’s slogan of Travail, Famille, and Patrie could easily apply to authoritarian Russian regimes
as Maurice Friedberg did to Brezhnev’s Russia and could be quite appropriate to Putin’s Russia.24
And this framework is intrinsically hostile to the claims of ethno-religious minorities. Already
several years ago Pierre Hassner observed that Putin “had led Russia into a harsh brand of
authoritarianism with Fascist features.”25 Hassner went on to discern the advent of fascism in the
elimination of rival power centers, the cult of Putin, the creation of official youth groups in support
of the regime to conduct, among other things the bullying of ethnic minorities, xenophobia, and
the cult of Stalin.26
Hassner is not alone in his observations as these phenomena have, if anything, become
stronger over time.27 Like other fascist states in history, Russia has lost meaningful parliaments,
independent judiciaries, and viable political parties and elections.28 Under Putin, fascist hypernationalism has created a second situation that is also common to fascist regimes through history,
especially unconsolidated fascist regimes, where ethnic Russian nationals in neighboring countries
are called upon as potential fifth columns that appeal to Russia for brotherly assistance and whom
Russia calls upon in defense of the motherland.29 Indeed to the extent that the current regime
increasingly resembles those of the past, not lest Stalin’s, it clearly partakes of similar attributes,
like the glorification of Russian culture and of the autocrat. And insightful observers like Joseph
Schumpeter already realized that it was converging on fascism already in the 1940s when the initial
Stalinist deportations of Crimean Tatars occurred.30
Beginning in the spring of 1944, the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs arrested en mass
Tatar Muslims in Crimea on the charge of conspiring with Hitler during WWII.31 Over 180,000
Crimean Tatars were deported to various parts of the USSR in overcrowded cattle trains, where
they died of starvation, disease, and exposure to the cold. They starved to death in labor camps,
collective farms, or forced-labor factories. Within two years, just under half of the exiled Tatars
were dead, and the Crimean population decimated. The deportations were explicitly intended to
remove a national minority from Crimea that was resisting Stalinist rule, in order to bring Crimea
territory under the control of Moscow, while spreading the surviving Tatars across the USSR to
force their ethnic assimilation and the ensure the destruction of their “troublesome” ethno-national
group.32
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Over the last half a century, the Crimean Tatars have slowly begun to demand justice and
restitution. This mobilization was aided with the break up of the Soviet Union, when Crimea
became part of an independent Ukraine. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014, and the
annexation of Crimea in March, Putin inherited a Tatar population in Crimea that believed the
Russian state had committed war crimes and genocide against them, and had been demanding
justice. Beyond these factors of historical Russia autocracy, imperialism, and chauvinism—which
are all preconditions of ethnic animosity and regime suspicion over the Tatars’ claim for justice—
there are at least two other major considerations why the Crimean Tatars and other minorities, like
Muslims in the North Caucasus, are again at risk in Putin’s neo-Tsarist, if not neo-Soviet, or even
Fascist Russia. First, Putin and his team have evidently concluded that Russia can only be governed
and secure if it is an empire, a conclusion entailing the destruction of its neighbors’ sovereignty and
integrity. In such a form, Russia can only survive as a militarizing or militarized fascist-like state,
in a condition of permanent conflict with its neighbors and interlocutors. This is because the state
of war that Russia is inciting in world affairs is the external manifestation of its governing logic of
empire that necessarily implies an equal state of internal war against all forms of dissent, ethnic
or otherwise, inside Russia. Under such conditions the existence of a vocal ethnic minority—in a
strategically sensitive area, and one that has connections with foreign governments—immediately
falls under intensified state suspicion and scrutiny.
Obviously the belief that Russia can only survive as an empire at others’ expense means war
or at least permanent conflict both at home and abroad, especially given the nature of the Russian
state. Apart from being a facsimile of similar Hitler speeches, Putin’s speech to the Duma on March
18, 2014, also constituted a landmine against the sovereignty of every state from Poland to Central
Asia.33 Putin here reiterated the right to send the Russian army abroad to defend Russian “citizens,”
demonstrating conclusively that Russia respects neither these governments’ sovereignty nor their
territorial integrity and is prepared to destroy both in the name of its great power interests.34 And
his subsequent call for self-determination of Russians abroad while repressing self-determination
at home reiterated that point.35 Certainly that latter call, especially when Russians believe that
Crimea is “predestined” to be part of a revived Russian empire, or has “always been” Russian land,
strongly militates against any forbearance for the Crimean Tatars or for other minorities within
the Russian Federation. Moreover, the prohibition on domestic calls for self-determination means
that any advocacy by the Crimean Tatars for their rights that include even rights short of selfdetermination stands at risk of being criminalized and subjecting its authors to harsh repression.36
The foregoing autocratic, repressive, even militarized nature of the state are all preconditions
for repression of any future Tatar demands for justice, whatever forms they might take. But what
adds to the dangers facing the Crimean Tatars is the foreign policy aspect of their situation, living in
and around a strategic area that is undergoing conflict if not war, and having foreign contacts in a
major state, Turkey. As history, especially in the Balkans and Black Sea area, suggests these factors
powerfully reinforce ethnic suspicion by governments towards ethnic or religious minorities, and
for state-sponsored or organized violence against them.37 In addition to these points the struggle
over regional security issues in “the former Soviet sphere” are among the most intractable conflicts
between Russia and the West in contemporary international relations. Thus the prominent Russian
analyst, Sergei Karaganov, Director of the prestigious Council on Defense and Foreign Policy
(SVOP), reportedly told a conference in Germany in 2009 that the “core of all differences between
the West and Russia is the question of whose sphere of influence the Soviet successor states fall
into.”38
In this context both historians and political scientists have focused on the connection between
exogenous geopolitical conditions and rivalries on the one hand, and the internal dynamics of
the formation of ethno-religious and nationalist movements throughout the Black Sea region as
interactive processes that give rise to ethnic strife and conflict. If one adds to this mix the vicissitudes
of post-Soviet state-building in the former Soviet republics, a process that clearly has not run its
course, it becomes clear that considerations of security will exercise a profound importance in
framing Russian policy and relations towards groups like the Crimean Tatars.39 In the contemporary
Black Sea region this interaction is likely to be particularly stressful on all concerned because the
region actually functions as a kind of laboratory for the study of the so-called “new wars.”40 Yet
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at the same time it also serves as a laboratory for the tensions between Russia and its Western
interlocutors over a vast agenda including the resolution of ethnopolitical conflicts in the former
Soviet Union, energy rivalries, the modalities of international intervention, and missile defense.
Neither does this list exhaust all the issues at stake in the East-West agenda.
Given the importance of “national security” for many actors in the overall Black Sea region
and the close links between ethno-national development, the tensions of state building, and
international geopolitical rivalries it is not surprising that some mélange of these considerations
have figured in past Russian and Turkish examples of ethnic cleansing, deportation, and even
genocide. Indeed, as Michael Reynolds and Terry Martin, to name only two scholars, have found,
the construction of a multinational state in both Tsarist and Soviet Russia and the Young Turks’
Turkey intimately connected ethnic to foreign policy issues.41 As Martin observes,
It was the Soviet leadership’s strong commitment to forming a multinational state, rather
than any hostility to ethnic identities, that politicized ethnicity by linking it to the formation
of administrative territories, land possession, and resettlement. This domestic nationalities
policy was then further linked to Soviet foreign policy goals. In order to explore this linkage,
I will introduce two further Bolshevik concepts—Soviet xenophobia and the Piedmont
Principle and show how they led to the formation of a novel Soviet administrative territory:
the border regions. By Soviet xenophobia, I mean simply the exaggerated Soviet fear of
foreign influence and foreign contamination. I absolutely do not mean traditional Russian
xenophobia. Soviet xenophobia was ideological, not ethnic. It was spurred by an ideological
hatred and suspicion of foreign capitalist governments, not the national hatred of nonRussians. Foreign intervention during the civil war did not create Soviet xenophobia. It
merely confirmed a pre-existing ideological inclination. Soviet xenophobia was, however,
given a national focus by ongoing low-intensity guerrilla warfare and sporadic partisan
uprisings along the entire Soviet frontier. Whereas foreign military intervention had been
brief and discrete, guerrilla warfare involved ongoing secretive border crossings and relied
on an ambiguous combination of foreign and domestic support.42

We can, in fact, point to “lessons learned” from the history of the overall area as its states
and people have increasingly become independent political actors in world history or have
striven to achieve that status. Historians and political scientists alike have recently re-emphasized
the fact that the idea of establishing a congruence between ethnic and political boundaries that
is a distinguishing feature of nationalism wherever it occurs came to the Black Sea and Eastern
Europe from the West. Therefore the impetus towards ethnic and political homogenization that
characterizes regimes across Eastern Europe and not just Russia has a powerful European strategicpolitical logic behind it.43
In the case of the Crimean Tatars, the special connection between them and Turkey—to
which many Tatars have fled over the centuries from Russian misrule and oppression—has only
enhanced their condition of being regarded as a potentially alien ethno-religious “fifth column” in
Crimea. In the Soviet Union and in contemporary Russia where every conceivable issue has been
or is being “securitized,” this state of being regarded ab initio as a suspect people who oppose the
annexation of Crimea puts the Tatars at enhanced risk in conditions of intensified geopolitical
rivalry between Russia and Turkey, or between Russia and the West as now appears to be taking
shape. This securitization process typifies the Putin regime’s approach to Russian national security
issues because it is all-embracing. As Sergei Rogov, Director of the USA and Canada Institute,
observed, “Over here, when the Russian Federation’s Security Council was set up, we adopted an
all-embracing definition of security that stipulated the security of the individual, society, and state
from external and internal threats in all spheres of vital activity.”44
And this process, in the absence of democratic reform to establish true democratic controls
over the security sector has allowed the military and the government to extend the securitization
process and ultimately allowed the military to concern itself with defining non-military as well
as military threats. Political actors who first politicize an issue as a threat to security and then
securitize it aim to persuade relevant audiences, in this case, the political and military elite, that the
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issue in question poses an “existential threat to the country, either to its territory, the integrity of
the state, its group identity, its environment, or its economic interests.”45
Securitization thus denotes political actors’ efforts, most often, though not exclusively,
through speech or discourse, to take an issue out of normal politics and bring it into the realm of
security. This process subordinates the issue to the competence of security organs, removes it from
the public realm, substitutes secret bureaucratic decisions for open politics, and often contravenes
human or civil rights.46
The aim of a “securitizing move” is typically to enable “emergency measures” that can
secure the survival of a referent object. If and when the content of the security “speech act”
is acknowledged as legitimate by a (significant) “audience” the issue in question has become
successfully “securitized.” It has been moved out of the sphere of “normal politics” and into
the sphere of “emergency politics;” where it can be dealt with in an urgent manner and with
fewer formal and informal restrains.47

Actors make “securitizing moves” not just to place an item on the agenda, but also to claim
that their agency alone has the capability either to define or resolve the problem or to implement
the appropriate solution. And as Reynolds and Martin suggest, the Crimean Tatars, among others
have been the victim of such an outlook in Soviet times when ethnic minority communities on
the border or in strategic areas came under suspicion from Moscow because of their connections
abroad or proximity to key foreign areas, in this case the Black Sea.48 Indeed, as Naimark points
out the deportations in the Crimea of 1944 that caught the Tatars in their dragnet were aimed
at deporting every non-Slavic group in the area, perhaps as Reynolds suggests, in anticipation
of Stalin’s subsequent geopolitical demands upon Turkey. Indeed, Stalin apparently aimed at
obliterating those Crimean nationalities’ living memory, culture, and history.49
This confluence of the nature of governance of the Russian state with geostrategic imperatives
places the Crimean Tatars at increased risk. Historically and today, especially in the Russian empire
where they lived until 1991 and where they are once again forcibly enclosed, the Crimean Tatars
may be defined as a “non-core group” (ethno-religious or ethnic minority) that possess an external
connection or involvement, particularly with Turkey. Accordingly Harris Mylonas argues that,
I posit that this external involvement, whether clandestine, covert. Or overt, drives not only
the mobilization and politicization of the no-core group’s identity, but also the host state’s
perception of the non-core group and the state’s nation-building policies toward that group.
Hence the foreign policy goals of the host state and its interstate relations with external
powers drive a host state’s choices of nation-building policies towards noon-core groups.50

Mylonas also argues that consolidated democracies can afford to accommodate rather than exclude,
repress, or attack non-core groups, e.g. the Crimean Tatars, because they are members of extended
alliances that reduce their perception of threat and offer them resources with which to deal with
such challenges.51 Russia lacks such an alliance system and can hardly be called a consolidated
democracy as conversely it is more likely to incline towards repressive or even exclusionary policies
towards non-core groups. In addition, non-core groups whose homeland lies outside the host state
(arguably Crimea is actually part of Ukraine which formally it remains part of) are more likely to
become ethnically mobilized against the host state.52
Other factors outlined by Mylonas also argue for the enhanced likelihood of Russian
repression or exclusion of the Tatars. First, given the nature of the Russian state, a democratically
driven policy of accommodation seems almost inconceivable. Moreover, given the inherently
coercive predisposition of the state as suggested by Douglas North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry
Weingast in their reflections on the inherent presence of violence in limited access states, even a
policy of assimilation primarily utilizing state-driven socioeconomic tools will come to be seen
as a coercive forceful, even violent one even if it is not actually coercive. In addition, Mylonas
also argues that states pursuing revisionist goals in international affairs like Russia are more
likely to pursue exclusionary policies to prevent a “fifth column” at home but these policies are
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inherently risky and could even lead to war. Georgia in 2006-08 and Ukraine in 2014 both confirm
this insight.53
The New Repression
The forcible return to Russian rule is utterly at odds with the desires of the Crimean Tatars and
their leadership expressed in their Majlis (Legislative Council). As the veteran Tatar leader Mustafa
Dzhemilyev has said, they want only autonomy within Ukraine, an insight based on the clear
recognition that only in a democratic Ukraine— which has now become possible, especially in
the light of planned reforms to decentralize Ukraine’s administration—is there any hope for the
Tatars to obtain any redress of their past grievances.54 Not surprisingly they therefore opposed
the Russian annexation form the start. Indeed, the Tatar leader, Ilmi Umerov, head of the State
Administration in Bakhchysarai in the Crimea, even called the March 2014 and annexation illegal
(which they plainly are) and threatened an underground partisan movement.55
But even if that had not been their consistent position, it is quite unlikely, given current Russian
politics, that they would encounter anything but repression from Moscow. First of all, Russia is still
unwilling to face up to the truth of the Stalinist period as a whole, let alone the many deportations
including that of the Crimean Tatars. Thus the Russian government has blocked release of a film
describing the horrors of the Chechen deportation earlier in 1944.56 Accordingly it is no surprise
that repression and the visible unwillingness to fulfill guarantees and promises made to them came
very quickly. For example, before the March 2014 referendum in Crimea the local authorities led by
Moscow’s satrap, Sergei Aksyonov, the “Acting Governor,” promised them national quotas in the
government only to revoke those promises.57 On March 19, 2014 Crimean Deputy Prime Minister
Rustam Temirgaliyev told the Russian media that the new Crimean Parliament wanted the Tatars
to relocate. He said Moscow was ready to pay and help with the moves.58 Two weeks later the
Crimean Parliament repudiated the deal on national quotas cited above as well as concurrent
promises on the Tatars having the right to national and cultural autonomy.59
Originally Russia, during March 2014, made many overtures to the Crimean Tatars:
After Refat Chubarov, chairman of the Crimean Tatar Majlis, called on the Crimean Tatars
and other residents of Crimea to boycott the referendum, the Crimean parliament on March
11th adopted a declaration “On guarantees for the restoration of rights of the Crimean Tatar
people.” The declaration stated that in a future Crimean constitution, the Crimean Tatar
language will be given the status of official language (together with Russian and Ukrainian),
that in executive organs of state power in Crimea at least 20 percent of positions will be
reserved for Crimean Tatars, that Crimean Tatar self-government organs, the Kurultai and
the Majlis, will be officially recognized, and that financial assistance, as well as assistance for
the restoration of historical monuments and native language education, will be provided.
Mustafa Dzhemilyev, the former head of the Majlis and the informal leader of the Crimean
Tatars, was also invited to Russia, officially by the president of Tatarstan. While there, Vladimir
Putin spoke with Dzhemilyev on the phone and reportedly promised “to do everything”
to protect Crimean Tatars from any possible aggression. Several official delegations from
Tatarstan also visited Crimea and offered material assistance to the Crimea Tatars, many of
whom still lack adequate housing after returning from places of deportation.60

But clearly these were purely tactical gestures and they evoked no support from the Crimean
Tatars. By April both local and central indications were clear. The new Crimean constitution
proclaimed Crimea “united and indivisible” did not recognize the Crimean Tatars as an
“indigenous people” of Crimea and did not give them the right to self-determination or recognize
the Majlis or other self-governing bodies. Thus they got no autonomy at all.61 The Constitution
gave the Tatars Russian citizenship entailing the right to own land and recognized their language
as one of Crimea’s official languages, but also reduced the total number of Parliamentary seats
form 100 to 75, raised the number of single-seat constituencies to 75 percent, and effectively barred
the Majlis from fielding party lists because only national, not local or ethnic, parties can compete
in Russian elections.62
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Moscow also is trying to eliminate the Tatars’ pro-Ukrainian Majlis leadership and split the
Tatars’ religious administration by creating its own pro-Moscow authorities, both of them being
long-standing Muscovite, Tsarist, and Soviet tactics.63 At the same time Russia seeks to eradicate
any Crimean Tatar Islamist groups and to use its designated strongman in Chechnya, Ramzan
Kadyrov, to help control the Tatars.64 By late April Moscow and the Crimean authorities exiled
Dzhemilyev from Crimea. They threatened him and anyone demonstrating on behalf of Crimean
Tatar autonomy in Ukraine with the full weight of repression under Russian law.65
Russian repressions did not only occur in this domain. Beyond exiling Tatar leaders, attempting
to deprive them of a political voice and to subordinate them wholly to Moscow while breaking
earlier pledges, Russian and Crimean authorities also began arresting or worse dissidents, of course
not only Tatars. A series of so called “disappearances” began in mid-March finally leading the
Crimean Muftiate also known as the Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) to speak out against the
authorities.66 Moscow, in classic Russian imperialist style, also simultaneously sought to break the
ties between the Mufti and the MSD on the one hand and the Majlis on the other. Russian authorities
warned that he MSD was “in danger” because of those links to the anti-Russian and anti-Orthodox
Majlis.67 By the end of June the same official who made this warning, Roman Silantyev a notorious
anti-Muslim, warned that the FSB planned to liquidate “radical Islamic organizations in Crimea.”
Since Silantyev defines as extremist anyone who the authorities do not like and has repeatedly
threatened the MSD, this new warning could clearly presage a full-scale offensive on the MSD and
the Crimean Tatars.68 Finally in early July the Crimean authorities barred Refat Chubarov, leader of
the Majlis, from entering “Russian territory” because of his “activities to incite interethnic hatred.”
In classic Soviet style Crimean authorities said that Chubarov’s activities showed he wanted to
be exiled from Crimea and deliberately aimed for this outcome.69 In the light of Putin’s warning
that “none of us can allow the Crimean Tatar people to become a bargaining chip in disputes—
especially in disputes between Russia and Ukraine,” it is clear that they can hope for nothing from
either Moscow or the local authorities.70 Likewise the UN High Commissioner for human rights,
Navi Pillay, stated that “Tatars faced numerous problems including physical harassment, fear of
religious persecution and internal displacement.” 71 And the UN simultaneously released a report
attesting to those risks.
Perhaps most dangerously, it already appears that policies are in train to seize the Tatars’ land
on which they are living. As Eric Lohr has written,
The Crimean Tatars who have returned from exile in the past 25 years have for the most part
not acquired legal title to the properties and land that they have been using. Part of this was
a result of the murky status of property after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Ukrainian
authorities failed to resolve the question, and now it stands as a threatening problem for
the Tatars. Crimean Deputy Prime Minister Rustam Temirgaliyev recently announced that
the government would ask Tatars to vacate “illegally occupied land.” This would threaten
the status of many of the Tatars, most of whom settled in makeshift homes on unauthorized
property when they returned from exile.72

Temirgaliyev essentially offered transfers of the Crimean Tatars to other lands but clearly is not
interested in resolving claims to the lands from which they were dispossessed in 1944.73 Neither
can anyone place any credence in his “promises” to resettle the Tatars on suitable lands elsewhere
in Crimea.
By June Russia’s Ministry of Development was preparing legislation allowing Moscow to
seize significant amounts of land in Crimea on an accelerated basis ostensibly to promote economic
development along the same lines Moscow used to seize lands in and around Sochi before the
Winter Olympics. This economic development would likely take the form of casinos to reduce the
costs of annexation by effectively imposing a hidden tax through that sector. Whatever Moscow’s
motives might be,
The use of the government’s power of eminent domain to seize land and then “quietly”
privatized it can be sued to change the face of Crimea. It is not difficult to imagine that such
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new powers will be used for Russians with close ties to Moscow and against groups like the
Crimean Tatars which oppose the annexation.74

Other analyses confirm that due to the incomplete nature of claims of title to land in Crimea
“Russian officials will deal with the law much as the Kremlin did with Ukraine’s sovereign borders
– as they choose.”75
Since the spring of 2014 repression of Crimean Tatar media has continued through processes
whereby Moscow has placed them under political and financial pressure.76 Similarly, new arrests
of leading Crimean personalities, e.g. Akhtem Chyhoz, Deputy Head of the Mejlis, and expulsions
from Crimea of Dzhemilev and Chubarov have taken place.77 According to Michael Birnbaum of
the Washington Post, as of November 2014,
Russian security forces have searched the homes of leaders of the Muslim minority group
for banned books. Young Tatar men have been kidnapped off Crimean streets. Tatar activists
are sitting in jail. A few have been killed. Some Tatars say they now fear to venture out of
their houses. Eight months after Russia annexed the Black Sea resort region of Crimea, the
descendants of the group that ruled the peninsula for centuries say they fear a new effort to
divide them. Their top leaders are in exile in Kiev. Those who remain say the new Russian
authorities in Crimea have spent more time investigating them than the kidnappings.
Analysts say Russian security services appear to be employing tactics they have used against
Islamist insurgencies within their borders. The difference in Crimea, Tatar leaders say, is
that there is no insurgency. But they fear that the tough approach may radicalize the most
disaffected members of their community.78

Finally, in January 2015, Moscow announced that the trial of Dzhemilev’s imprisoned son, Khaizer
Dzhemilev, is about to take place despite this being a violation of the provisions of the European
Court of Human Rights.79
These repressions, as Birnbaum suggests, are hallmarks of classic Russian repressions of the
past and—taken in tandem with the ever more overt participation of the Russian military and
government in the invasion of Ukraine, and in the commission of what can only be described as
acts of terrorism against the local population there—can only arouse the deepest fears that if Russia
can continue to act with impunity, the outcome could follow the sanguinary traditions of Russian
history.
Turkey and the Chances for Resistance
Under the circumstances and given the historical connection between the Crimean Tatars and
Turkey it is no surprise that the Tatars, increasingly frustrated by this religious, economic, and
political repression, as well as the efforts to impose economic and political pressures upon the
Tatars’ media, have appealed to Turkey and even Azerbaijan for relief and support.80 Turkey’s
position on the annexation of Crimea and the overall Ukrainian crisis has been evolving steadily
towards greater resistance and opposition to Moscow’s actions and claims. Cemil Cicek, Speaker
of Turkey’s Parliament, recently denounced the annexation of Crimea as unacceptable and that
Turkey would not recognize it and instead give priority to the support of the Tatars.81 Similarly
when the crisis began Prime Minister Erdogan said he had urged Putin to respect the rights of the
Tatars.82 In early July Foreign Minister Akhmet Davutoglu received Dzhemilyev and Chubarov,
denounced the barriers to their returning to Crimea, and stated that Turkey was not wavering
in its support for the Crimean Tatars despite its close economic and political ties with Russia.83
Indeed, Turkey has now banned any ship form its harbors that declares that they have passed
through a Crimean port identified as part of the Russian Federation, or that they are from those
ports.84
Nevertheless, both Ankara and Baku have multiple reasons for caution in defending the
Crimean Tatars as more overt representations on their behalf would not only jeopardize their own
ties to Moscow but also go far to confirm the visible suspicions of both local and central authorities
in Crimea and Russia that the Tatars are a seditious “fifth column” with ties to Turkey and plotting
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to embroil Turkey and Azerbaijan in Russia’s internal affairs. The many signs of this mentality of
suspicion, coupled with the fact that for twenty years Russian nationalism has been systematically
directed against Muslims, can only add to the angers facing the Crimean Tatars.85
Conclusion
Thus we have, in a sense, returned full circle to the past whereby repression at home begets
suspicions not only of disloyalty but of active connivance with foreign powers in anti-Russian (or
anti-Soviet) activities that only further add to the motives of imperial greed, concentration of power,
and chauvinism to facilitate policies ending in deportation. But it is not only the foreign dimensions
of Russian nationality policies that evoke the past. The overall domestic and nationality policies
of the Russian regime betray an addiction to the past disasters of Russian history, suggesting that
in some sense Russia is what Claude Levi-Strauss called a frozen culture. The return of official
nationality and the mounting evidence of officially inspired ethnic hatreds and toleration for
locally generated manifestations of these emotions also evoke previous manifestations of these
phenomena throughout the entire span of Russian history.
We may fairly say that today no institutional, moral, or legal barriers other than expediency
and potential fear of the consequences stand between the Kremlin and the orchestration of another
deportation of an ethnic or other minority that is deemed to be a threat to the government. But
today, unlike in the past, Muslims are now considered as insurgents all over the world, including
the North Caucasus. There are plenty of signs that Russian repression could generate an Islamic
or other terrorist movement among Crimean Tatars that could ultimately connect with those in
the North Caucasus. And there is no reason to believe that the Kremlin is not concerned that this
could come about.86 Even before this crisis there was a high potential for violence in Crimea and
analysts who studied it worried that the conventional wisdom was that Russia could annex it and
was thinking of doing so whenever that decision suited it.87 Yet the potential for ethnic violence has
been there from 1991 and Russian policies are clearly, just as in the North Caucasus, stimulating
that potential outcome. Pace Naimark and Brecht, the forces that made for past deportations could
come again, and not only against the Crimean Tatars for it is clear that overall nationality policy
is moving towards ever stricter centralization, repression, chauvinism, etc. as in the past. But this
time the spirit of resistance pervades the Muslim world and they will fight back. Moscow may
believe, as St. Petersburg did a century ago, that it could incite ethnic antagonisms in the Black Sea
basin and benefit from doing so even at the cost of war.88 But that illusion was brutally shattered in
the First World War and an equally delusional drive to restore the empire to save Putinism could
trigger one or more new theaters in the global war on terror. Right now Putin seems to resemble
Nicholas I in his policies, not least in the return of official nationality.89 But as one Russian historian
observed afterwards, all that one could say about Nicholas I’s reign was that “it all was a mistake.”
That mistake ended in the Crimean war that set Russia on the path of failed renewals and abortive
efforts to coerce and even deport Russia’s ethnic minorities, leading to its ultimate destruction
under the ill-fated and equally, albeit differently, misguided Nicholas II. If Russia continues as it is
going towards the Crimean Tatars and the other ethnic minorities of Russia, Putin might yet come
to be seen not as the heir of the “iron Tsar” but of his feckless great-grandson.
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Abstract: The article begins with a description of the deportation of Crimean Tatars. It provides a brief
review of the German Occupation of Crimea, examines the negative images of Crimean Tatars published
in Soviet newspapers between 1941-1943 and the explicit rationale given by the Soviet authorities for the
deportation of Crimean Tatars, and reviews the mitigation of hostilities against Tatars in the years following
the war. The article continues with accounts of the attempts to repatriate Crimean Tatars after 1989 and
the discriminative policies against the returning people. The conclusion of the article describes current
hardships experienced by Tatars in occupied Crimea.
Keywords: Crimean Tatars, Soviet Union, Russia, Stalin, Second World War
The last seventy years have presented Crimean Tatars with profound challenges and enormous
hardship. They suffered greatly at the hands of the Soviet government during their deportation of
1944 and their return in the late 1980s, and they are being discriminated against by the Russian
Government following the annexation of Crimea in 2014. After the Soviets recaptured Ukraine
from the Wehrmacht in 1944, Crimean Tatars were deported to Central Asia based on accusations
of willingly supporting the enemy, killing innocent Ukrainian civilians, and conspiring to establish
a Crimean Tatar republic under German rule. The presentation of this group as traitors and enemies
of the Soviet people was used as a foundation for discriminative policies during their return to
Crimea. Now they are facing oppressive measures implemented by the Russian government in
Crimea, which are being justified based on accusations of extremism and radicalism.
In order to understand the structures and dynamics of the current identity-based conflict in
Crimea that has led to the brutal oppression of Crimean Tatars after the Russian annexation of
Crimea in 2014, it is necessary to understand the political and social legacies of Stalinist repression,
and the impact of that repression on the development of the systems of identity for Crimean
Tatars and Russians over the last fifty years. The case study presented in this paper covers a vastly
understudied area in the literature of Ukrainian studies, Russian studies, and genocide studies,
which has theoretical and practical implications for our understanding of conflict and identity in
post-Soviet Russia, and the on-going conflict in Ukraine.
The analysis in this article represents a clear case of categorical violence. Johan Galtung
developed the concepts of direct, cultural, and structural violence.1 While direct violence describes
open cases of aggression, structural violence is understood as injustice and exploitation built into a
social system of inequalities, and cultural violence is based on the prevailing attitudes and beliefs
in the society. This article shows that Crimean Tatars were victims of all three forms of violence
described by Galtung. They were deported by the Stalinist regime, were harassed upon their return
to Crimea in 1990s and brutally beaten and killed during the current occupation regime in Crimea.
The political structures of Soviet Union and current Putin’s Russia supported these aggressive
policies, while a culture of paternalism and submission to power justified violent actions.
This article states that the prevailing form of violence against Crimean Tatars was categorical
violence. This violence is based on the social category (ethnic, religious, regional, national, gender,
age, etc) that is ascribed to a particular group. It can be related to existing identities of this group,
or it can be created by the authority or group in power. Because of belonging to a specific social
category, a particular group can be denied some rights or access to resources and power (economic
and political discrimination), to basic needs, including food (famine), territory (deportation), or
right to exist (genocide). Members of a particular social group can experience exceptional hardship
only because of their membership in this group that is perceived as treacherous, rebellious, or just
secondary.
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Both social category as a perception of a group by others, and social identity as a membership
in a group, are products of a process of boarder formation, drawing distinctions between an
“us” and a “them.”2 The constitution of social actors is often shaped through the drawing and
redrawing of social boundaries, as well as the invention and borrowing of the boundaries, and
encounters between previously distinct and competing networks of social actors, which can all lead
to the formation of categories of social actors.3 Communities often recognize clear boundaries that
represent distinctive ways of life, and may mobilize themselves by perceiving these boundaries
as endangered by a threat from outside.4 In such a way, the mobilization of conflicting parties
often accompanies an increased clarity of group boundaries amongst the individuals in conflict.5
These contracted and reconstructed social boundaries help justify categorical violence toward
specific groups that are placed outside of the boundary of powerful groups. This article shows how
Crimean Tatars were placed outside the boundary of loyal Soviet people during Soviet Union, and
outside the boundary of loyal Crimean residents during the current Russian occupation of Crimea.
They became victims of categorical violence that targeted this specific ethnic group for decades.
The paper begins with a description of the deportation of Crimean Tatars, and provides a brief
review of the German Occupation of Crimea in order to provide the historical context necessary
for examining how Soviet propaganda participated in clarifying the group identify of the Crimean
Tatars as an other outside the boundaries of Soviet identity. The case study presents an account
of the negative images of Crimean Tatars published in Soviet newspapers between 1941-1943, and
shows how these portrayals accompanied the explicit rationale given by the Soviet authorities for
the deportation of Crimean Tatars.
After outlining the relevant historical context of the Soviet repression of Crimean Tatars and
the identity boundaries that were concretized after the Second World War, the paper proceeds to
review the mitigation of hostilities against Tatars in the years following the war in order to show how
the boundaries between Crimean Tatars’ and Soviet identities were redrawn to present Crimean
Tatars as being insiders, or outsiders, depending on changing political and social contexts. The
argument, for example, shows that during the German occupation of Crimea, Soviet propaganda
presented the Crimean Tatars as little brothers, mobilizing popular support for the Crimean Tatars
by positioning Tatar identity with the family of the Soviet nation. However, when the political
demands of the Soviet government shifted after the Second World War, Soviet newspapers began
presenting the Crimean Tatars as traitors to the USSR, who were a different, dangerous national
group and had to be removed.
The terms national, nation, and nationality in English often denote a group of people united by
common descent, history, or culture who form a political social body, oftentimes a state. Russian
society and Soviet politics, however, has a long history of conceptualizing nations and nationalities
in different terms, which has a great deal of overlap with the concept of ethnicity. Beginning around
the 1930s, the boundaries of national identities in the USSR were often delineated ideologically. As
the socialist regimes collapsed and central authority fragmented after the fall of the Berlin Wall,
social categorization based on ideological models became irrelevant. The creation of the new
independent states, the development of concepts of national identity, the rise of ethnic autonomies
and enlargement of the European Community lead to changes in the system of identity. The
movement from totalitarianism to political pluralism after 1989 was connected to the construction
of a state and the reshaping of national identities. Most post-Soviet national identities are now
political and are defined by the state. In this post-Soviet space, when a country declared itself a
“national state,” it led to an ethnic definition of “nationality.”6
The paper continues with accounts of the attempts to repatriate Crimean Tatars after 1989 and
the discriminative policies against the returning people. The main contention is that the categories
of ethno-national social identity that are structuring the current conflict Crimea were concretized by
the fall of the USSR. In the 1990s, the population of Crimea was nearly 2.5 million, with 64 percent
of the population identifying themselves as ethnic Russians, 23 percent as Ukrainians, 10 percent as
Crimean Tatars, and 3 percent as Byelorussians, Armenians, Greeks, Germans, Jews, and others. This
meant that Crimea was the only large-scale administrative-territorial district in Ukraine where the
ethnic majority consisted of ethnic Russians. At the same time, the people who identified themselves
as ethnic Crimean Tatars considered Crimea as the motherland that formed their ethnic group.
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Because of the history of Soviet repression against Tatars and Muslims, Crimean Tatars viewed
ethnic Russians as threats to their security, despite the fact that the Russians living in Crimea in
1989 were not responsible for committing Soviet atrocities. The Crimea of the 1990s, therefore,
had substantial potential for ethnopolitical violence. 7 It is through this context that the current
political discourse of Crimean Tatars as anti-Russian radical extremists, which is being employed
by the Russian government in Crimea to justify repression of the Crimean Tatars, was forged. As
the case study demonstrates, this dynamic of presenting Crimean Tatars as extremist nationals was
firmly established through the context of Soviet polices. It was very common for proponents of the
USSR, and for Soviet propaganda, to portray the USSR as a fatherland for all people residing in
its territory regardless of their ethnic or national identity. This made the Crimean Tatar desire to
return to a designated homeland after their deportation seem like a lack of patriotism, so that the
very act of Tatars pursuing repatriation (among other rights) was viewed as the work of extremist
nationals.8
The conclusion of the article describes current hardships experienced by Tatars in occupied
Crimea. These hardships grew out of the resentment amongst ethnic Russians living in Crimea
against the resettlement of Crimean Tatars, which produced conflicts over land, property, and
citizenship. That Crimean Tatars received state donations to fund their resettlement increased
negative attitudes towards Crimean Tatars amongst ethnic Russians, who had experienced
economic deprivations following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Crimean Tatars considered
it legitimate to reclaim the property, possessions, and national-territorial autonomy that they had
been deprived of when they were deported from Crimea by the Soviet authorities. This dynamic
legitimized Russian irredentist autonomy claims after 1989, with Russians perceiving themselves as
being marginalized by Crimean Tatars even though ethnic Russians had far better access to jobs and
education. Crimean Tatar protestations against discrimination in housing, employment, education,
and politics provoked ethnic Russians into feeling threatened by a Crimean Tatar minority. Hence,
the goals of Russians and Crimean Tatars were incompatible with the formation of a common
national identity in post-Soviet Crimea in Ukraine.9 But, more importantly for understanding the
current repression of Crimean Tatars, this discourse has become the primary discourse through
which the repression of ethnic Crimean Tatars is rationalized, legitimized, and perpetrated by the
Russian government in Crimea.
The Deportation of Crimean Tatars
During Second World War, Crimea was among the first Soviet territories occupied by the
Wehrmacht, the German occupying army. Taking the British colonial rule over India as their
model, the German occupying authorities resorted to a divide-and-rule strategy for dominating the
occupied population.10 However, because they lacked sufficient manpower for complete control,
the German army sought support from certain segments of the local population, recruiting them
to serve in the local police force or in lower levels of government.11 Historians have pointed out
that the German attempt to divide and conquer occupied regions of the USSR aligned with the
interest of Crimean Tatar nationalists who wanted an independent Tatar nation-state.12 Crimean
Tatar nationalist leaders worked with German authorities in Berlin, even though they frequently
complained that the Germany authorities were attempting to exploit and curtail Crimean Tatar
nationalist ambitions to fit German interests.13 Regardless, the German attempts to divide and
conquer relied on tactics of ethnic division, whereby the Wehrmacht carefully exploited ethnic
tensions and favored Crimean Tatars over other groups.14
Crimean Tatars are a Turkic-speaking people. They represent a mixture of the ancient Gothic
and Alan populations who settled in Eastern Europe in the 7th century. The name Tatars first
emerged in the 13th century, when the Mongol Golden Horde occupied the peninsula. As the
non-Turkic population became assimilated with other Crimeans via shared religion, language, and
culture, Tatars formed an independent state known as the Crimean Khanate—a political entity
ruled by a khan, on the model of the invading Mongols. This state remained independent until the
Russian Empire began to expand in the 17th century.
Upon Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula in the 18th century, the Crimean Khanate
lost its autonomy. The relationships between Crimean Tatars and the Russian empire periodically
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intensified, culminating in the Crimean War in 1854. The mutual mistrust between the imperial
Russian and Crimean Khanate governments further strained relations in the peninsula, forcing
many Tatars to leave for the Ottoman Empire for fear of retaliation and possible resettlement within
the Russian heartland. Though many Tatars remained in Crimea, by 1917 Tatars made up only a
quarter of the population there.15
In its early years of power following the Russian Revolution, the Soviet regime followed a policy
created by Lenin to support the national autonomy of minority national groups throughout the
Soviet Union. The Russian empire had been a multi-national empire, and the new Soviet government
had to find a way to rein in the nationalist ambitions of the various national groups—such as
Ukrainians, Kazaks, Belarusians, Tatars, and many more—who spoke their own languages, held
their own particular religious traditions, and demanded the right to national self-determination.16
In order to convince these groups to support the Bolshevik revolution, Lenin initially promised
to support national self-determination within the USSR, and promote the autonomy of national
minorities. By the early 1930s, however, the Soviet regime found this policy untenable, and turned
to policies intended to coerce nationalist groups into submission to the authority of Moscow. The
political ambitions of various national groups were handled an individual basis through policies
that ranged from banning national languages, to state-orchestrated famines, massacres, forced
resettlements, interment in gulags, and the imprisonment or extrajudicial executions of members
of the intelligentsia of the various national groups.
In 1934, in an attempt to assert Soviet control over Crimea, Crimea was divided into zoning
districts, where the territories with a predominance of a certain national or ethnic group were
transformed into independent administrative units. 177 regional self-regulatory bodies, the majority
of them Crimean Tatars, were created, including units in the Alushta, Balaklavsky, Bakhchisaray,
Karasubazarsky, Kuibyshev, Sudak, and Yalta regions. Moreover, a number of ethnic schools were
established, where Crimean Tatars could teach their own language and their own curriculum.
Newspapers and magazines were published in the Crimean Tatar language.
During his leadership of the Soviet government, Stalin changed many of the policies regarding
the rights of national and ethnic groups. Historians have termed these policies of the late 1920s
and early 1930s to be indicative of an “Affirmative Action Empire,” where Stalin believed that
sanctioning nationalist autonomy for minority groups allowed Moscow to dictate the contents
of their national culture and thereby circumscribe the political ambitions of these groups.17 This
contradiction between promoting national autonomy while crushing the political ambitions
of national groups was common throughout the USSR. Lenin and Stalin had both used the
establishment of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1921 as a propaganda tool
to demonstrate that Soviet power was just and fair, offering political and cultural autonomy to the
nations who respected Soviet authority.18 The establishment of the republic was followed by famine
that some have considered to be a state-orchestrated famine, which killed over 100,000 Crimeans,
most of whom were Tatar. By 1928, the nationalist leaders who Lenin and Stalin supported in 1921
were shot to death, and the USSR sought to eliminate the Crimean Tatar intelligentsia—all while
proclaiming Crimean Tatar cultural autonomy.19
These policies across the USSR did not quell nationalist resistance to the Soviet program of
collectivizing land and property. In Crimea, as elsewhere in the USSR, this brief period of regained
autonomy was not to last. Stalin, by the mid 1930s, adopted a policy of destroying national identity
across the USSR and creating a new Soviet national identity for the Soviet state. In this campaign
to create a single Soviet nation, aspirations for the distinct identity of minorities were brutally
suppressed. These repressions led to mass arrests and the destruction of hundreds of religious
buildings (mosques, temples, synagogues, etc.) in Crimea. The independent ethnic administrative
units were terminated and Crimean Tatars—among others—lost their religious freedoms and their
right to send their children to ethnic schools, where they could be educated in their native language.
During the German occupation of the Ukraine in the Second World War, the situation changed
yet again. The German occupying authorities enticed Crimean Tatars with special privileges, and
invited Tatar nationalist leaders to Berlin.20 They distributed gardens to the Tatars, which was a
highly symbolic act given that the Soviet Union had abolished private property and collectivized all
the land. The German occupying authorities released Crimean Tatar prisoners of war, and excused
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Tatars from labor duty. In addition, Crimean Tatars were relieved of heavy tax duties, allowed to
practice their religion openly, and offered education in the Tatar language. A Moslem Committee
was created in Simferopol, and Crimean Tatars were appointed to administrative positions within
it. Such policies garnered strong support for the occupying force from many Crimean Tatars,
particularly among older residents whose suffering under Stalin’s brutal collectivization policies
was not forgotten. In exchange for such privileges, some Tatars did in fact collaborate with the
German occupation by revealing key strategic information, such as the positions of partisan troops
as well as Soviet army plans.
Yet, most Tatars refused to work for the Wehrmacht, in part because of German brutality
against inhabitants of Tatar villages. Furthermore, during this time ten percent of the Crimean
Tatar population was mobilized and forced to fight on the front lines for Hitler;21 almost every
family had a close relative serving. In addition, a majority of Crimean Tatars retained their loyalty
to the Soviet government, based in part on their consumption of Soviet propaganda urging them
to resist the German occupiers.22
At the beginning of the war, Soviet newspapers recounted acts of courage and heroism by
Tatar soldiers. These accounts fostered patriotism in Crimean Tatars, and intensified hatred toward
the Germans. Every issue of these newspapers published accounts of atrocities committed by the
German troops, the progress of the Soviet army, and the courage of Crimean Tatar soldiers and
guerillas fighting alongside and with the Soviet army. The leading Crimean newspaper, Krasnyi
Krym, generally portrayed the Tatar people as coexisting peacefully for centuries with their “older
brother―the great Russian nation.” In these accounts, all nationalities in the Soviet Union were
acting in unison against their common, and evil, adversary.23 One such article recounts the brutality
of the German army:
Brother- Tatars! You are in the occupied territory among the enemy. You see and feel the
horrors of the Fascist occupation. The Germans send your sons to the frontline. They rape your
daughters; they turn you into powerless slaves. They condemned you to starvation and death.24

As Crimean Tatars were positioned in unity with other nationalities in the “Soviet family,” the
boundary divisions between Crimean Tatars (as “brothers”) and Germans (as the “vicious enemy”)
intensified.
The newspapers repeatedly cast the Germans as colonizers seeking to destroy the cultural
heritage of the people: “The Germans try to sow discord among people of the Crimea. They set
Russians against Jews, Tatars against Russians. This is an old trick of colonizers.”25 The proclamation
made by German occupying forces that they would bring freedom to Tatars was unmasked in these
narratives as part of a devious campaign of colonization, linked to their true mission to destroy
the nation’s honor and pride, and to plunder the rich Crimean soil.26 But the Soviet army—it
was promised—would soon reenter the peninsula and dispel the Wehrmacht, according to the
newspaper accounts.
Some of the articles at this time do mention the collaboration of Crimean Tatars with the
German army, but the reports state that such collaboration occurred only after German deception,
provocation, and coercion. Even so, the collaborators were viewed as traitors to the nation.
According to one article,
[The Germans] created the so-called Tatar Committee, but it is clear to everyone that this
committee is the slave of the German–colonizers, it works for Fascists and helps rob and deceive
the Tatar people.27

The articles referred to an old Russian proverb that there is no village without a dog, implying
that every community has its own degenerates (urody obshestva) and there are some traitors within
any community—but such cases were presented as rare. In general, the Crimean Tatar population
remained loyal to Soviet rule and was viewed as such.
The Soviet authorities drew upon cultural images of tight-knit Crimean Tatar communities,
which emphasized family security and respect for elders, to show that the willingness of some
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Crimean Tatars to join the German army was like an act of youthful rebellion against the wider
family. By casting enemy collaboration in familial terms, forgiveness for such transgressions and
re-unification of the greater Soviet family could result, presumably, from acts of repentance on the
part of the rebellious child.
As the war progressed, Soviet propaganda sought to intensify national pride by promoting images
of the heroism of the multicultural Soviet army. Acts of enemy collaboration by a few individuals
were presented as cases of character flaws, likened to the betrayal of selling one’s ancestral land.
Newspaper stories stressed that the Soviet army included soldiers of all racial and ethnic groups,
in stark contrast to the racist policies of the Wehrmacht, which followed the National Socialist racial
policies, and considered all non-Arians as Untermenschen and prohibited people of inferior races
from fighting in its ranks.28 Many articles offered personalized accounts of the hardships of Crimean
Tatar troops and featured the life stories of those who demonstrated outstanding courage.29
As the Soviet army recovered its territory from the Wehrmacht in the later stages of the
war, the number of articles glorifying the heroic deeds of Tatars rapidly decreased. The Soviet
propaganda machine shifted from publishing inspiring stories in pursuit of national unity to
narrative tactics that served the need to return a sense of normalcy to the reoccupied territory.
Following a new government campaign, the newspapers abandoned their earlier characterization
of Crimean Tatars as rebellious younger brothers and portrayed them, among other ethnic groups,
as enemy accomplices. These portrayals castigated these groups as traitors who deserved severe
punishment. Moreover, based on this characterization future generations of Crimean Tatars should
be condemned for the actions committed by their ancestors during the war. Dehumanizing images
of Tatars were spread throughout the general population, representing a stark contrast to the
glorification of those who had served in the Red Army.
The official decision to deport all Tatars from Crimea between 1942 and 1943 required careful
planning and forethought at the highest levels of government. In his secret correspondence to Stalin
months prior to the decision to deport Tatars, Levrentii Beria, the head of NKVD (the organization
preceding the KGB), characterized all Crimean Tatars as traitors. In one transmission Beria writes:
The devastating situation in the occupied territories of Crimea can be explained by the
diversion group. 1178 people who helped the German army were arrested. The Tatar national
committee, which had branches in various regions in Crimea, mobilized volunteers into the
Nazi Tatar division and sent the non-Tatar population to the labor camps in Germany.30

In another letter, Beria states that during the Second World War, Crimean Tatars acted as accomplices
to German occupiers:
Many Crimean Tatars betrayed their Motherland, deserted from the army and joined the
army of the enemy, participated in the voluntary Nazi divisions, [and] participated in the
barbaric and cruel killings of the Soviet people.31

As such correspondence was taking place, the People Commissar on Internal Affairs and the
People Commissar on State Security imposed a law (Ukase) in April 1944 designed to punish all
anti-Soviet elements operating in areas previously occupied by the Wehrmacht. According to this
law, the Crimean peninsula was to be cleared of “agents of German and Romanian intelligence,
traitors, collaborators, members of crime organizations.” The law’s intent is conveyed as follows:
To clear the territory of the Crimean region from the agents of foreign intelligence agencies
and contra-intelligence groups, of those who betrayed their country and traitors, who
actively helped Nazi-German occupation forces and their agents, of participants of antiSoviet organizations, bandit groups and other anti-Soviet elements that helped occupations
forces (13 April, 1944).

Interestingly, the law lacked particular reference to any specific ethnic affiliation of the enemy
elements.
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In a secret wire to Stalin, Molotov, and Malenkov two weeks later, Beria reported on the
number of members of each nationality living in Crimea who were killed, taken to labor camps by
the German army, or evacuated by the Soviets:
On Crimea. The population of the Crimea before the war—1,126,000 people, including 218,000
Tatars. Killed 67 thousands of Jews, Karaimov, Krymchakov, taken to Germany—50,000
people, evacuated 5,000 people.32

Beria explained that the high number of casualties in Crimea resulted from the work of saboteurs
and anti-Soviet elements among the Crimean Tatars. The Tatar National Committee was cited as
working closely with voluntary German divisions, supplying intelligence on Soviet operations,
and sending non-Tatar natives to the German labor camps. The document stated:
The Tatar National Committee, having its own branches in every Tatar district in Crimea,
recruited intelligence agents to work in the occupied territories, enlisted volunteers to
the created German Tatar division, [and] sent the local non-Tatar population for work in
Germany.

Crimean Tatar families, women, and elders were identified as traitors aiding those hiding
from the Soviet army. These accusations had the effect of intensifying prevailing divisions between
those who were considered loyal Soviet peoples and the supposedly treasonous Crimean Tatars.
In a later telegram to Stalin, Beria established for the first time an ethnic designation to antiSoviet elements operating during the war.33 He wrote that more than twenty thousand Crimean
Tatar soldiers deserted the Soviet army and joined German forces.
Considering treacherous action of the Crimean Tatars against the Soviet people and
considering unfeasibility of the further residency of Crimean Tatars on the border of the
Soviet Union, NKVD asks for your consideration of deportation of all Crimean Tatars from
the territory of Crimea.34

In this communiqué, Beria recommended to Stalin that the entire Crimean Tatar population be
deported to the Uzbek Soviet Republic. Before writing this memo, Beria had already informed
the head of the Central Committee of Uzbekistan about this impending deportation, anticipating
no obstacles to his proposal of this state-sponsored brutality. He stated that the operation would
start on May 21 and last for about ten days. In the letter to Stalin, Beria wrote, “the issue of settling
the Tatars in Uzbek SSR is arranged with the Secretary of the Central Committee of Uzbekistan,
comrade Usupov.”35
The day after receiving this correspondence, Stalin signed the deportation decree. A topsecret document dated May 11, 1944 recounts that the Soviet State Defense Committee set the
decree in motion, ordering the deportation of the entire Crimean Tatar nationality from the
Crimean peninsula. Many Crimean Tatars were accused of treason, deserting their military units,
embracing the enemy’s goal of conquest, and serving in Schutzmannschaftsbataillonen (police
battalions). The document additionally asserted that Crimean Tatars acted inhumanely against the
Soviet guerrillas, actively engaged in transporting Soviet people to German labor camps, gathered
intelligence for the enemy, and sabotaged Soviet military operations. Instead of being cheered
as war heroes or scolded as younger brothers, the Crimean Tatars were now repositioned as a
monolithic unit, a dangerous enemy bloc whose recent campaign of mass treachery necessitated
the deportation of the entire population to Uzbek Soviet Republic by June 1, 1944. These drastic
measures were allegedly required to prevent any additional collaboration of Crimean Tatars with
potential sympathizers to the retreating German army.
Moreover, although the Germans were in retreat and certainly losing the war by this time, the
idea that they could have used Crimean Tatars to establish alliances with Turkey and with segments
of the Muslim population prompted concern among the Soviet officials that the Tatars could take up
the banner and threaten the cohesion of the Soviet Union by fostering Muslim solidarity across the
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region. Despite such frenzied accusations, the few documented cases of collaboration by Crimean
Tatars were wildly exaggerated by propagandists.36
The Soviet fear of losing Crimea to the Wehrmacht army even after their departure prompted
the authority to deport so-called unreliable elements of the population into Central Asia. But
even in possession of totalitarian controls, the Soviet leaders still required a public justification
for such widespread actions launched against this ethnic group. With vitriolic hatred of Germans
still deeply ingrained in the collective psyche, the positioning practices began to shift, and a new
enemy group emerged.37 But unlike Germans, who, as invaders, were never in close proximity
to the majority of the Soviet population, Tatars inhabited the land for centuries and lived freely
among the Soviet people. Their perceived betrayal felt personal, close to home, and fratricidal.
Many segments of the general population found in the Tatars convenient scapegoats.38 to explain
the source of their current misery. Tatars were blamed for the miserable conditions of service in
the Soviet army, and the lack of basic necessities for survival for many members of the general
population. The positioning tactics of the propaganda campaign established a normative order that
exiled the outgroup not only physically but socially, forever tainting them with the stain of treason.
The Soviet political elite skillfully exploited the emotional trauma among the population. In
May 1944, with little forewarning, Tatar women, children, and the elderly were loaded into freight
trains and transported to Central Asia, primarily to Uzbekistan. Lacking food, water or adequate
sanitation, many Tatars died in transit. Those who survived the journey were confined to special
zones for their residency. The vigilance of lower Party officials to meet pre-established quotas
resulted in many Tatars abandoning their property and personal possessions. The settlements of
Crimean Tatars in Uzbekistan turned into permanent residences. Tremendous economic, political,
and social hardships ensued. Beria’s plea to Stalin to implement a “cleaning [cleansing] process
of Crimean population from the anti-Soviet elements” resulted in thinking clinically about the
whole operation. Almost every day for four months preceding the final arrests and deportations,
Stalin received progress reports which reduced the tragic events for thousands of families to
numerical measurements—the number of people deported, the number of arrests, and the number
of appropriated houses, cattle, and other domestic animals.
The secrecy of Soviet institutions kept the general population ignorant of the numerous
atrocities committed by the Soviet government against its people. Those who expressed disapproval
of inhumane treatment of minority groups were denounced as enemies of the people. Nevertheless,
stories about mass deportation and arrests began to circulate unofficially throughout the country.
Many segments of the general population learned about the deportation of Crimean Tatars to
Uzbekistan, as well as the dispersion of Chechens, Koreans, and Volga Germans to Kazakhstan.
Other small ethnic minorities, such as the Karachay, Ingush, Balkar, and Kalmyk, were also
scattered across vast Soviet territories. But few realized the scale of the tragedy, or the full extent of
demonization campaign against the Tatars and other minorities.
During post-war reconstruction in the Soviet Union, a large number of deportees sought to
return to their homeland. Yet the need to control the interactions of multiple nationalities could
not warrant such mobility. The Supreme Committee of the Soviet Union passed an Ukas (decree)
imposing severe punishment to anyone attempting to repatriate, citing that returning Crimean
Tatars would serve as agents for foreign governments. The law demanded that each ethnic group
be assigned a particular place of residence. Like so many of the edicts of the Soviet government,
this law was established in secret.39
Repatriation—Exoneration of the Crimean Tatars
Over time, the cause for Crimean Tatar repatriation became widely recognized. Beginning in
1989, the liberal policies associated with Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika allowed more than a
quarter of a million of Crimean Tatars to return to their historic homeland, predominantly from
Uzbekistan.40 These policies were driven by the need to redress gross injustices of the past and the
brutal mistreatment of this Turko-Muslim ethnic group. As might be expected, many Crimean
residents objected to Tatar repatriation. Their allegedly treasonous deeds during the war were
not forgotten or forgiven. The Tatars were stigmatized as a danger to the Soviet people, citing
alleged Tatar degeneracy. In the half-century absence of Crimean Tatars from their homeland,
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Tatar history and culture heritage were largely expunged from the population of Crimea as they
were castigated as invaders who presence represents a threat to the legitimate residents of the
peninsula.
As an extended arm of the reigning political institutions, the mass media actively embraced
government policies for the repatriation of exiled ethnic groups; however, their simultaneous
coverage of public demonstrations and conflicts among the local population in Crimea perpetuated
strong negative images of returning Crimean Tatars. Letters to the Editor of the large newspaper
Argumenty i facty (Arguments and Facts) denounced attempts by Crimean Tatars to return to Crimea.
Their claims to return to their historic homeland were dismissed as groundless. Most returnees
were accused of never having lived in Crimea. Tatars were accused of marrying outside of their
ethnic group and thus relinquishing their right to return. Because the USSR was viewed as a
fatherland for all people residing in its territory regardless of their ethnic identity (or nationality in
Soviet policy), the desire to return to a designated homeland represented a lack of patriotism. Once
again, the practices of identity positioning returned to the idea of the greater Soviet family to suit
the needs of the dominant group. The very act of Tatars pursuing repatriation (among other rights)
was viewed as the work of extremist nationals.41
As the number of Crimean Tatars returning to the peninsula increased, ethnic hostilities
intensified in Crimea. After extended political debate in the late 1980s over the rights of Crimean
Tatars, representatives of the Central Committee of Communist Party of Ukraine held dialogues
between Crimean Tatars and other ethnic groups, seeking to decrease social tensions and prevent
extremist tendencies toward repatriation in the population. Some Committee officials were sent
to Uzbekistan, the major source of repatriates, to discourage the migration of large numbers of
people. Moreover, the Committee recommended that the Soviet Ministers of Ukraine revisit the
history of the peninsula, particularly the period of Second World War, to install a monument in
commemoration of the Crimean Tatars soldiers who died during the war.42 These positioning
tactics embraced a policy of “keep them where they are.” The Department of Information and
Popularization of the Central Committee of the Communist party of Ukraine advised the Ukrainian
media to promote peaceful coexistence among the diverse ethnic group of the Crimean peninsula.43
The Ukrainian newspapers called for harmonious ethnic relations and stressed long traditions of
respectful and peaceful coexistence between Tatars and the Ukrainian population. They condemned
attempts to sow seeds of discord among the citizens of the Ukraine.44 According to some articles,
Crimea had sufficient resources to meet the needs of all returning ex-patriots.45
And yet, economic challenges contributed to escalating tensions between current residents
and the newcomers to Crimea. To aggravate tensions, the government could not provide all
returnees with affordable housing, equal educational opportunities, or adequate medical
services. The newspapers repeatedly raised the following rhetorical question: “Where does one
get various resources?”46 The dissolution of the Soviet Union increased economic burdens on
the local government. Lacking governmental support, many returning Crimean Tatars settled in
locations that were prohibited by government authorities. The formation of unauthorized selfseized settlements, known as samozahvat, enraged the local population. Newspapers reported that
samozahvat destroyed 238 hectares of fertile land.47 Hundreds of houses built by the newly arrived
Crimean Tatars were bulldozed; hundreds were denied registration, jobs, and education. The rights
for housing and settlement became a point of contention between the government of Ukraine and
the Tatar mejelice, a local elected governing office.
Public officials and the media eventually recognized the scarcity of resources to meet the basic
needs of the general population. The voices that encouraged resettlement were met with disdain
from most members of the population. Some of these critics saw the fount of troubles as coming
“from the top” by government authorities.48 Old labels, stories, and prejudices reflecting well-worn
patterns of ethnic hostility resurfaced. Many articles cast Crimean Tatars as traitors for serving in
the German army.49 The economic prosperity of some Crimean Tatar families was attributed to their
inherent criminal character, as evident in practices such as money laundering and government
corruption, rather than to their hard work.50 Many members of the general public even positioned
Tatars as barbarians.51 Tatars were denigrated as culturally backwards, lacking adequate language
skills, and unsuited for modern life.52
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In general, economic hardships often force people to blame an ethnic or minority group
that differs from the predominant population. The citizens of Crimea during the 1980s argued
that the peninsula was being invaded by traitors who sought to transform Crimea to Tatarland
(otatarivshiy).53 Despite certain official proclamations regarding the need to exonerate Tatars from
past allegations, returning Tatars accused by some officials of engaging in a sinister campaign of
conquest over the rightful residents of Crimea. These officials went as far as to argue that Crimean
Tatars lost all their rights as a result of their deportation to the Central Asia.54
As they began to repatriate, some Crimean Tatars responded to their continued provocation
with aggressive statements, political challenges, and in some cases violence. Attempts to reclaim lost
property led to numerous attacks against the local population. Crimean Tatar officials threatened
that, once in power, they would deny residency for all non-Tatar populations in Crimea.55 Such
rhetoric further incited animosity and escalated the struggle to a state that approached civil war.
Crimean Tatars in Occupied Crimea
In February 2014 Russia took control of Crimea and occupied the peninsula. On March 16, 2014
the Crimean Government held a referendum on the status of Crimea. The aim of the referendum
was for the Crimean people to decide whether Crimean would join Russia as a federal subject, or
if they wanted to restore the 1992 Crimean constitution and Crimea’s status as a part of Ukraine.
According to Crimean authorities, 96.77 per cent of voters in Crimea supported joining Russia.
Many Crimeans loyal to Kiev, including Crimean Tatars, boycotted the referendum, and the EU
and US condemned it as illegal. The Joint Statement on Crimea issued by the President of the
European Council Herman Van Rompuy and President of the European Commission José Manuel
Barroso stated: “The referendum is illegal and illegitimate and its outcome will not be recognized
… We reiterate the strong condemnation of the unprovoked violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity and call on Russia to withdraw its armed forces to their pre-crisis numbers and
the areas of their permanent stationing, in accordance with relevant agreements.”56
Crimean Tatars together with other residents of the peninsula were forced to give up their
Ukrainian citizenship for Russian citizenship. All Ukrainian citizens became foreigners in their
own land and had to acquire a “residence permit.”57 Facing an illegal Russian Government, many
Crimean Tatars decided to leave Crimea. According to Amnesty International, “up to 7,000 Tatars
have fled Crimea already. Those who have stayed face the unenviable choice of having to give up
their Ukrainian citizenship and accept a Russian one or become ‘foreigners’ in their homeland.”58
The highest executive body of Crimean Tatars, the Mejlis, has openly criticized Russia’s
occupation of Crimea. Members of Mejlis recommended that all Crimean Tatars boycott both the
March referendum on Crimea’s status and the September local elections. Most Crimean Tatars
boycotted the March 16 illegal referendum on the status of Crimea, fully supporting Ukraine’s
territorial integrity. They also boycotted Russian local elections held on September 14.
Mejlis also appealed to the Crimean authorities to disarm and make illegal the self-defense units
in Crimea. These self-defense units were formed as armed paramilitary groups in late February with
the aim of precluding any opposition to the referendum on Crimea’s status. Since then they have been
involved in “unlawful detention, abduction, ill-treatment including torture, and harassment of proUkraine activists and other residents with complete impunity.”59 The self-defense units have also been
a part of illegitimate searches of persons, properties, and vehicles, violent dispersals of meetings and
public gatherings, and numerous attacks on representatives of the mass media. Crimean authorities
did not launch any investigations regarding unlawful actions of self-defense units. Instead, in June
2014, the parliament of Crimea passed the law On People’s Uprising that makes the self-defense units
legal on the peninsula. The law authorized self-defense units to check identity documents and assist
police in temporarily detaining people.60 Many units are operating without the presence of police.
They regularly harass, interrogate, and sometimes beat people because they choose to do.
Mejlis became the target of coercive actions by the Crimean Government. The prosecutor
issued several statements describing the Mejlis actions as extremist activities, including a boycott
of the September 14 local elections.61 In September, the de facto prime minister of Crimea stated
publicly that the Mejlis was not a “legal organization” and that it had “very little authority” among
the Crimean Tatar population.62
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The leaders of Mejlis were forced to live outside Crimea. On April 22, 2014 an informal leader
of the Crimean Tatars, Mustafa Jemiliev, was informed by the Russian Federal Migration Service
that he was a persona non grata in Crimea, and on May 2, 2014 he was refused entry to Moscow to
board his flight to Crimea. The following day, he was stopped at the checkpoint between Crimea
and mainland Ukraine. Several thousands Crimean Tatars created a human corridor welcoming
Jemiliev into Crimea but he was refused entry. On May 4, 2014, the Chair of Mejlis, Refat Chubarov,
received a written warning from the Prosecutor of Crimea stating that his activities and the activities
of the Mejlis were in violation of Russian law on extremism.63 On July 5, 2014, on his return from the
neighboring Ukrainian region of Kherson, Chubarov was stopped at a checkpoint by the Russian
military and received notice of his five-year ban on entering the territory of Russia.64
The houses of other Mejlis members were routinely searched by Crimean authorities. For
example, on the night of May 14, a day before planned public gatherings to commemorate the
anniversary of the mass deportation of Crimean Tatars, the authorities searched dozens of homes,
including the home of Mustafa Dzhemilev and the Mejlis’ press secretary, Ali Khamzin. The
authorities searched for weapons and explosives at the home of Mejlis member Edem Mustafaev.65
The authorities also searched dozens of private residences of Crimean Tatars and conducted
invasive, and some times illegal, searches of mosques and Islamic schools to look for drugs,
weapons, and prohibited literature.  
Crimean authorities also denied Crimean Tatars’ right to freedom of expression, assembly
and potentially association. For example, the ban imposed on all mass meetings in Crimea until
June 6 impeded the events planned for the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the mass
deportation on May 18. Crimean Tatars were allowed only to hold a common prayer on the outskirts
of the Crimean capital, Simferopol.
Unlawful detention, abductions, and the beating of Crimean Tatars also became a common
feature in Crimea. In October, authorities arrested and charged three Crimean Tatars with violating
the law during the protests of May 3. Human Rights Watch previously documented at least 15
cases in which Crimean Tatars or pro-Ukraine activists were forcibly disappeared, abducted, or
went missing in Crimea since March 2014. Six of them were later released but two of them were
subsequently found dead.66 For example, on March 3, 39-year old Reshat Ametov had held a oneman protest in front of the Crimean Council of Ministers building in Simferopol. Three men from
the self-defense forces led him away and put him into their car. Two weeks later his body was found
showing signs of torture. A criminal case that has been opened but has, as of yet, not result in any
arrests.67 Edem Asanov, a Crimean Tatar who was not politically active but had posted information
about the treatment of Crimean Tatars on his social network VKontakte, disappeared on September
29 in Evpatoria. Six days later, police found Asanov’s body hanged in an abandoned building.
Crimean Tatars’ media also became a target of Crimean authorities and self-defense units.
Russia’s Federal Security Service and the Crimea prosecutor’s office have issued warnings to
leading Crimean Tatar media outlets not to publish extremist materials and threatened editors that
the outlets would not be allowed to re-register unless they changed their anti-Russian editorial line.
The self-defense units publicly referred to ATR, the main Crimean Tatar channel that broadcasts
in three languages: Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian, and Russian, as the enemy channel and since March
attacked and beat several ATR journalists.68 On May 16, the Crimea prosecutor’s office issued an
official warning to ATR’s leadership about its coverage of the mass gathering on May 3, stating that
the channel had reported on the gathering’s participants making calls “of an extremist nature.”69
According to Amnesty international, “ATR has received informal instructions from the authorities
not to broadcast reports which included members of the Mejlis or leaders of the Crimean Tatar
community, unless they were loyal to the Crimean authorities and Russia.”70 Several journalists
and media workers have been detained and in some cases harassed and beaten. For example, on
May 18, self-defense units detained Crimean Tatar journalist Osman Pashayev and his crew while
they were filming a meeting in Simferopol. The self-defense units forced him and his colleagues
to stand facing a wall and interrogated them, beating and harassing them for several hour. The
journalists’ equipment was confiscated and never returned to them.71
All Ukrainian media was gradually removed from translating in Crimea. According to the
OSCE, “Broadcasts from the six main Ukrainian television channels in Crimea have been blocked
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and replaced with broadcasts from Russian channels. Since the end of June, cable television
providers also stopped airing most leading Ukrainian-language channels in Crimea, including
Inter, Channel 5, 1+1, and several others, significantly reducing the amount of televised Ukrainianlanguage content.”72 Police seized the equipment and computers that belonged to Chernomorska
(Black Sea) Television Company and the Center for Journalistic Investigation, a nonprofit group
specializing in investigative journalism that had an office in the same building.73
Conclusion
Categorical violence against Crimean Tatars is rooted in the redefinition of social boundary and
ascription of treacherous and rebellious attitudes to the entire ethnic group. During the Second
World War, the Soviet authorities orchestrated a campaign to collectively reclassify certain ethnic
minorities as a prelude to their deportation from their homelands. Such negative categorization
soon became an instrument of terror. The demonization of Germans as Nazis by the Soviet
propaganda machine intensified hatred toward their (perceived and actual) collaborators.
Working in secrecy, Soviet propagandists exploited information about a few cases of Crimean
Tatar collaboration with the German occupation to generate nationalistic hatreds that lasted for
half a century.
Significant reduction of the level of hostility toward the Crimean Tatar population began
with perestroika and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The repatriation of Crimean Tatars in
the beginning of the 1990s aimed to redress previous injustices and to compensate then for the
hardships they experienced at the hands of the Soviet government. However, Crimean Tatars
were ill-treated by local Crimean authorities and experienced discrimination from the Crimean
population. They were denied access to land, work, and affordable housing. After Ukrainian
independence they gradually acquired many rights but some issues remained unresolved.
The illegal occupation of Crimea by Russia has again reignited hardship suffered by Crimean
Tatars. They refused to acknowledge the new authority by boycotting the referendum on the
status of Crimea and the local elections. In response, local government and militant self-defense
forces targeted Mejlis leadership, activists and mass media representatives. Harassment, arrests,
abductions, and beatings once again became a part of the everyday life for Crimean Tatars. Two
Mejlis leaders were prohibited to live in Crimea and Mejlis actions were portrayed as extremist.
The demonization of Crimean Tatars that started during the Second World War by the
communist regime continues to play a definitive role in their positioning in society today. It provided
the justification needed by the Crimean Government in the late 1980s to create impediments to the
return of Crimean Tatars to their Motherland. Similar definitions of treason and extremism were
employed by the authorities of illegally occupied Crimea in 2014. In all three situations, categorical
violence based on the negative portrayal of Crimean Tatars has led to a denial of their rights, and
the prosecution and harassment of leadership and ordinary citizens.
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Abstract: Since it came into force in 1951, the United Nations’ Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, a document created with the explicit purpose of “liberat[ing] mankind from such an
odious scourge,” has largely failed to deliver on the promises it enshrined. The twentieth century bore witness
to an increasing frequency of genocides, a pattern which is continuing into the twenty-first century with the
outbreak of arguably genocidal violence in Darfur in 2003, and more recently, the Central African Republic
(CAR) in 2014. This article analyzes the failure of the Genocide Convention by exploring its deficiencies
alongside issues of state sovereignty and levels of political interest, and particularly, the relationship between
these issues, in the context of the specific cases of Cambodia, Rwanda, and Darfur. Understanding the lessons
of these past failures is crucial as the UN attempts to address genocidal violence in the CAR today.
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The creation of the United Nations’ Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide1 (Genocide Convention) in 1948 was, as Mr. Evatt, then-President of the General
Assembly observed, an “epoch-making” event for “a significant advance had been made in the
development of international criminal law.”2 Certainly, it was a landmark document being one
of the first of its kind to address human rights issues. More importantly, with its moral obligation
for signatories to prevent genocide, it was unique in its scope and in its potential as a tool that
could be utilized by the UN, and the international community, when faced with cases of potential,
or unfolding, genocide. Thus, it went much further than any other international criminal law
document at that time. Nevertheless, the Genocide Convention was not without its flaws. Debates
over several controversial yet significant aspects continued over the two years of drafting resulting
in an ambiguously worded, loop-hole ridden diplomatic compromise. This was a necessity for, as
the Australian delegate Mr. Dignam noted, waiting to satisfy the arguments of all fifty-eight member
states “would be tantamount to postponing the completion of the instrument indefinitely.”3 From
the outset, the Convention was seen by its own creators as an incomplete compromise, a starting
point which they hoped, “in spite of its imperfections…could not fail to have a preventive effect.”4
The record of the Genocide Convention since it came into force in 1951 would seem to suggest
otherwise.5 In fact, as the Cold War began to dominate the international arena, it went through
a “lengthy hibernation.”6 Unfortunately, the same could not be said of genocide itself. Instances
of genocidal violence occurred unimpeded throughout the period. The most well-known case is
that which took place in Cambodia between 1975 and 1979, where the calculated slaughter and
starvation of up to twenty percent of the population went largely unacknowledged, and definitely
unrestrained, until the controversial Vietnamese invasion of 1978 thrust it to the forefront of world
affairs.7 With the end of the Cold War came increased optimism as a “new world order” was to
be established hopefully bringing greater success for the UN. On 13 January 1992, British Foreign
Secretary, Douglas Hurd suggested that “now the Cold War is over, the UN, and particularly
the Security Council, is working as the founding fathers intended.”8 If the founding fathers had
intended for the UN to stand idle as the perpetration of brutal atrocities shattered the lives of
hundreds of thousands of victims around the world, then it certainly was. For the end of the Cold
War had also “lifted the lid” on “simmering tensions” around the world.9 Horrific genocidal
violence erupted first in the former Yugoslavia in 1992 and then Rwanda in 1994. These cases
emphasize that despite early optimism, the Convention still remained mostly impotent in regards
to prevention. Indeed, the odious scourge has continued into the twenty-first century where, in spite
of initiatives such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the creation of the Office of the Special
Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide (OSAPG), genocidal violence has continued on and off in
Darfur, Sudan since 2003.
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More recently, UN spokespeople have been warning of looming genocide in the Central
African Republic (CAR). Sectarian violence, largely between Christian and Muslim groups, broke
out in 2013 following the overthrow of President François Bozizé by Michel Djotodia, leader of
Muslim rebel group, Séléka, on 24 March.10 Despite the official disbandment of Séléka and the
eventual resignation of Djotodia on 11 January 2014, horrific violence continued to engulf the
country following the rise of the Christian militia group, anti-balaka.11 Amnesty International
reported massacres that had caused Muslims to begin fleeing the country12 and in the same month,
John Ging, director of operations for the UN Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
warned that, “it has all the elements that we have seen elsewhere, in places like Rwanda and
Bosnia…the seeds are there, for a genocide. There’s no question about that.”13 Secretary-General,
Ban Ki-moon, also raised the specter of genocide, when in April he cautioned that, having failed
the people of Rwanda twenty years before “we are at risk of not doing enough for the people of the
CAR today.”14 In July 2014, a ceasefire agreement was rejected by Séléka rebels and October saw a
resurgence of violence that has continued into 2015.15
The threat of genocide in the CAR is very real. However, after almost two years of violence,
the Genocide Convention appears to remain as impotent as ever, while the international response
echoes past failures. In this article, I revisit the responses to past cases exploring, in particular,
the failure to prevent or halt genocide in Cambodia, Rwanda and Darfur. Since the constraints of
this article preclude in-depth analysis of a vast array of cases, I have selected these instances as
representative of failures from the Cold War period, the more humanitarian oriented 1990s and the
post-Rwanda years in order to highlight how the Convention has been used, or more often not used,
in preventing and halting genocide. By focusing on individual cases from these different periods,
I contextualize these responses within their individual political climates. I argue that the failure of
the Genocide Convention is the result of complex, inter-related factors, including those related to
state sovereignty and levels of political interest which impact on, and are in turn influenced by, the
Convention’s own deficiencies in a somewhat trilateral relationship. Understanding past failures
in terms of this relationship is crucial as the international community grapples with the challenges
of potential genocide in the CAR today.
Pawns on a Chessboard: Cambodia
The Cold War era has aptly been described as a period in which no more than “lip-service” was
paid to human rights which generally took a backseat as bipolar politics dominated international
concerns.16 Nowhere is this more evident than in one of the most infamous cases of human rights
abuses of this period, abuses that have largely been acknowledged as genocide. Between 1975 and
1979, the communist Khmer Rouge (KR), under the leadership of Saloth Sar, more commonly known
by the pseudonym Pol Pot, staged a revolution in Cambodia which “turned back Cambodian clocks
to year zero.”17 Over the next few years, Cambodians were systematically slaughtered and starved
to death under a ruthless regime which aimed to transform the country into a utopian, agrarian
society and which would target for elimination any “undesirable elements.”18 Following a series of
border skirmishes which had begun in early 1977 and had escalated to war by the end of the year,
Vietnamese troops invaded Democratic Kampuchea (DK) on 25 December 1978. Over a course
of two weeks, they had secured the capital Phnom Penh and installed a Vietnamese-supported
government as the KR fled across the border into Thailand.19 The invasion catapulted the previously
neglected situation in Cambodia to the forefront of world affairs and became the subject of heated
debate within the UN’s Security Council. The Vietnamese Government justified their response as
self-defense in the face of KR and Chinese aggression which they claimed threatened their survival
and, as the true extent of atrocities was revealed, began to emphasize the humanitarian outcome
as further validation for the invasion.20 DK, represented by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, described
the regime as victim to the “flagrant aggression” of Vietnam who had used “Hitlerite” methods in
their “colonial conquest” of Cambodia.21
The position of the major powers in these debates was largely motivated by the political
circumstances in Southeast Asia and their corresponding realpolitik interests. From the 1960s,
Indochina had become a battlefield for influence between China and the Soviet Union. Vietnam
had grown closer to the Soviet Union during its war with the US and China responded to this
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by attempting to increase its influence in Laos and Cambodia, aiding the communists in both
countries.22 The survival of DK in the late 1970s was in large part due to aid provided by the
Chinese and similarly, by 1978, Vietnam had come to depend on the Soviet Union.23 The debates
reflected these divisions and alliances. The Soviet Union took up the humanitarian arguments
of the Vietnamese, referring to atrocities as a “policy of open genocide.”24 On the opposite side,
China simply avoided discussion of human rights abuses focusing instead on condemnation of the
invasion arguing that with the “powerful support” of the Soviet Union, Vietnam had barbarously
breached Cambodian sovereignty in their first steps at creating a colonial empire.25 The stance of
the US was similarly influenced by political context. Following their defeat in the Vietnam War in
1975, they had mostly withdrawn from the region and had been against any involvement that may
have led to another conflict.26 Nevertheless, they had discreetly supported the KR. In a meeting
with Thai Foreign Minister, Chatichai Choonhavan, in November 1975, Secretary of State, Henry
Kissinger, acknowledged that the KR were “murderous thugs” but noted that the US would “be
friends with them” as they were needed as a barrier against Vietnam.27 Furthermore, in the 1970s,
they had been attempting to develop friendly relations with the Chinese government, and were
naturally inclined against their ideological, and former, enemies, the Soviet Union and Vietnam,
respectively. Thus, alongside China, they supported the genocidal regime.28
However, the US, along with others that continued to support the KR, could not completely
ignore discussion of atrocities as they had submitted reports and condemned DK for human
rights abuses through 1978. Indeed, the Soviet Union had directly quoted from a statement
circulated by President Carter on 21 April, in which he stated that “America cannot shirk its duty
to condemn the Cambodian Government.…Thousands of refugees from Cambodia accuse their
own Government of destroying hundreds of thousands of inhabitants as a result of the policy
of genocide.”29 The US was forced to acknowledge that human rights abuses had occurred but
also argued that such abuses did not justify the breach of Cambodian sovereignty.30 This was to
be the stance of the majority of delegates. The debates centered predominantly on Cambodian
sovereignty with no discussion of the genocidal violence that, in spite of underlying motives,
was halted by the Vietnamese invasion. Essentially, the bipolar political circumstances of the
time meant that Cambodia was a pawn on the superpower’s chessboard more than a legitimate
human rights concern.31 As Michael Reisman has argued, most states were “more concerned with
protecting Cambodian sovereignty than with preventing that sovereignty from being used to
murder over a million human beings.”32
It was this kind of situation that had led Raphael Lemkin, who had coined the term “genocide”
in 1944 and was a key figure in the creation of the Genocide Convention, to direct his crusade for
international legislation against the crime. The concept of state sovereignty, which allows states
to conduct their internal affairs free of external interference permitting leaders to exercise power
within their own borders unimpeded and with impunity, evolved and became entrenched after
the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.33 Lemkin argued against the idea of absolute sovereignty stating
that it could not be “conceived as the right to kill millions of innocent people.”34 Due largely to
his efforts, the end of the Second World War saw an erosion of this notion as the Nuremberg
trials became the first to successfully punish perpetrators under international law. The Genocide
Convention was created within this context and with its obligation to prevent and punish genocide
offered a direct challenge to state sovereignty. However, it is a concept that continues to be a
cornerstone principle of the UN and therefore, there are inherent complications with the role of the
UN as both a defender of sovereignty and an organization committed to preventing and halting
genocide. Article 2(7) of its Charter stipulates that it is not authorized to intervene “in matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”35 while Articles I and VIII of the
Genocide Convention oblige the UN and the international community to become involved in the
domestic affairs of others when faced with genocide, implying the necessity of intervention. The
complications that arise from this inherent contradiction are exacerbated by the failure to clarify
what constitutes appropriate prevention as required by the Convention, with further difficulties
arising in determining when and if taking action to prevent or halt genocide is legitimate. Ultimately,
the problem of sovereignty in relation to prevention and intervention, as Bruce Cronin has argued,
lies in having to navigate this tension.36
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In the case of Cambodia, the tension was avoided as the Genocide Convention lay forgotten in
favor of the Charter of the UN which was cited extensively in the debates. Even if the Convention
had been discussed, responses from delegates suggest that the ambiguities of Articles I and VIII
would have been manipulated to allow DK sovereignty to have remained sacrosanct. Certainly,
the delegate from Portugal made this clear when he stated that, “there are no nor can there be any
socio-political considerations that would justify the invasion of the territory of a sovereign State by
the forces of another State.”37 Moreover, despite the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) March
1979 judgment that the situation in DK had “constituted nothing less than autogenocide” and “the
most serious [events] that had occurred anywhere in the world since Nazism,”38 in its thirty-fourth
session in November that same year, the General Assembly issued a resolution which ignored
any mention of genocide but “deeply regret[ed] the armed intervention by outside forces in the
internal affairs of Kampuchea,” reiterating, “that all States shall refrain…from the threat or use of
force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or independence of any State, and strictly adhere
to the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States.”39 As Leo Kuper argued,
despite evidence of genocide, the UN remained a champion of state sovereignty,40 a response in
line with its role in maintaining international peace, but at odds with the promises, both preventive
and punitive, of the Genocide Convention.41 However, though they had mentioned genocide,
neither Vietnam nor the Soviet Union drew on the Convention to legitimize or justify the invasion
and their arguments were further weakened since the doors of DK between 1975 and 1979 had
restricted the flow of information coming out of the country.
On coming to power in April 1975, the KR immediately expelled all foreign nationals. The
borders remained closed until March 1978 when three Western journalists were permitted a guided
visit.42 Consequently, the only information coming out of the country was from the KR controlled
radio station Voice of Democratic Kampuchea and from refugees that escaped into Thailand.43 The
situation was viewed through a narrow lens and it was difficult for the international community to
fully comprehend the true nature of the regime. Indeed, those involved in the anti-war movement,
such as Noam Chomsky, questioned the validity of reports of atrocities, claiming that they had
been exaggerated to justify another war in Southeast Asia.44 Nevertheless, reports and stories of
atrocities increased over the years and as mentioned, President Carter began speaking of genocide
in early 1978. In March that year, the CHR invited comments and observations “relating to the
human rights situation” in DK and several states submitted extensive reports, the submission
from Canada explicitly referring to genocide.45 These documents were then passed to the SubCommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to further analyze in
preparation for their next annual meeting.46 The KR, having been invited to comment, rejected the
investigation as “impudent interference” in their internal affairs and warned that it would “not
tolerate any affront” to its sovereignty.47 By the time it was back on the CHR’s agenda in March
1979, they had been overthrown. In January 1979, only Vietnamese and Soviet officials had visited
Cambodia and witnessed the devastation wrought there.48 As it was, the majority of delegates
were less inclined to take them at their word, the delegate from Portugal lamenting that, “had
Kampuchea been an open society, all the claims now made of invasion would have been instantly
verified. The Pol Pot government certainly had good reasons not to allow the outside world to
know what was happening in its own country, and the price for this is always heavy.”49 The CHR
report, curiously ignoring the documents it had collected in the previous year, also claimed that
“there was no proof [of atrocities]…since there had been no investigation by the United Nations.”50
State sovereignty became a hindrance then, allowing the KR to obstruct access to the country
and impede the collection of accurate information which delayed discussions and meant that
intervention and not prevention was required. The political context was not one conducive
to intervention and the Vietnamese invasion forced tensions between state sovereignty and
humanitarian intervention to the surface. In the subsequent debates sovereignty, as defined and
rooted in the principles of the UN Charter, was used as a tool by those who opposed Vietnam,
while those that supported the invasion failed to mobilize the Genocide Convention and its
potential for legitimizing the overthrow of a genocidal regime. In the context of the Cold War,
the main concern lay with keeping the peace in an unstable region between smaller states that
had more powerful allies. As such, primacy was afforded to state sovereignty even when there
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was substantial evidence of genocidal acts. This suggests that the primary obstruction in this case
was the political context and resulting interests of the main powers involved who were able to
manipulate and use state sovereignty to their advantage. However, as Paul Bartrop has pointed out,
the concept of sovereignty is a central underlying feature of realpolitik and national interest.51 The
ideals and principles behind state sovereignty inform and shape politicians’ understanding and
definition of what lies within their national interests, and thus, the two cannot be separated. The
Genocide Convention was intended to mitigate the absolute nature of this relationship to ensure
that sovereignty as a natural right and interest of states could not be used to justify or impede the
prevention or halting of genocide. However, its effectiveness lies in the balance between the UN
as an international organization for the defense of sovereignty and the UN as committed to the
promise of “never again.” In the political context surrounding genocide in Cambodia, the former
took precedence and consequently, the Convention lay forgotten.
A New World Order?: Rwanda
The end of the Cold War saw a redefinition of the UN’s role in ensuring peace and security, moving
away from a focus on keeping the peace between states, to keeping the peace within states.52 This
ushered in a new era of optimism in terms of the UN’s effectiveness in its humanitarian endeavors
and, to an extent, eroded the concept of state sovereignty. In this environment, responses to genocide
in Rwanda should have been more amenable to prevention or intervention. As a smaller, poorer
country, it was less “sovereign” than powers that were stronger militarily and economically.53 It
was not a pawn on a “superpower chessboard” and, except for France, none of the other permanent
five members of the Security Council had any direct interest in Rwanda. This lack of interest was
to prove equally disastrous for prevention for most scholars agree that, when faced with perhaps
the clearest case of genocide since the Holocaust, the international community could simply not
muster the will to act. What perhaps makes this particularly shameful is that, while the impact of
state sovereignty, in terms of limiting available information and obstructing access to the country,
meant that Cambodia was always going to be a case of intervention, Rwanda has since been
acknowledged as a genocide “both foreseen and flagged” and thus, entirely preventable.54
Indeed, though the initial trigger for the genocide was the death of Rwandan President Juvénal
Habyarimana when his plane was shot down on 6 April 1994, the tensions that underscored the
brutal slaughter that followed this incident had been a consistent problem since the country became
independent in 1962.55 Frictions between different groups in Rwanda became entrenched and
exacerbated by colonial rule in the early twentieth century which had established a hierarchal style
society based on, what they perceived to be, “scientific” understandings of ethnicity placing the Tutsi
as politically superior to the Hutu and Twa groups.56 The “Hutu Revolution” between 1959 and 1961
overturned this system, leading to an eruption of violence during which the Hutu majority came
to power and many Tutsi fled the country. Following this, Michael Barnett argues, ethnic violence
became a central facet of Rwandan politics.57 Through the 1960s, Tutsi refugees unsuccessfully
attempted to force their way back into Rwanda and the Hutu government responded viciously
leaving over 20,000 Tutsi dead and 300,000 in exile.58 Violence flared up again in 1990 after the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded the country to further its primary goals of repatriating Tutsi
refugees and establishing a power-sharing government. After thirteen months of negotiation, the
Arusha Accords were signed in August 1993 and the UN established the United Nations Assistance
Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), consisting of a force of 2,548 peacekeepers, to monitor the ceasefire
agreement.59 Despite an apparent end to the dispute, a UN commissioned report investigating
the human rights situation submitted in August 1993 by Bacre Waly Ndiaye warned of genocide
based on massacres and human rights violations that had occurred throughout the year. Ndiaye
suggested that “genocide” might be applicable because of a pattern of systematic attacks that had
been directed against “Tutsis in the overwhelming majority of cases.”60 The recruitment and training
of the Interahamwe militias, the distribution of arms, and propaganda inciting discrimination and
extermination of Tutsi, were further indications of impending violence, if not genocide.61 Perhaps
the clearest warning, however, was given in January 1994 when commander of UNAMIR, General
Roméo Dallaire, received insider information that Hutu extremists were planning an extermination
campaign. In response, Dallaire requested authority to seize caches of machetes and other weapons
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but was denied on the basis that such action was beyond UNAMIR’s Chapter VI mandate.62 Despite
early warning and opportunities for prevention, the genocide began on 7 April and over a period of
one hundred days, over 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutus were systematically targeted and killed.63
Having failed to prevent genocide prior to the outbreak of violence, the international community
maintained a policy of inaction delaying intervention until the genocide was already over. This
response is largely seen to be a result of a general indifference or a lack of political will to intervene.
Jared Cohen, for example, describes the US response as one of “one hundred days of silence,” a
description that Linda Melvern would probably agree applies to Britain as well.64 Undoubtedly,
in the midst of a series of crises in Bosnia, Haiti, and North Korea, and with elections in South
Africa, Rwanda was seen as a low priority. Furthermore, UN resources were stretched thin as they
were engaged in peacekeeping missions throughout the world with over 71,000 troops committed
in seventeen problem areas.65 Added to this were the repercussions of a disastrous peacekeeping
mission in Somalia the year before. A UN-led mission to establish peace in Somalia resulted in
the deaths of twenty-four Pakistani peacekeepers on 5 June 1993 and subsequent attempts to
apprehend those responsible ended with the deaths of eighteen American rangers.66 The domestic
fallout from events in Somalia saw a dramatic shift in US policy away from a broad definition of
national interest and expansion of the US’ role in peacekeeping as outlined in Presidential Review
Decision 13, to a more restricted and selective policy of intervention described in Presidential
Directive Decision 25.67 Somalia similarly influenced the UN’s approach with Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali advising African leaders in October 1993 that the role of the UN was to
maintain peace, not to impose it.68 The legacy and risks of another Somalia hung over Rwanda
and despite the shift towards humanitarian intervention after the end of the Cold War, the global
context in April 1994 was not one that produced a strong will to intervene.
Moreover, as Frank Chalk and others suggest, politicians assessed their response on the basis
of national interest and whether intervention would result in domestic political opposition.69 The
Clinton Administration did not want a repeat of Somalia and the British government’s reluctance
was influenced, according to an off-the-record interview with a foreign office insider, by a lack
of interest from the British press and public.70 It was not just indifference, but a national interest
that went against intervention that caused the US and the UK to lead the Security Council in its
avoidance of intervention. The policy was not one of complete inaction though, for after the death
of ten Belgian peacekeepers on 7 April, a concerning reminder of events in Somalia, they were able
to efficiently and effectively secure the resources and supplies for the safe evacuation of all foreign
nationals.71 Both the US and the UK then successfully lobbied for the withdrawal of UNAMIR
and on 21 April the Security Council adopted Resolution 912 reducing forces on the ground to
an ineffective 270 peacekeepers.72 It was not until after 6 May, a month into the genocide, that the
Security Council was finally willing to reconsider its stance and provide “urgent and effective means
of action.” Boutros-Ghali recommended a force of 5,500 troops, the same number that Dallaire
had consistently requested in order to halt the genocide in early April.73 Discussions, debates and
delay tactics continued, however, until 17 May when Resolution 918, agreeing to an increase of the
UNAMIR force, was adopted.74 Unfortunately, the UN relied on states donations which were not
forthcoming and continued delays over supplying troops and equipment meant that the force did
not arrive in Rwanda until the genocide had come to an end in July, through the efforts of the RPF.75
The deliberate inaction of the international community was a response defended and
rationalized by the avoidance of the term genocide which many believed would have invoked
the Convention and its perceived obligations to prevent.76 Though some officials might argue that
they could not have predicted genocide and that they had no idea what was happening, evidence
suggests that violence in Rwanda was recognized as genocide early on and that, despite this, many
politicians refrained from using the word publicly.77 Instead, the situation was distorted in the
media through its representation as an African civil war and a product of “ancient tribal rivalries.”78
The failure of the media to convey the magnitude of the situation allowed politicians to continue to
downplay the genocide and in fact, the perception of the situation in Rwanda as a civil war aided
the US and the UK in their arguments for pulling peacekeeping troops out of a place where, they
reasoned, there was no peace to keep.79 Discussions over the use of the term genocide did not take
place in the Security Council until the end of April. Some in the Council supported its use and the
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President drew up a statement that explicitly described the situation as genocide, however; this
reference was later removed due to the opposition of some states, namely the US and the UK.80
The US argued that “events in Rwanda clearly seem to meet the definition of genocide” but noted
that “if the council acknowledges that, it may be forced to ‘take such action’ as provided for in
Article VIII.”81 The British ambassador, David Hannay, further emphasized that if the Council used
genocide and did not act it would be seen as ridiculous and would become a “laughing stock.”82
As Barnett has argued, “the UN was caught between the force of moral obligation and the reality
that it was not going to deliver a rescue operation.”83 It was embarrassment by the continued use
of genocide by other world leaders and human rights organizations, such as Oxfam and Human
Rights Watch that eventually led the Security Council to consider taking action on 6 May, although
it took until 10 June for US officials to be allowed to fully use the term “genocide.”84
The reluctance to use the rhetoric of genocide was due to a perception that invoking the
Convention would oblige states to intervene. However, this obligation is actually more moral than
legal. The response of the international community would seem to suggest that the ambiguous
wording of the preventive provisions of the Convention were interpreted as requiring full military
intervention when actually that obligation could entail the use of “soft options.” For example,
Helen Fein suggests that the suppression of Radio Television Libre des Milles Collines would have
been a cheap and effective method of preventing “direct and public incitement to commit
genocide.”85 Nevertheless, the international community favored an all or nothing interpretation of
the Convention’s obligations which impeded action as states were unwilling to entertain the idea
of military intervention.86 Furthermore, definitional ambiguities in the wording of the Convention,
a problem to be discussed later in this article, enabled those that wished to avoid saying genocide
to do so. US State Department spokesperson, Christine Shelly, dodged direct reference to genocide
stating that it “has a very precise legal meaning…Before we begin to use [the] term, we have to
know as much as possible about the facts of the situation, particularly about the intentions of those
who are committing the crimes” She further reasoned that “the intentions, the precise intentions,
and whether or not these are directed episodically or with the intention of actually eliminating
groups in whole or in part, is a more complicated issue to address…It’s something that requires
a very careful study before we can make a final determination.”87 Shelly clearly exploited the
Convention’s ambiguities to the advantage of those who did not wish to invoke it, making the
determination of genocide seem like a legitimately more complicated and long drawn-out process
than it reasonably should be.
Thus, even in the more humanitarian oriented 1990s, the realpolitik, national interests of states
hindered the prevention and halting of genocide. Whereas Cambodia had been a pawn between
major powers that had significant involvement in the region, Rwanda suffered from the opposite.
Of the permanent five, only France had any direct interest there and in a context where the UN
was engaged in multiple missions throughout the world, one of which, a year before had gone
disastrously wrong, politicians in the US and the UK were unwilling to risk the domestic backlash
should they commit to another peacekeeping mission that may go awry. For very different reasons,
political interest was a hindrance to the effectiveness of the Genocide Convention. In this case, the
Convention was not forgotten, though not formally invoked, and its deficiencies played into the
hands of those attempting to avoid what they considered to be an obligation to “do something.”
While a lack of political interest as influenced by realpolitik can impede the effectiveness of the
Genocide Convention as states are reluctant to act unless prevention or intervention is within their
national interest, the deficiencies of the Convention intensify this problem by allowing and enabling
politicians to manipulate and exploit the very tool that should encourage action.88 Furthermore, the
failure to clarify the nature of the obligation to prevent and to give an idea of the ways in which
preventing or halting genocide might be enacted outside of military intervention exacerbated the
lack of will to intervene as politicians deliberately sought to avoid the perceived obligation to
commit militarily in Rwanda.
“Never Again,” Again: Darfur
After the failure in Rwanda, as well as Bosnia, in the 1990s, the UN and the international
community reaffirmed their commitment to the promise of “never again” and small steps were
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taken to overcome some of the issues of preventing and halting genocide. In 2001, the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, established by the Canadian government in
2000, issued its report which promoted the R2P concept. This framed the underlying principle
of state sovereignty not as control over one’s people but as a responsibility to one’s people.
More importantly for prevention, however, R2P acknowledged that, should a state fail in its
responsibility, by being unwilling, unable or the perpetrator, then that responsibility would fall to
the international community as a whole.89 This was aimed at easing issues of sovereignty by giving
priority to the state to prevent atrocity crimes within its borders and by justifying the involvement
of the international community in its internal affairs if it failed to do so. These principles were
reaffirmed at the 2005 World Summit and the Secretary-General has since been working towards
further clarifying and developing an understanding of the obligations and actions required by the
international community as entailed by R2P.90 In addition, in 2004, the Secretary-General created
the OSAPG, which became a fulltime position in 2007, to address previous limitations in efforts
to prevent genocide.91 The Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide’s (SAPG) mandate was,
according to Juan Méndez, the first to act in this role, to focus on how to prevent genocide by
“gathering information, providing early warning and presenting appropriate recommendations
to prevent a situation from degenerating into genocide.”92 It has also created an extensive and
flexible framework for analyzing and identifying potential cases based on the definition offered in
the Convention, has monitored and provided recommendations on situations in various countries
and, in doing so, has had some successes.93 Nonetheless, although promising, it is within the
context of these initiatives that genocide in Darfur, Sudan has continued unimpeded since 2003.
While analysis of Cambodia and Rwanda have emphasized the role of particular factors, namely
state sovereignty and level of political interest, Darfur is the first case in which the Convention was
officially invoked and directly applied to an on-going genocide and is thus, an excellent example
of its inherent deficiencies.94
Violence in Darfur broke out in early 2003 following attacks on government military forces
by rebels of the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and Justice and Equality Movement
(JEM). The Government of Sudan (GoS) responded with a devastating counter-insurgency
campaign, supporting Janjaweed militias in their desolation of Darfur.95 These militias have
systematically targeted Black African Darfuris, predominantly from the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa
tribes, razing villages, killing large numbers of civilians and engaging in mass rape of women and
girls.96 Though violence was triggered by the armed rebellion of SLA/M and JEM in early 2003, like
Rwanda, it has complex, more long-term, and varied origins.97 Since the 1980s, ethnic tensions have
been exacerbated by a changing climate which saw drought, famine and desertification push what,
superficially, can be categorized as Arab, nomadic herders and Black African, sedentary farmers
into competition for increasingly scarce resources.98 Attempted mediation by the GoS often saw the
Arab-dominated government typically favor Arab herders over Black Africans and, as conflict has
continued, the government has supplied weapons and provided assistance to Arabs in the region.99
Conflict within Sudan, as well as in neighboring regions, has also aggravated the situation and
hindered early preventive action. An Arab supremacist ideology imported from Chad and Libya
has intensified government favoritism toward the Arab groups and the involvement of Chad in the
rebellion, in terms of supplying arms and assistance, has increased factionalism within the rebel
groups which has obstructed attempts to establish and maintain peace.100 Civil war between North
and South Sudan has also intensified frictions as both the GoS and Sudan People’s Liberation
Army/Movement (SPLA/M) have provided supplies and financial assistance to groups in Darfur in
order to enhance their respective causes. When, in 2001, the government and SPLA/M entered into
peace talks in Naivasha, at which Darfur was not represented, rebel groups became concerned over
being left out of decisions that would shape the future Sudan and staged an uprising in response.101
As René Lemarchand suggests, the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January
2005 officially ending the civil war, and paving the way for independence for South Sudan, may
also have impeded peace efforts as rebels attempt to force a similar agreement.102
The civil war has also overshadowed violence in Darfur as media reportage focused on the
peace talks.103 It was not until March-April 2004 that Darfur began to capture media attention after
a speech by UN Humanitarian Coordinator, Mukesh Kapila, on 19 March 2004, associated the
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violence with the Rwandan genocide.104 Public awareness dramatically increased and, during the
following months, responding to domestic activism and pressure, US politicians gradually began to
discuss Darfur in relation to genocide.105 An investigation was launched which, after interviewing
1,136 Darfuri refugees in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in Chad, found a “consistent
pattern of atrocities” directed against the non-Arab ethnic groups in Darfur.106 Based on these
findings, Secretary of State Colin Powell declared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
on 9 September that, “genocide had been committed…and may still be occurring.” Accordingly,
under Article VIII of the Genocide Convention, he called on the UN to launch “a full-blown and
unfettered investigation.”107 On 18 September, the UN, responding to these recommendations issued
Security Council Resolution 1564 which established a Commission of Inquiry (COI) to investigate
atrocities in Darfur.108 The COI conducted its investigation in Sudan between November 2004 and
January 2005 and, contrary to the US finding, declared that the “Government of Sudan had not
pursued a policy of genocide,” although recognized that “gross violations of human rights” had
been perpetrated, including crimes against humanity and war crimes.109
The fact that the US and UN arrived at such divergent conclusions, while possibly influenced
by differences in methodology, rigor, and thoroughness in their respective investigations,110 is also
a result of the definitional ambiguities in the Genocide Convention. Article II of the Convention
offers a list of acts that might be considered genocide if “committed with the intent to destroy,
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.” It offers no further
clarification for how such intent might be determined, whether “in whole or in part” should
refer to the intent to destroy or to the actual destruction of a group, or how “in part” might be
either quantified or qualified. Consequently, the Convention’s ambiguous wording proved
problematic when invoked in relation to Darfur. The wording “in whole or in part” was found to
be straightforward when applied to actual, physical destruction and both investigations concluded
that atrocities were sufficiently “widespread,” “systematic,” and “large scale.”111 However, “in
whole or in part” as it pertained to the “intent to destroy” proved to be a point of contention. The
US investigation found that “evidence corroborates the specific intent of the perpetrators to destroy
a group ‘in whole or in part’” and that “intent may be inferred from their deliberate conduct.”112 In
contrast, the COI found that “the crucial element of genocidal intent appears to be missing” This
was argued on the basis of “several indicators” such as “the fact that…attackers refrained from
exterminating the whole population…but instead selectively killed groups of young men”113 The
COI focused predominantly on killing as opposed to other methods of genocide and imposed a
higher threshold of interpretation than the US investigation had, understanding genocidal intent
as meaning the intent to destroy the group “in whole” rather than “in part,” an interpretation
at odds with the jurisprudence of international law.114 In his analysis of the UN’s investigation,
Samuel Totten suggests that the COI may have been biased towards a finding against genocide
from the start.115 If this was the case, then the ambiguities of the Convention certainly assisted its
manipulation of the definition of genocide so as to arrive at the desirable conclusion.
In addition to its ambiguous wording, limiting protected groups to just national, ethnic, racial,
or religious groups has created difficulties. Aside from the obvious problem of excluding certain
groups from protection, which Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn argue meant that prior to the 1990s the
UN had not denounced any genocidal killings as genocide,116 this limitation means that for a finding
of genocide, it must be ascertained whether the victims constitute one of the protected groups and
whether they were targeted with the intent to destroy them as part of that group. This is exacerbated
by the Convention’s failure to provide definitions for terms which have complex and mutable
identities. As Chalk and Jonassohn have emphasized, the terms national, ethnic, racial, and religious
are historically and culturally dependent and have fluid meanings that can differ over time and
across cultures.117 There are inherent complications involved in identifying groups that rarely meet
neat, objective definitions. Moreover, there are questions over who should define the group identity.
Should this be an objective party such as the UN, scholars, or politicians, or should it be a subjective
one such as the victim group or the perpetrators themselves? More importantly, what happens when
the definitions of the subjective approach do not meet those of the objective approach?
These issues are highlighted by Darfur where the identification of victim and perpetrator
groups proved difficult since to an outsider there seemed to be little to no difference between
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them.118 The US investigation had offered a broad interpretation defining victims simply as “nonArab” ethnic groups.119 However, the COI considered the issue in more depth noting that victims
objectively do not appear to make up ethnic groups distinct from the perpetrators.120 Indeed, they
shared a number of cultural characteristics.121 The COI took into account the perspective of both
the perpetrator and victim group and found that individuals “have come to perceive themselves as
either ‘African’ or ‘Arab’” and consequently, victims “subjectively make up a protected group.”122
This reasoning is based on jurisprudence established by the International Criminal Tribunals
for Yugoslavia and Rwanda.123 Though they concluded that the group element was sufficient to
find genocide, the COI’s lengthy discussion of the topic is suggestive of the complex and timeconsuming difficulties inherent in identifying groups involved in genocidal violence, especially
since, in most cases, these groups are likely to be subjective social constructions as opposed to
objectively distinguishable categories. This obviously has potential to impact preventive efforts
as a genocide determination is delayed while questions over the identification of a group and
whether victims were targeted based on that membership are answered.
Definitional issues in the Convention create, as Scott Straus suggests, “debilitating debates”
over whether a situation can accurately be described as genocide which prolongs and hinders
preventive responses. Such debates typically distract from difficult, but more important, questions
over what could and should be done to prevent or halt genocide.124 Furthermore, as Beth Van Schaack
observes, the investigation and determination of genocide as a precursor to either prevention or
intervention can be used as a delay tactic by those reluctant to act.125 By the time the US called on
the UN, for example, genocide was already underway and, despite having already investigated the
situation itself, asked the UN to investigate further and not to intervene. The apparent requirement
of a determination of genocide prior to action by the international community is also potentially
detrimental. Of course, Jerry Fowler is correct in his assertion that a determination of genocide
does not result in direct action.126 However, the rhetorical power of “genocide,” a power that other
terms have failed to develop, has potential in terms of outraging, raising awareness and mobilizing
support for action.127 Furthermore, the use of genocide can morally embarrass, and to an extent
oblige, politicians who might otherwise seek to avoid efforts to prevent or halt genocide. Indeed,
it was the memory of Rwanda that prompted George W. Bush to declare “not on my watch” in
relation to Darfur.128 However, the characterization of violence as crimes against humanity and not
genocide by the COI let the international community “off the hook” so to speak as it appears to
have stymied media attention and public interest that had been gathering increased momentum
through 2004. David Luban observes that media coverage largely misunderstood the findings
leading to headlines such as “Murder – But No Genocide,” and “Sudan: U.N. clears Government
of Genocide” that contributed to a perception that crimes against humanity were not as bad, and
also a belief that the UN had vindicated the GoS.129 Despite such increased activism after first
declarations of genocide, the failure to legitimize those claims seems to have led to a general apathy
that enabled the US to weaken its initial Darfur Accountability Act which had been established to
bring in tough legislation against the GoS.130 It is impossible to determine the extent to which the
COI’s findings did impact action in Darfur. However, the implication is that at the very least it
altered the perception of Darfur as an urgent crisis allowing politicians to remain reluctant to
intervene and violence to continue unabated, fading into the background, described recently as a
“forgotten genocidal war.”131
In addition to definitional issues, the lack of clarification over what the obligation to prevent in
Article I of the Convention entails also impedes its effectiveness in prompting successful prevention.
This is emphasized by the responses of the US and UN to their respective investigations in Darfur.
The US simply deferred the matter to the UN and Powell even made the point that other than
this referral “no new action is dictated by this determination.”132 This response has been criticized
by scholars, including Eric Reeves who suggested that Powell undermined the Convention by
interpreting the obligation to prevent as entailing so little.133 Nonetheless, the ambiguous wording
and failure to clarify the obligation to prevent means that the US interpretation, however distasteful,
was valid within the terms of the Convention. The UN response was similarly disappointing. The
COI seemingly noted the importance of action stating that “the international community cannot
stand idle by, while human life and human dignity are attacked daily and on so large a scale in
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Darfur.” One might have thought that such reasoning would conclude with recommendations
for intervention. Incredibly, it did not. Instead, the COI recommended that the situation be
referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for prosecution.134 This response reflects the
punitive focus of the Genocide Convention and highlights the negative effect this can have on
prevention and intervention. By approaching their investigation as a legal case, focusing on justice
as if the genocide had concluded, the COI bypassed prevention, or rather by 2004, intervention,
which gave the impression of constructive action, and may have contributed to a lack of forceful
action that has allowed genocide in Darfur to continue relatively unobstructed. In July 2008, the
ICC’s chief prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo did eventually petition the Court to issue an arrest
warrant, including counts of genocide, for President Omar al-Bashir arguing that “his alibi was
‘counterinsurgency’. His intent was genocide.”135 A warrant was issued in 2009, though the charge
of genocide was conspicuously absent, however, al-Bashir dismissed the warrant as worthless.136 In
2010, a second arrest warrant was issued, this time including genocide.137 However, since Sudan is
not a signatory to the Rome Statute, the ICC can do little while he remains within Sudanese borders
and under the protection of state sovereignty.
The specter of state sovereignty has also haunted efforts to bring genocide to an end in Darfur
as the GoS continues to obstruct intervention. Since 2004, the GoS has attempted to force the
removal of the African Union’s Mission in Sudan (AMIS),138 has objected to a UN peacekeeping
force, although Security Council Resolution 1769 establishing a hybrid UN-AU force (UNAMID),
albeit with a watered-down mandate, was agreed in July 2007,139 has delayed deployment of
peacekeepers and has frequently restricted peacekeepers’ freedom of movement within the
country.140 Since the issuance of the arrest warrant, it has further clamped down on movement and
access in Darfur in order to prevent investigation of atrocities. More importantly, in 2009, the GoS
expelled all foreign NGOs and has since used its sovereignty to block aid and access to IDP camps
where food shortages and malnutrition have become increasingly worse. 141 Despite R2P and a
gradual erosion of the notion of absolute sovereignty then, the concept continues to allow al-Bashir
to act with impunity, remains an impediment to efforts to halt violence in Darfur and is actually
contributing to genocide by attrition.
That the GoS’ sovereignty remains intact in spite of R2P and evidence of genocide is largely
due to an international community that for all its rhetoric has expressed a lack of will to take a more
robust approach. Indeed, though it led the way in first discussions of genocide and has implemented
sanctions against GoS, the US response has been weak. This is largely due to the political context
which saw Sudan become an ally in the US’ war on terror after the attacks in September 2001.142
Furthermore, the context of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 caused some countries to be cautious
of US motives in declaring genocide in Darfur and as Eric Heinze observed, any involvement in
another Arab nation’s internal affairs without UN support was unlikely to have been well-received.
In fact, the US was accused of using the rhetoric of genocide in relation to Darfur as a “pretext to
invade another oil-rich and predominantly Arab and Muslim state.”143 Securing UN support has
been problematic since China and Russia, both of whom have vested interests in Sudan, have often
abstained from votes and threatened the use of the veto on issues related to Darfur. Indeed, China
has invested heavily in oil and other commercial developments importing two-thirds of Sudan’s
oil supply and, along with Russia, is one of the main suppliers of weapons to the government.144 In
addition to their diplomatic maneuvering, both countries continue to defy a UN arms embargo by
supplying weapons and munitions that fuel the conflict.145 Such a context has given tacit support
for the GoS allowing for the continuation of genocide under the protection of state sovereignty
which is used to block the diluted measures that have been undertaken to bring violence to a halt.
State sovereignty becomes quite the formidable barrier when the realpolitik interests of states create
a lack of will to intervene.
Thus, while the Genocide Convention was invoked, its deficiencies have contributed to failures
to halt genocide in Darfur. The lack of clarification over what the obligation to prevent entails
has meant that US politicians could appear to act, easing domestic pressure, through referring
the situation to the UN without actually taking action itself. Similarly, the punitive focus of the
Convention has enabled the UN to ‘act’ by referring the situation to the ICC for punishment.
Definitional ambiguities have enabled a dubious negative finding of genocide which stymied a
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rising activism and was again used as a delay tactic by those who wished to avoid action. Obviously,
these failures cannot be viewed in isolation. State sovereignty has been an impediment to efforts
to halt genocide as the GoS has maintained ultimate control over access to the country. This is a
situation that is intensified by a general lack of will to intervene due to realpolitik interests of states
that implicitly lie with supporting the GoS and not with halting genocide.
Conclusion
Writing in 1981, Kuper remarked that the Genocide Convention was a “dead letter.”146 Over thirty
years and a number of genocides later, his comment remains largely accurate. The Convention was
created in the aftermath of Second World War to mitigate the absolute nature of a fundamental
principle of the nation-state system; namely, state sovereignty, which Lemkin argued could no
longer allow states to act with impunity. With its moral obligation and unanimous promise to
“liberate mankind” from the “odious scourge” of genocide it also attempts to address realpolitik
decision making. In both endeavors it has been disappointing. Far from being a tool for the
prevention and halting of genocide, it appears to have become more useful to those who wish to
avoid action.147 At the time of writing, genocide is ongoing in Darfur and has been used to describe
violence in the CAR, as well as Syria and Iraq.
The analysis of this article has shown that the Genocide Convention certainly has its flaws
and is an impediment to the prevention and halting of genocide in terms of its failure to clarify
what the obligation to prevent entails, including what actions might be required and legitimate,
its definitional ambiguities which cause debilitating debates over whether a situation is in fact
genocide, and its punitive focus which draws attention away from prevention and intervention.148
However, its utility is essentially bound up with the concept of state sovereignty and problems
related to levels of political interest in a complex, intersecting relationship. State sovereignty can
obstruct the flow of information crucial to a genocide determination, brings up tricky questions
over what and when preventive action is legitimate, and more importantly, how the UN should
balance its often contradictory roles of, on the one hand, a defender of sovereignty and, on the
other, an organization committed to the prevention of genocide. Underlying both the Convention’s
deficiencies and state sovereignty are the problems of levels of political interests. A low level of
political interest or a high level of differing realpolitik interests can both be disastrous for prevention
and intervention as politicians manipulate state sovereignty and the deficiencies of the Genocide
Convention in order to ensure that their national interests are met which, based on the three cases
discussed, usually includes avoiding action in the face of genocide.
Understanding the relationship between the factors that contributed to past failures to
prevent genocide is crucial as the twenty-first century is rapidly becoming another “century of
genocide.” Though steps have been taken to improve the possibility of prevention outside of the
problematic framework of the Genocide Convention through the creation of the OSAPG and R2P,
these initiatives, like the Convention, are similarly bound up with state sovereignty and political
interest which will ultimately impact their effectiveness. The current crisis in the CAR is already
suggestive of this. In a joint statement in October 2013, the SAPG, Adama Dieng, and the Special
Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, Jennifer Welsh, invoked R2P in relation to the CAR.149
Echoing Darfur, in December 2013, the Security Council issued Resolution 2127, which called for
the creation of a commission of inquiry to investigate human rights violations in the CAR, and for
the creation of the International Support Mission for the Central African Republic (MISCA) formed
from African soldiers that would bolster French troops already on the ground.150 In April 2014, the
Security Council voted to send a UN peacekeeping force which would increase the joint force to
12,000, although only 1,800 troops had arrived in September with the remainder not expected to
arrive until early 2015.151 In June 2014, the COI for the CAR, issued a report, which, echoing the
Darfur Report, stated that “it was too early to speak of genocide or ethnic cleansing” though did
acknowledge that crimes against humanity and war crimes had taken place.152 This finding was
in spite of concluding that “widespread attacks were directed against the civilian population…
driven, at least in part, by a desire to kill as many Muslims as possible…and efforts were made to
kill even those who were seeking to flee the country.”153 The report has been utilized in the media
more as a confirmation of the absence of genocide, rather than as a confirmation of the urgency
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to act.154 As such, the title of a Huffington Post article, “A Country is on the Brink of Genocide and
Very Few Know About It,” accurately summarizes the present situation.155 In a political context
in which a number of crises have been described in terms of genocide, including Syria and Iraq,
like Rwanda, the CAR is a low priority. Thus, over a year later, very little progress has been made
in halting its escalation and although condemning a resurgence of violence in January 2015, UN
investigators are now calling for the establishment of an international tribunal.156 Only time will tell
whether the international community can rise to the challenge and make “never again” a reality in
respect to the CAR.
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Abstract: Theoretical accounts of genocide and mass atrocity commonly embrace the thesis of norm
transformation. This thesis holds, first, that individual and institutional participation in such crimes is at
least partially explained by transformations in basic norms that structure social and political life. It holds,
second, that preventing future occurrences of such crimes requires changing norms that currently guide the
actions of particular individual and institutional actors. This paper clarifies, defends, and extends the thesis
of norm transformation. It clarifies this thesis by providing a general account of the nature and dynamics of
norms. It defends this thesis against charges of circularity and against the claim that norms are not, in fact,
fundamental guides to action. Finally, it extends this thesis by arguing that changes in norms before, during,
and after mass atrocities count among the considerations that ought to be included in assessments of legal
and moral accountability for such crimes.
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Theoretical accounts of genocide and mass atrocity commonly embrace some version of the
thesis of norm transformation. This thesis holds, first, that individual and institutional participation
in such crimes is at least partially explained by transformations in basic norms that structure social
and political life. It holds, second, that preventing future occurrences of such crimes requires
changing norms that currently guide the actions of particular individual and institutional actors.
Taken together, these two claims put the thesis of norm transformation at the center of ongoing
efforts to explain and prevent genocide and mass atrocity.
Despite widespread acceptance of the thesis of norm transformation, there is no scholarly
consensus concerning the nature or dynamics of norms. Political scientists and historians,
sociologists and legal scholars all operate with distinct conceptions of norms, rarely considering
whether those conceptions meet the needs of researchers approaching genocide and mass atrocity
from alternative disciplinary perspectives. This conceptual variation has impeded critical reflection
on the thesis of norm transformation, and has allowed important challenges to this thesis to go
unaddressed.
This paper clarifies, defends, and extends the thesis of norm transformation. It clarifies this
thesis by offering a general account of norms and norm dynamics, and by showing how this account
can enrich existing explanatory and preventive applications of the thesis of norm transformation. It
defends this thesis against a number of theoretical and practical challenges—including challenges
to the power of this thesis to help explain historical mass atrocities, and challenges to the efficacy
of proposed preventive changes in norms. Finally, it extends this thesis by arguing for a third,
evaluative claim, namely, that changes in norms before, during, and after mass atrocities count
among the considerations that ought to be included in assessments of legal and moral accountability
for such crimes.
In proposing this extension of the thesis of norm transformation, this paper posits a fundamental
continuity between explanatory, preventive, and evaluative applications of this thesis. The paper
thus breaks with much recent scholarship on genocide and mass atrocity, within which these
different aims appear either unrelated or at odds.1 At the same time, the paper acknowledges key
criticisms of existing modes of assessing legal accountability for mass violence. Those criticisms
help structure the discussion of the evaluative implications of the thesis of norm transformation.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section One uses a case drawn from the annals of National
Socialist medical practice as the starting point for a general discussion of norms and norm dynamics.
Norms are defined in terms of three features: their acceptance, their particularity, and their action-
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guiding power. Different types of norm transformations are then distinguished, including norm
inversion, norm breakdown, and norm emergence.
Section Two examines in more detail existing explanatory and preventive applications of
the thesis of norm transformation. Applications of both types, it is argued, rely on three basic
theoretical assumptions. The first assumption is that it is possible to reliably identify differences
in the norms accepted by particularly situated individuals across two or more moments in time.
The second assumption is that norms have a fundamental, or non-reducible, power to guide the
actions of individuals and thereby pattern the conduct of groups. The third assumption is that it
is possible to pinpoint specific mechanisms by which particular changes in norms have been, or
might be, achieved.
Section Three addresses two significant challenges to current explanatory and preventive
applications of the thesis of norm transformation. These challenges – termed the circularity
challenge and the norm-reducibility challenge – target the first two theoretical assumptions about
norm dynamics mentioned above. In response to these challenges, the paper first argues that
testimony, broadly construed, offers a source of non-circular evidence concerning historical norm
transformations. The paper then distinguishes between identity-instituting and identity-vindicating
norm transformations, and uses this distinction to defuse the second, norm-reducibility challenge.
Section Four turns, finally, to the evaluative extension of the thesis of norm transformation.
The section frames this extension in terms of the localization of moral and legal responsibility
for transformations in norms that contribute to mass atrocity. The section first argues that it is
legitimate to localize—i.e. restrict to some subset of a larger set of qualified parties—attributions of
moral responsibility for norm transformation in cases where specific mechanisms for transforming
norms can be identified, and where those changes in norms have had a demonstrable effect on the
precipitation or prolongation of large-scale wrongs. The section then argues that in cases of societywide norm breakdown, as may be found in so-called “extremely violent societies,” localization of
legal responsibility for mass violence faces a higher justificatory burden, for both historiographical
and properly juridical reasons.
Norms: Definition and Dynamics
On 11 September 1940, Dr. Leonardo Conti of the Reich Interior Ministry addressed a letter to
his former medical school teacher, Professor Gottfried Ewald. Conti’s letter was occasioned by
Ewald’s critical evaluation and rejection of the secret Nazi euthanasia program, Aktion T4.2 The text
of Conti’s letter reads as follows:
Dear Professor Ewald,
With the deepest gratitude I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 21 August. I still
remember with great pleasure your lectures in Erlangen.
Your analysis contains much that is right, I’m sure. Nevertheless, I take a different view,
although I cannot and will not set it down in writing at this time. I would only like to say, that
I am fully convinced that the opinions of the entire German Volk concerning these things are
undergoing a transformation, and I can very easily imagine that things which in one period are
considered objectionable [verwerflich] can in the next period come to be regarded as the only
right choice. This is something we have experienced countless times in the course of history.
As the most recent example I would gently point to the sterilization law: here the process of a
transformation in thought [Umformung des Denkens] is today already quite far advanced.3

Conti’s letter has commonly been cited as evidence of professional complicity in the Holocaust.4
The letter is of interest here because of the remarkable historical articulation it offers of the
thesis of norm transformation. Conti’s letter contemplates transformations in two long-standing
prohibitions within the medical profession: a prohibition on intentional medical killing and a
prohibition on involuntary sterilization. In order to better understand these claims, we must first
clarify the definition of norms.
Defining Norms
This paper proposes the following general definition of norms:
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Norms are practical prescriptions, permissions, or prohibitions, accepted by members of
particular groups, organizations, or societies, and capable of guiding the actions of those
individuals.

Several features of this definition demand elaboration. First, it is necessary to explain what
“acceptance” of a norm entails. Second, it is necessary to explain the significance of the particularity,
or domain-limitedness, of norms. Third, it is necessary to explain what it means for norms to guide
actions, and in what ways this can occur.
In the first place, norms are accepted by individuals. This is the basis of the socio-empirical
quality of norms—i.e. their status as social facts that can be studied via standard procedures
of historical and social scientific inquiry.5 Philosophical accounts of norm acceptance vary
considerably; this paper will not seek to defend any single one of them.6 What is crucial is that any
adequate account must accommodate a range of different types of norm acceptance, extending
from relatively formal and explicit acts of acceptance (as in the case of professional oaths,
university honor codes, and so on) to relatively informal or implicit forms of norm acceptance
(as in the case of norms governing fair dealing in monetary transactions or gift giving).7 This
paper is committed, furthermore, to two specific claims about norm acceptance. First, there is a
substantive difference between following a norm merely in order to avoid sanctions imposed on
infractions, and following a norm in order to sustain or satisfy properly normative attitudes (such
as obligation; felt-bindingness, and so on). That difference may constitute, and at least tracks, the
difference between merely conforming with and actually accepting a norm.8 Second, although it
may be the case that all norms are, in principle, linguistically expressible, it is not necessarily the
case that every individual who accepts a certain norm must be able to give a clear verbal account
of that norm’s requirements.9
In the second place, norms are domain-limited. They circulate within particular groups,
organizations, and societies. This feature of norms explains the significant role that norms play in
sustaining shared identities within particular groups, organizations, or societies.10 It is also crucial
to efforts by historians and social scientists to use norms to explain patterns of collective, rather than
merely individual, behavior.11 To be sure, the bounds of the collectivities within which particular
norms circulate are rarely static. The discussion of norm dynamics below aims to account for some
of the many ways in which those bounds can change.
Finally, norms have the power to guide actions. Exactly how norms perform this central, actionguiding function is contested. One problem is to understand the cognitive and conative conditions
under which norms dispose individuals to pursue particular courses of conduct. A second problem
is to establish distinctions among the different types of actions—ranging from compliant to
defiant—that can rightly be said to be guided by a given norm.12 While these difficulties should
not be discounted, the action-guiding power of norms is clearly central to both explanatory and
preventive applications of the thesis of norm transformation.13 Importantly, this paper assumes
what I call the priority of the practical point of view. Put simply, this assumption holds that
properly characterizing the contributions of particular norms to the prevention, or precipitation,
of mass atrocities requires considering how those norms contribute to individuals’ first-personal
deliberations over plans and courses of conduct.
How, then, does the definition of norms offered here enrich our understanding of Conti’s
claims concerning the prohibitions on intentional medical killing and involuntary sterilization? It
does so in three ways. First, Conti is asking Ewald to believe that, despite continuing widespread
acceptance of the prohibition on euthanasia within German society, this norm is likely soon
to change substantially. This claim, in turn, rests on an implicit distinction between the norms
accepted by medical professionals such as Conti and by members of society at large. Finally,
Conti appears to be suggesting that his former teacher ought not only to accept the change in the
norms concerning euthanasia, but to act upon it—either in his role as a professor, or as a hospital
administrator, or both.14
Ultimately, the claims set out in Conti’s letter are not just claims about norms, but claims about
transformations in norms. In order to fully understand these claims, it is necessary to turn from the
definition to the dynamics of norms.
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Norm Dynamics
The topic of norm dynamics can be divided into two broad classes of questions. First, there are
questions about the categorization of different types of transformations in norms. Second, there
are questions about the empirical conditions under which norms are more or less likely to undergo
transformations of these several types. The analysis offered in this section focuses on questions of
the first kind. Specifically, it seeks to distinguish between norm inversion, norm breakdown, and
norm emergence.
Norm Inversion

Norm inversions occur when individuals who previously accepted prohibitions on certain
actions come to regard those same actions as required, or vice versa. It is possible, in principle for lone
individuals to experience such radical transformations in normative attitudes and commitments,
without thereby participating in broader group- or society-level inversions. Nevertheless, historical
and social scientific claims about norm inversion typically refer to changes in norms accepted in
the aggregate by members of particular groups, organizations, or societies.15
Conti’s letter to Ewald offers a remarkably apt description of the dynamics of norm inversion.
As Conti writes with respect to the existing prohibition on intentional medical killing: “things
which in one period are considered objectionable can in the next period come to be regarded as
the only right choice.” The last part of this claim makes clear that Conti has in mind not merely
the erosion of a prohibition, but rather a shift from a prohibition to a prescription, or normative
requirement. It is also evident from Conti’s letter that he anticipates not just individual, but grouplevel inversions of norms: first among members of the medical profession, ultimately among “the
entire German Volk.”
Norm Breakdown

Norm breakdowns occur when previously accepted norms cease to guide actions in fact,
and cease to be available as guides to action in principle. These two types of transformation are
logically distinct, but in practice they often occur together.16 When previously prevailing norms
cease to be reflected in the publically observable actions of large numbers of individuals within a
particular group, those norms tend to become less useful as guides to action for other members
of that group. In the accounts of norm breakdown among German professionals under National
Socialism offered by Konrad Jarausch and Berel Lang, just this dynamic is described.17
Like other kinds of norm transformations, breakdowns in norms are generally identified at
the level of groups or populations. However, they cannot be fully understood without considering
the beliefs and actions of individual actors. When norms break down, they lose their power to
guide the decisions and actions of individual actors. This can occur for one of a number of reasons.
Sometimes requisite motivational factors, such as empathy or a sense of fairness, fade. Other times
norms, and the systems of norms to which they belong, become too complicated or convoluted
to guide action. Wartime brutalization offers a reason of the first kind for norm breakdown.18 The
existence of secret or contradictory laws within a repressive state offers a reason of the second
kind.19
Norm Emergence

Norm emergence refers to a range of pathways and processes by which new norms arise
and gain acceptance within particular populations. In this way, norm emergence contrasts with
both norm inversion and norm breakdown – each of which starts from a condition in which a
particular norm is already accepted by individuals belonging to a particular group, organization,
or society.
Conceptual distinctions among different modes of norm emergence have only recently begun
to receive sustained attention from scholars. Political scientists have described cases of grafting of
new norms onto already existing norms, and have emphasized the importance of the work that
norm entrepreneurs do in facilitating norm emergence.20 Philosophers have analyzed phenomena
such as the tendentious introduction of norms, and have modeled non-coercive paths of emergence
for particular cooperation- and coordination-facilitating norms.21
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Perhaps the most interesting trend in the study of norm emergence has been the rapid increase,
over the past decades, in case studies of the development of particular norms in international law
and politics.22 Unlike more general discussions of norm dynamics, many of these case studies
aim to show how the development of specific norms has helped, or might help, to prevent mass
violence. In order to better assess such claims we should turn now to examine in more detail the
thesis of norm transformation.
The Thesis of Norm Transformation
The thesis of norm transformation combines claims about the explanation and the prevention of
large-scale crimes. It holds, first, that individual and institutional participation in such crimes is at
least partially explained by transformations in basic norms that structure social and political life.
It holds, second, that preventing future occurrences of such crimes requires changing norms that
currently guide the actions of particular individual and institutional actors.
Efforts by scholars and policymakers to use the thesis of norm transformation to explain, or
prevent, particular instances of genocide and mass atrocity will be referred to here as applications of
this thesis. This section will analyze several representative explanatory and preventive applications
of the thesis of norm transformation. One aim of this analysis is to show how the general account
of norms and norm dynamics offered above can enrich existing applications of this thesis. Another
aim is to identify the basic theoretical assumptions underlying such applications.
Explanatory Applications
Reflecting on the Rwandan genocide in a 2004 article, political scientist Lee Ann Fujii directly invokes
the thesis of norm transformation. “Put simply,” she writes, “genocidal leaders had to transform
the normative environment [in Rwanda] such that actions that were once considered verboten
(such as killing thy neighbor) could be viewed as not only legitimate but imperative.”23 Fujii offers
a social psychological explanation for why such a transformation in norms should accompany
genocide. “Norms,” she avers, “become more important when reality is confusing, contradictory, or
changing. The more ambiguous the situation, the more likely people are to rely on norms as guides
for behavior; and the clearer the prescription of a given norm, the more likely people will follow
that norm and not others.”24 Throughout her paper, Fujii scans historical records and first-person
accounts for clues to the particular mechanisms by which “genocide became normalized.”25
Fujii’s invocation of the thesis of norm transformation calls attention to three theoretical
assumptions that underlie explanatory applications of this thesis. The first assumption is that it is
possible to reliably identify differences in the norms accepted by particularly situated individuals
across two or more moments in time. The second assumption is that norms have a fundamental, or
non-reducible, power to guide the actions of individuals, and consequently to pattern the conduct
of groups. The third assumption is that it is possible to pinpoint specific mechanisms by which
particular changes in norms have been, or might be, attained.
These three assumptions are not restricted to Fujii’s application of the thesis of norm
transformation. The letter from Dr. Conti discussed above manifests these assumptions. Turning
to a more contemporary, and scholarly, literature, Christopher Browning’s influential analysis of
participation by “ordinary men” in mass killings on the Eastern Front during the Second World
War embodies these assumptions.26
Consider the first assumption identified above. Browning’s study of the members of Reserve
Police Battalion 101, and his reasons for rejecting the idea that racist ideology or wartime
brutalization might help to explain their participation in mass atrocity, are too familiar to require
recapitulation here. What is worth noting is that Browning identifies not one, but two inversions
in norms accepted by members of this particular unit at different moments in time. Browning first
posits an inversion in norms regarding killing prior to participation by members of the Police
Battalion in mass shootings in German-controlled territory in Eastern Europe. He then posits a
second inversion, in fact a reversion, in the decades following WWII. Browning writes:
to concede that the morally inverted world of National Socialism—so at odds with the political
culture and accepted norms of the 1960s—had made perfect sense to them at the time, would
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be to admit that they were political and moral eunuchs who simply accommodate to each
successive regime. That was a truth with which few [former members of Reserve Police
Battalion 101] either wanted or were able to come to grips.27

In order to see how the second assumption about norms is implicit in explanatory applications
of the thesis of norm transformation, it is helpful to consider cases of apparent norm breakdown.
Argentinean legal scholar Carlos Santiago Nino offers a helpful example in his discussion of
“institutional anomie” during the Dirty War in his home country. Nino suggests that “judicial
recognition of the legitimacy of coups d’état and the regime’s ensuing laws is perhaps the clearest
example” of such anomie. 28 In helping to legitimate such practices, Nino argues, Argentinean courts
allowed the erosion of crucial rule of law norms such as publicity and consistency in the law.29
Similar claims about breakdowns in norms governing the conduct of legal actors have been made
by scholars of legal institutions under National Socialism.30 In each of these cases, the assumption is
that relevant norms, had they not broken down, could have guided the implicated actors towards
substantially different courses of conduct.
Consider, finally, the assumption that it is possible for scholars to pinpoint specific mechanisms
by which particular changes norms have been, or might be, attained. Here it is appropriate to
return to Fujii’s 2004 analysis of the Rwandan genocide. Fujii identifies three distinct stages in
the emergence of what she calls a “genocidal norm.”31 Each stage is associated with different
mechanisms for provoking norm transformation. First there was a stage of spreading a message of
social division and threats to the Hutu population from Tutsis. Second was a stage of producing
objective evidence of those threats, through staged attacks, killings, and so on. Third was a stage of
making the threats appear imminent, so as to require immediate action.32
Several of the specific mechanisms for norm transformation that Fujii singles out in these several
stages have clear analogues in other historical cases of genocide. These include disseminating hate
propaganda33 and staging “enemy” attacks. Exactly how strong the causal connections between
such acts and subsequent episodes of mass violence are is contested.34 Even where scholars point
to different events as contributing to the inversion, emergence, or breakdown of norms, however,
they share the assumption that it is possible to pinpoint specific mechanisms or processes that
contribute to such transformations.
Preventive Applications
Preventive applications of the thesis of norm transformation rest on the same three theoretical
assumptions about norm dynamics as explanatory applications. A representative example comes
from legal scholar Mark Osiel’s 2009 book, Making Sense of Mass Atrocity. After asking how changes
in the law might “help created and cultivate within modern armies the institutional characteristics
enabling them to steer clear of mass atrocity,” Osiel suggests that one strategy might be to introduce
laws imposing civil liabilities on officers whose subordinates take part in atrocities. The imposition
of civil liabilities, Osiel suggests, avoids the problems of procedural justice that comparable
criminal liabilities would encounter.35 At the same time, this change in the law directly counters
existing social norms against “snitching” on fellow members of one’s military unit.36
Osiel’s proposal clearly depends upon the theoretical assumption that it is possible to reliably
identify differences in the norms accepted by particularly situated individuals across two or more
moments in time. In this way this preventive application of the thesis of norm transformation
parallels the explanatory applications discussed above. What is different in this and other preventive
cases is that the first of these two periods of time is defined as the present, and the second as some
point in the future.37
The new norm Osiel advances is aimed primarily at individuals, and is closely tied to concrete
sanctions (in the form of fines) for violations. Neither of these features is essential to preventive
applications of the thesis of norm transformation. To see this, it is useful to turn to the emerging
norm of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and consider its claims to guide actions.
Unlike Osiel’s proposed legal norm, R2P aims chiefly to guide the actions of states, rather
than single individuals. And unlike Osiel’s proposed norm, R2P aspires to guide actions even
in the absence of effective enforcement mechanisms. Further clarity comes from distinguishing
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between primary and secondary bearers of responsibilities under R2P. Primary bearers of such
responsibilities are individual states and state leaders. Secondary bearers are the various state and
non-state actors composing the international community, who are tasked with taking up protective
responsibilities when and where primary bearers fail to uphold them.
Crucially, scholars of R2P avoid describing protective actions by secondary bearers as
punishments for failures by primary bearers to fulfill their responsibilities.38 Furthermore, as
Luke Glanville has pointed out, there are currently no legal penalties prescribed for failures by
secondary bearers to act in cases of malfeasance by primary bearers of responsibility.39 What
this example shows is that, while preventive applications of the thesis of norm transformation
depend on the assumption that norms have the power to guide actions, both the status of the
actors guided by such norms and the schemes of accountability supporting such guidance can
vary substantially.
Preventive applications of the thesis of norm transformation commonly give special attention
to the mechanisms by which desired transformations are to be achieved. In political science, as
noted above, scholars have offered numerous studies of the efforts of norm entrepreneurs to change
norms in order to prevent war and civil conflict.40 In addition to highlighting the accomplishments
of heroic individuals, such studies suggest that particular events in the domestic or international
sphere may serve as catalysts for preventive norm transformations. In each of these cases, authors
assume that it is possible to pinpoint specific mechanisms that have caused, or might in the future
contribute to, preventive transformations in norms.
Two Challenges to the Thesis of Norm Transformation
The previous section surveyed some representative explanatory and preventive applications of the
thesis of norm transformation, and identified three basic theoretical assumptions underlying such
applications. This section will consider challenges to two of those assumptions. The first challenge,
called here the circularity challenge, targets the assumption that it is possible to reliably identify
differences in the norms accepted by particularly situated individuals across two or more moments
in time. The second challenge, called here the norm-reducibility challenge, targets the assumption
that norms have a fundamental, or non-reducible, power to guide the actions of individuals, and
thereby pattern the conduct of groups.
The Circularity Challenge
Explanatory applications of the thesis of norm transformation rest in part on the assumption that it
is possible to reliably identify differences in the norms accepted by particularly situated individuals
across two or more moments in time. The circularity challenge casts doubt on this assumption.
It raises questions about the verifiability of claims about the existence of particular at any given
moment in time. Although charges of circularity can be leveled at claims about the existence of
norms in the present day, such charges are strongest when applied to historical claims about norms
or changes in norms. For this reason, it will here be treated as an historiographical challenge to the
thesis of norm transformation.
Claims about the existence of norms are susceptible to charges of circularity because of the
evidentiary gap that separates the observed conduct of actors – i.e. the actions that individuals
undertake – from the unobservable cognitive and conative states of actors – i.e. the beliefs and
attitudes with which they undertake them. In everyday life it is common to infer information about
relevant beliefs and attitudes from the actions of individuals. But in the case of purportedly normguided conduct, such inferences threaten to produce a circular course of reasoning, in the following
manner. First, observed patterns of behavior are taken as evidence of the existence of norms (and,
by extension, the acceptance of those norms by individuals). Second, these same inferred norms are
relied on to explain, or account for, those observed patterns of behavior.41
Some of the most promising strategies for confirming the existence of norms in present-day
contexts are not available in cases of norms supposed to have existed in the past. Cristina Bicchieri,
a leading theorist of social norms, has pioneered experimental methods for identifying, and
measuring the strength of, such norms in present-day political societies.42 These methods depend
on the experimenters’ ability to control the beliefs subjects have about the types of interactions they
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are involved in, as well as the experimenters’ ability to change the material incentives that subjects
have for certain kinds of behavior. So, in experiments designed to analyze norms of fairness,
subjects may be selectively fed information about the past behavior of their experimental partners;
or they may be told that the experiment has been designed in such a way as to prevent partners
from detecting unfair divisions of monetary rewards.43
Experiments of this kind are clearly not feasible when it comes to the study of norms supposed
to have existed in historical contexts.44 There are, however, other sources, besides the actions of
historical individuals themselves, which can provide evidence of the existence of norms that might
help to explain those actions. Two of the most important of these sources, already much discussed
in the literature on genocide and mass atrocity, are documents and testimony.45
Holocaust scholars have extensively debated the relative merits of documents and testimony
as sources of historical knowledge about this genocide. Leading figures such as Raul Hilberg
and Robert Wolfe have insisted on the primacy of documents created by the National Socialists
themselves as sources of information concerning the plan and execution of their genocidal
policies.46 Such documents do indeed provide evidence of norms, and changes in norms. One
important example concerns the language rules developed by various parties within the military
and political hierarchies to conceal the truth about the policies of deportation and mass killing,
both from the targets of such policies and from third parties. The existence of letters and memos in
which particular officials were reprimanded for failing to conform to such language rules seems to
provide non-circular evidence for the existence of such rules, which, as I have argued elsewhere,
may have taken on the status of social norms. 47
For Hilberg, the evidentiary advantage of documents over testimony was decisive. As Yehuda
Bauer has argued, however, prioritizing documents produced by the authors of the plan of
destruction threatens to distort the historical record in another way, by leaving out large segments
of the experience of the groups and communities occupied or terrorized by the National Socialists
and their allies. Treating testimony as a source of historical knowledge is not unproblematic, Bauer
admits, but it is a mistake to think that historiographical quality is unequivocally improved by
excluding it.48
If testimony is admitted as a source of historical knowledge, then it provides a second route
to overcoming the circularity challenge to claims about the existence of norms in historical
contexts.49 It’s important to be clear as to the bounds, and limits, of this resource. As Bauer points
out, testimony will be most reliable when multiple individuals provide consistent testimony
concerning the existence or influence of a particular fact or event.50 In the context of discussions
of norms, numbers are important in part because it is always possible for single individuals to be
mistaken about what norms are accepted by other individuals in a particular context. An example
may help to illustrate this point. Consider a case reported by the German Jewish academic Victor
Klemperer in his important diaries of daily life in Dresden under National Socialism. In his diary
entry for June 13, 1934, Klemperer shares an anecdote concerning the consequences of boycotts of
Jewish-owned business in three neighboring towns outside Dresden:
In Falkenstein one is not allowed to buy from the “Jew.” And so the people in Falkenstein
travel to the Jew in Auerbach. And the Auerbachers in turn buy from the Falkenstein Jew.
However, on bigger shopping expeditions the people from the one-horse towns travel to
Plauen, where there’s a larger Jewish department store. If you run into someone from the
same town, no one has seen anyone. Tacit convention.51

Do Klemperer’s observations count as evidence of the existence of an emerging rule of behavior
in this region at this period, and if so, what is the strength that evidence? Because this is a diary
entry, rather than a piece of courtroom testimony or an oral reminiscence from well after the fact,
certain kinds of criticisms do not apply. Klemperer’s report could hardly be motivated by a desire
to exculpate himself for some wrongdoing (as courtroom testimony might); nor can this report be
distorted by the clouding effects of time. Nevertheless, it is a genuine question whether Klemperer
was correct in his claims about both the actions, and the intentions, of non-Jewish residents of
these towns, and the evidentiary quality of his claim would be heightened if it were joined by
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testimony from other individuals from the area confirming this point. To gain fully dispositive
evidence of a norm governing this specific practice, it might also be necessary to acquire testimony
regarding certain counter-factual claims, such as the claim that at least some of the shoppers in
this region would have acted in this way even if the instrumental reasons for doing so (i.e. fear of
stigmatization or criticism) were removed.52 To my knowledge, such supplementary testimony
does not exist concerning this particular, highly localized convention. It should, however, be
possible to find multiple testimonies to the existence of other kinds of norms during the Holocaust
and other episodes of genocide and mass atrocity.53 In this way, then, it seems possible to overcome
the circularity challenge to explanatory applications of the thesis of norm transformation using
documents and testimony.
The Norm-Reducibility Challenge
Whereas the circularity challenge targets the assumption that it is possible to reliably identify
differences in the norms accepted by particularly situated individuals across two or more moments
in time, the norm-reducibility challenge targets the assumption that norms have a fundamental, or
non-reducible, power to guide the actions of individuals, and consequently to pattern the conduct
of groups. Here I will focus on the argument for norm reduction recently set forth by political
scientist Kristen Renwick Monroe.
In her 2012 book, Ethics in an Age of Terror and Genocide, Monroe aims to show how individuals’
identities, worked out in the context of specific social relationships, constrain the range of choices
available during moral decision-making. 54 Three concepts are crucial to Monroe’s model of moral
choice. First is the concept of identity. Drawing on the findings of social identity theory within
social psychology, Monroe suggests that differences in identity do much to explain the different
actions of perpetrators, bystanders, and rescuers in contexts of genocide and mass atrocity. One
of the key claims here is that individuals who conceive of their identity as more extensive, i.e.
as bearing broader connections with other individuals across space and time, are more likely to
perceive threats to the well-being of those others as morally salient, and thus as presenting an
opportunity for moral choice.55
While identity constrains determinations of moral salience, the determinations themselves are
reached through the cognitive process of categorization. Monroe defines this second key concept
as “the process by which ideas and objects are recognized, differentiated, or distinguished from
one another and then understood.”56 Her model construes cognitive categorization as operating in
several distinct stages. First, out of the manifold data of experience, cognitive categorization settles
the particular ways in which particular situations will be framed for particular actors. Particular
modes of framing, in turn, lead to the activation, or suppression, of particular scripts for behavior.
These scripts, finally, count as the proximate causes of observed conduct.57
The third major concept in Monroe’s model of moral choice is that of cognitive stretching. This
concept seeks to capture the fact that patterns of categorization can change over time, in response
to a variety of environmental or social factors. Put differently, cognitive stretching seeks to explain
how situations or events that at one time seem to be morally salient for particular individuals can
subsequently cease to be categorized in this way, or vice-versa.58
Monroe clearly believes that it is possible to reliably identify differences in the norms accepted
by particularly situated individuals across two or more moments in time. She also clearly believes
it is possible to pinpoint mechanisms by which transformations in norms are brought about—
citing for example Christopher Browning’s account of the effects of isolation, propaganda, and
manipulation on German police officers recruited for mass killings.59 Monroe thus accepts two
of the three theoretical assumptions behind the thesis of norm transformation. Her empirically
grounded model of moral choice challenges the remaining assumption, however, by suggesting
that norms are not fundamental as guides to action.
To the extent that Monroe’s model explicitly addresses the ability of norms to guide decisions
and actions, it suggests that they do so non-reflectively. Her entire account is designed to call into
question moral theories that focus on deliberation and rational reflection on right and wrong action.
Indeed, the central framing device for her study is the idea that both bystanders and resisters of
genocide tend to claim that they had “no choice” in acting or failing to act.60
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A second, and more consequential, feature of Monroe’s model is the claim that the acceptance
of norms often occurs unreflectively, and may be difficult to raise to the level of conscious awareness
or reflection. Monroe argues that an individual’s identity, or self-conception, largely determines
both which facts about the world that individual recognizes as morally salient, and which choices
seem available to that individual in the face of such facts.61
Both of these claims are, in principle, compatible with the thesis of norm transformation,
though they provide a very different picture of both the acceptance of norms and the way in which
norms guide action than has been presented so far in this paper. There is, however, a case to be
made that, on Monroe’s model, norms themselves are not decisive for understanding moral choice
in the context of mass atrocity. Norms are not fundamental to the explanation of individual and
group conduct during large-scale crimes, since both cognitive processes of categorization and,
before this, social processes of identity formation seem to be doing most of the explanatory work.
And norms are not fundamental to the prevention of large-scale crimes, since what really seems
to be important is changing individuals’ self-conceptions, and in this way altering the categories
they deploy and the facts or events that they take to be legally or morally salient.62 This, in my
view, is the strongest statement of the challenge that Monroe’s theory offers to the thesis of norm
transformation.
In responding to this challenge, I will argue that the acceptance of norms is not merely a
consequence of, but also often constitutive of, individual and group identities.63 That is to say,
changes in the set of practical prescriptions, permissions, or prohibitions that one accepts can
serve as conditions for claiming, or maintaining a claim upon, particular identities. Two particular
types of changes in norms are worth distinguishing here. First are identity-instituting norm
transformations. These are changes in norms that serve as conditions for the adoption of new
identities. Second are identity-vindicating norm transformations. These are changes in norms that
serve as conditions for preserving, in the face of some significant threat, existing identities.
How do identity-instituting norm transformations bear on theories of genocide and mass
atrocity? Here again the National Socialist euthanasia program, Aktion T4, is instructive. As Henry
Friedlander has shown, the ideas and ideologies that stood behind the euthanasia program had
existed in Germany (and indeed, in countries outside of Germany, including the United States)
well before the rise of the Nazi movement.64 In terms of changing norms, particularly legal norms,
to reflect these ideas and ideologies, however, it was specifically the political takeover of power
by Hitler that “made the implementation of the race hygiene utopia possible.”65 It is this utopian
aspect of the Nazi policy towards the disabled, emphasized by historian Eric Weitz, that makes it
appropriate to consider the relevant changes in laws regarding so-called “life unworthy of life” as a
form of identity-instituting norm transformation: a change in norms coinciding with, and regarded
at the time as a condition for, the development of a new Völkisch identity.66 Claudia Koonz has
perhaps gone furthest in suggesting that it was identity-instituting changes in norms, rather than
the broader racist or ableist ideologies with which those changes were connected, that distinguished
National Socialist political culture from that of other contemporary political societies.67
Shifting to identity-vindicating norm transformations, it is useful to consider the Nuremberg
Code of medical ethics, promulgated in the first so-called “Successor Trial” at Nuremberg. While
chief prosecutor Telford Taylor considered it possible to “pass very briefly over matters of medical
ethics” in his opening statement at this Doctors’ Trial, retrospective accounts have called the
Nuremberg Code “the most important document in the history of the ethics of medical research.”68
Chiefly at issue in the Nuremberg Code is the requirement that doctors obtain voluntary and
adequately informed consent from prospective research subjects. As historian Paul Weindling has
pointed out, a major aim of the scientists and physicians who assisted Taylor in developing his
prosecutorial strategy was to avoid “too strong a denunciation of Nazi medicine [which] might
jeopardize their own position,” and to articulate “conditions under which risky experimentation
was ethically permissible.”69
The development of the principle of informed consent, on this reading, is an example of an
identity-vindicating norm transformation. It is a norm that had not been clearly articulated, or
broadly accepted, prior to WWII, but which became part of the basis of the continuing legitimacy of
the medical profession after that conflict. Importantly, this change in norms was not so radical as to
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completely disrupt or destroy the existing identity of medical professionals; it allowed physicians
to continue drawing on a tradition of medical experimentation designed to improve future care,
even while suggesting that certain past methods of research were not longer permissible.70
The discussion of identity-instituting and identity-vindicating norm transformations offered
above has shown that norms, and changes in norms, cannot be eliminated from an identity-based
account of moral choice on the basis of the non-fundamentality objection. This finding is significant
for both explanatory and preventive applications of the thesis of norm transformation. It also helps
to establish the legitimacy of evaluative applications of the thesis of norm transformation, to which
I now turn.
Extending the Thesis of Norm Transformation
Scholars of genocide and mass atrocity regularly register tensions between efforts to explain,
prevent, and pursue accountability for participation in large-scale crimes.71 Some go further, and
suggest that questions of accountability, or moral and legal responsibility for large-scale crimes,
necessarily conflict with efforts to understand and prevent such crimes, and consequently ought
to be deferred.72
While recognizing the reasons behind these calls for caution, this paper takes a different view.
The thesis of norm transformation establishes a fundamental continuity between explanatory,
preventive, and evaluative approaches to genocide and mass atrocity. If the three basic assumptions
underlying the explanatory and preventive applications of this thesis are indeed tenable—if it is
possible to non-circularly identify changes in norms, if norms play a non-reducible role in guiding
action, and if it is possible to identify specific processes through which norms have been, or might
be, transformed—then it is important to consider the implications for efforts to hold individuals
and groups accountable for participation in large-scale crimes. This section briefly discusses two
such implications. The first concerns strategies for localizing moral responsibility for mass atrocity.
The second concerns obstacles to localizing legal responsibility for such wrongs.
Localization of Moral Responsibility
To localize responsibility for wrongdoing is to restrict attributions of responsibility to some subset of
a larger set of qualified parties. Some ways of localizing responsibility – such as holding executives
responsible for the success or failure of corporations and other institutions—typically strike us as
legitimate. Other ways of localizing responsibility—such as scapegoating in its various guises—
are by definition illegitimate. A key factor in assessing the legitimacy of any proposal to localize
responsibility consists in the degree of effective control that particular individuals exercised, or
were capable of exercising, over the decisions and actions of other individuals.73
This paper proposes the following principle for localizing moral responsibility for mass
atrocities. Where specific mechanisms for transforming norms can be identified, and where those
transformations in norms have had a demonstrable effect on the precipitation or prolongation
of large-scale wrongs, then it may be appropriate to hold individuals involved in designing or
implementing such mechanisms morally responsible for doing so.
Two examples will clarify the range and limits of this principle. The first, already referred to
above, is the development of a coded language for describing the torture and killing of the disabled,
Jews, political prisoners, and other persecuted groups under National Socialism. The second is the
profusion of hate propaganda that commonly accompanies large-scale wrongs.
Each of these mechanisms has been identified as contributing to what James Waller calls “a
culture of cruelty that helps [perpetrators] initiate, sustain, and cope with their extraordinary
evil.”74 If such assessments are accurate, then it seems appropriate to hold individuals responsible
for developing and deploying such mechanisms. Localizing responsibility for changes in norms
in this way does not absolve other individuals of responsible from particular wrongful acts, such
as killing, torture, or theft. Instead, it introduces a new layer of responsibility specifically aimed at
addressing the specific wrong of transforming the normative landscape. In assessing responsibility
for such norm transformations, standard criteria for moral responsibility, including intent,
knowledge, and ability to actually accomplish the transformations contemplated, will need to be
considered. But there is no reason to think that these criteria pose greater barriers to attributions of
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moral responsibility for instigating norm transformations than they do for assessing responsibility
for other kinds of contributions to mass atrocities.75
Importantly, this principle pushes for the localization of moral, rather than legal,
responsibility for norm transformations. It is unlikely that international courts or tribunals would
ever countenance a crime of transforming the normative landscape as such – though certain
mechanisms for doing so (such as the spread of hate propaganda) have been criminalized in
international law.76 In part, this is because of the different epistemologies, or ways of knowing
and proving, employed by law and by other moral and historical discourses.77 In part, this is
because courts and justice systems simply are not designed to deal with the problem of assigning
responsibility in cases where infractions are normal, rather than exceptional, as the next section
will suggest.
Rethinking Localization of Legal Responsibility
A second evaluative implication of the thesis of norm transformation can be framed in the form of a
critique of current practices of localizing legal responsibility for mass atrocity. This critique builds
on historian Christian Gerlach’s doubts about the explanatory value of the concept of genocide.78
Gerlach contends that thinking about mass violence in terms of genocide undermines, rather
than enriches, historical understanding. More specifically, he argues that “genocide is an actionoriented model designed for moral condemnation, prevention, intervention, or punishment,”
which unduly “restricts the analysis” of large-scale violence.79 Gerlach’s positive project is to show
that mass violence is more pluralistic in its targets and perpetrators, more complex in its planning
and execution, than genocide-oriented studies acknowledge.80
Gerlach’s analysis of the complex causes of mass violence embraces the thesis of norm
transformation. In extremely violent societies, he observes, “ethical norms and values are
devalidated not only among persecutors or profiteers, but also among the vulnerable groups. This
leads to atomization, betrayal, corruption, opportunism, ignorance, and cruelty.”81 What is novel is
Gerlach’s emphasis on cross-cutting breakdowns in norms governing social, political, and religious
life.
This way of understanding mass violence, with its emphasis on “social processes that can only
partially be controlled by any government,” runs counter to efforts to localize legal responsibility
within a relatively small group of governmental actors.82 As explained above, one criterion for the
legitimacy of any effort to localize responsibility is the vesting of control over events in particular
individuals. This is just what the notion of extremely violent societies denies.
Gerlach suggests that the concept of genocide itself localizes legal responsibility for largescale crimes in ways that may be justified on instrumental, though not historiographical, grounds.
“Punishment has to be limited,” he writes. “To admit that all sorts of groups, organizations and
individuals participated in mass violence runs counter to the attempt to restore social peace and to
find values based on which society may live together in [the] future.”83
If the general analytical framework of this paper is correct, then Gerlach’s perspective on
the relationship between of historical analysis and policies aimed at prevention or punishment
seems too pessimistic. These different undertakings can and should inform each other; challenges
encountered in the course of the one endeavor should prompt revisions in approaches to the other.
Legal scholar Mark Drumbl argues to this effect in his book Atrocity, Punishment, and International
Law.84 There, Drumbl suggests that the model of individual criminal responsibility, grounded in
assumptions about the prosecution of socially deviant action, is ill fitted to cases of mass atrocity
characterized by widespread societal participation and support. He proposes a more pluralist
approach to attributions of legal responsibility, one that accommodates a variety of democratically
responsive forms of criminal and civil proceedings.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess Drumbl’s specific policy suggestions. One
takeaway from his analysis, however, is that localization of legal responsibility for mass atrocities
in a small group of leading actors can be as problematic from a legal perspective as it is distortive
from a historiographical point of view. That is a finding that coincides with this paper’s basic claim
that explanatory, preventive, and evaluative applications of the thesis of norm transformation are,
in principle, compatible.
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Conclusion
The thesis of norm transformation is powerful and provocative. It provokes by asking us to
acknowledge the mutability of the basic norms that structure political societies—including our
own societies. In return, it offers a powerful framework for making sense of crimes that strain
comprehension and defy censure.
The thesis of norm transformation does not compel a choice between explanatory, preventive,
and evaluative priorities in the face of mass atrocity. Instead, it posits a fundamental continuity
between these different aims. It suggests that they are not just compatible, but may even be
complementary.
Important questions remain about how the thesis of norm transformation should be applied
with respect to particular episodes of genocide and mass atrocity. Some of these questions are
historiographical. Others concern institutional design. Still others are legal or moral. Rather
than seeking to settle these questions, this paper has clarified, defended, and extended the set
of concepts on which scholars from diverse disciplinary backgrounds can draw when pursuing
answers. Ultimately, Raphael Lemkin’s observation concerning genocide applies to large-scale
crimes more generally: “the examination of the problem is not limited to one branch of science, but
claims the support of many.”85
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Abstract: In genocide scholarship, dehumanization is often considered to be an alarming early warning sign
for mass systematic killing. Yet, within broader research, dehumanization is found to exist in a variety of
instances that do not lead to aggression or violence. This disparity suggests that while dehumanization is an
important part of the genocidal process, it is too imprecise as a salient early warning sign. Genocide scholars
have acknowledged such a conjecture in the past. This article initiates an embryonic research agenda that
offers “toxification” as a more precise early warning sign for genocide than dehumanization. It contends that
while dehumanization signals that killing members of a particular group may be regarded as permissible,
a more indicative early warning is one that flags when extermination is considered a necessity. Following
a literature review of dehumanization, the purpose of this article is to introduce the idea of “toxification”,
and to illustrate how the concept can work in practice, using two twentieth century genocides as examples.
Keywords: peace and conflict studies, race and ethnicity, social psychology and interaction
Introduction
Scholarship over the last half century suggests that genocide does not manifest without hideously
vivid preliminaries: the processes’ paradox of contextual uniqueness and “painful axiom of
invariance”1 has yielded a number of early warning indicators that are considered common to
genocides. 2 Dehumanization—the denial of a person’s humanity and his/her ejection from the
“sphere of equal moral standing”3—is often accepted as an important early warning sign for genocide
and mass atrocities. This is because it is a psychological-coping device for would-be perpetrators to
commit acts that are axiomatically considered immoral, and internalised as exceptionally ethically
affronting. However, outside the field of genocide studies, dehumanization is found to exist in
instances that are not linked to aggression, conflict, or even violence; in fact, recent research has
identified dehumanization in subtle, everyday social perception and common interaction.4 Such an
incongruity calls into question the validity of dehumanization as a salient early warning sign for
genocide.5 This is not to refute dehumanization’s role in preparing perpetrators and populations for
genocide to occur, but that genocide early warning frameworks need to identify a more pernicious
process specific to genocide. Importantly, and to their credit, such an observation has been made by
genocide scholars in the past, and thus reinforces the argument made here for a more precise early
warning. However, within genocide literature, there remains little distinction between identifying
when killing is regarded by the perpetrators as more allowable or tolerable because individuals are
no longer included in the perpetrators’ sphere of moral standing (as per dehumanization), and when
extermination is regarded by the perpetrators as an absolute necessity—the latter, I contend, being
more definite to genocide. Consequently, this article constitutes an embryonic research agenda that
offers “toxification” as a contender for this more exact early warning. Toxification is the cognitive
perception of victims as malignant and carcinogenic pests that must be purged for the survival
of the perpetrator, and/or the perpetrators’ ideal society. While toxification and dehumanization
co-morbid, the former is distinct insofar that victims are perceived to be not only outside the
perpetrators’ human universe of moral obligation, but as irreconcilably lethal and therefore (in the
eyes of the perpetrators) unavoidably exterminable. The observation that perpetrators regard the
victims as toxic or fatal prior to extermination is not an anomaly in genocide research: indeed, kill
or be killed rhetoric is largely cited. Yet, the operationalization of such a concept as an important
early warning sign for genocide is largely absent; if anything, this perception of lethality continues
to be erroneously regarded as dehumanization in current early warning frameworks.6 The purpose
of this article is to offer an emerging conceptual agenda that introduces toxification as possible
candidate for a more precise early warning sign for further robust empirical studies: I am not
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claiming with any conviction here that toxification is a more telling indicator. Such a claim would
require greater empirical breadth that comparatively analyzes toxification in genocide vs. nongenocides—something better suited to future research once the need for a more telling indicator is
recognized, and the concept is better understood.7 Hence, my inclusion of the Holocaust and the
Rwandan genocide is to simply illustrate how toxification’s two strains manifest. Further, I am not
offering toxification as a cause for genocide: while this would be an interesting exercise, it would
demand a different investigation entirely.8
This article begins with a literature review of dehumanization in genocide literature and
broader dehumanization literature to illustrate its limitations as an early warning sign. Next,
because this is essentially a theoretical conjecture—albeit in its nascent conception—I will engage
with existing social theories regarding the abject and pollution, before providing a thorough
explanation of toxification. Lastly, in seeking to avoid definitive claims that toxification is a more
telling early warning sign for genocide, I look to the Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide of
1994 to illustrate how toxification manifests prior to and during genocide. To demonstrate that
toxification is not simply specific to these cases, brief consideration will be given to an additional
two twentieth century genocides.9
Dehumanization
The definition of dehumanization is consistent in genocide literature and broader dehumanization
literature. Dehumanization is understood as the denial of an individual’s essential humanness
and identity, and thereby situating individuals “outside the boundary in which moral values,
rules, and considerations of fairness apply”10 to other humans.11 It is the “psychological-symbolic
removal of others from the classification of human”12 wherein the other is expelled from what
Helen Fein termed the “human universe of moral obligation.”13 An individual is no longer
included in the moral compact to be responsible for the other or in the meaningful social fabric
that “governs human relationships.”14 Moreover, there are two main ways individuals are thought
to be dehumanized: via the denial of human uniqueness (emotions that are felt only humans)
and via human nature (emotions felt by humans and animals).15 The first is often understood as
animalistic dehumanization, which refers to the denial of “uniquely human attributes,”16 such as
moral sensibility, reason, emotional depth, and civility. Instead, the dehumanized is regarded as
the antithesis of such qualities: coarse, immoral, impulsive, child-like, uncultured and governed
by the satisfaction of basic needs.17 The second is mechanistic dehumanization, which is the denial
of human nature, wherein the individual is regarded as incapable of empathy, vitality, warmth;
rather, the individual is—like a machine—an insentient being, impervious to pain and passion
as humans understand it. Thus, despite emphasizing different characteristics, both forms of
dehumanization deny individuals their humanity, individuality and identity.18 Whereas the latter
sees the individual as unable to experience—to “feel pleasure and pain”19 as a human would, the
former sees individuals without agency—the capacity to “plan, intend and exert choice”20 as a
human would: in both instances the dehumanized are underserving of being in the universe of
human moral obligation.21 Dehumanization is thus an estranging and othering process: it is the
“activity of repressing, subjugating, annihilating the similarities between the self and others, and
the ways in which the other is known and understood.”22 Such a decommissioning of humanity
causes individuals to treat others as “a means to an end, rather than an end in themselves.”23
Thus, whether writing about genocide or other processes, scholars accept a consistent definition
of dehumanization. Yet, while there is a trend in genocide studies to regard dehumanization as a
telling early warning indicator for mass slaughter, this same understanding of dehumanization
is cited in other, seemingly banal processes in broader literature. Some genocide scholars have
acknowledged the insufficiency of dehumanization as a telling early warning sign—as explored
below—however, little movement has been made toward operationalizing a better concept. This
disparity is explored below.
Dehumanization in Genocide Literature and Broader Literature
In genocide literature, dehumanization is often considered an alarming early warning sign for
genocide, because it silences perpetrators’ and the population’s “universal human abhorrence of
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murder,”24 because the targeted group victim is no longer seen as human.25 For instance, Gregory
Stanton, in his celebrated Eight (now Ten) Stages of Genocide, regards dehumanization as the
very “phase where the death spiral of genocide begins.”26 Similarly, Jacques Sémelin asserts
that “killing starts with the words disqualifying [the victims’] humanity” 27 because it is thought
to dull moral inhibitions against butchery. In his concluding analysis, Alexander Hinton cites
essentialization—the marking and crystallization of difference—that sees the other as less than
fully human as a “hallmark of genocide”, because individuals are “depicted as legitimate targets
of violence whose execution should not pose a moral dilemma. Killing them is not murder, but
rather the slaughter of a lowly animal.”28 More recently, on the 9th of December 2014, marking
the 66th anniversary of signing the 1948 Genocide Convention, the United Nations SecretaryGeneral’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide Mr Adama Dieng remarked: “The
Holocaust did not start with the gas chambers and the Rwandan genocide did not start with
the slayings. It started with the dehumanization of a specific group of persons.”29 Outside the
purview of genocide literature,30 however, dehumanization is not associated with mass murder,
ethnic cleansing, forced displacement or other crimes against humanity, nor is it loaded with such
severe connotations.31
For instance, Nick Haslam et al. found that dehumanization exists in “everyday social
perception, and can occur in the absence of intense conflict or aggression,”32 such as the experiences
of “women, immigrants, refugees, the homeless, African Americans and other stigmatised
groups.”33 Similarly, Laurie Rudman and Kris Mescher write about dehumanization of women by
men, wherein women are often seen as instruments or tools, lacking agency, self-determination,
and subjectivity: women are thus regarded as fungible, controllable and/or synonymous to
animals.34 Using neuroimaging data of Princeton University undergraduate students, Fiske and
Lasana Harris found that extreme out groups, such as poor people, the homeless, and drug addicts,
were dehumanized to such an extent that they did not register in the participants’ medial frontal
cortex (the region of the brain responsible for recognizing and attributing a mental presence to
others) as social beings.35 Dehumanization occurs in the event of physical difference; that is, if an
individual is noticeably physically handicapped or suffering from mental disability that manifests
physically.36 Heather Keith and Kenneth Keith37 unveil that people with physical and mental
disabilities are frequently dehumanised in contemporary societies, and Phillip Goff et al. identify
that Blacks are still thought by sects of contemporary America as positioned “somewhere between
the deformed and the simian.”38 A number of scholars have conducted various investigations into
the dehumanization of refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced peoples, and immigrants—
all of whom experience dehumanizing policies, but are not destroyed en masse with the intention
of total annihilation as per genocide.39 Lastly, further distancing dehumanization from genocide,
Haslam et al. have argued that “merely being associated with animals or machines, or being denied
the corresponding humanness traits or emotions, does not necessarily have negative consequences”
40
because it apparently enables leaders to make difficult decisions concerning sanctioning strikes
that could result in the death of civilians during warfare. Although the aforementioned groups
face virulent prejudice, persecution, and often violence as a result of their dehumanization,41
there is little to no concern for genocide.42 Thus, while genocide rarely occurs in the absence of
dehumanization, this literature review unveils that genocide does not begin with dehumanization,
and that its usefulness as a telling early warning device can be contested.
Some genocide scholars have acknowledged the insufficiency of dehumanization as a telling
early warning, and this serves to reinforce the argument made here for a more accurate indicator.
43
Rowan Savage writes that “dehumanization is found outside the field of genocide studies,”44
and that “dehumanization facilitates genocide, but no means causes massacre, or always has
massacre as a result.”45 In a parallel vein, James Waller identifies that something more malevolent
than dehumanization must flag the intention to destroy an entire group of people.46 Israel Charny
maintains that, “the process that makes genocide possible does not stop at dehumanization…what
needs to be added is to justify taking people’s lives…the proof that the other is also a terrible threat
to our lives and it is their intent to take our lives away from us unless we stop them.”47 Lastly, Johannes
Lang observes that “dehumanization leaves only a void”48 —it does not necessitate action, but
rather allows for a space of possibility. Thus, in addition to the above literature review that points
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to dehumanization’s limitation as an early warning sign for genocide, what is needed is a specific
discussion regarding why this is the case: that is, what dehumanization does, and does not, signal.
Crucially, dehumanization says nothing to the perception of killing a certain group being a
necessity. I submit that this is perhaps why dehumanization is seldom loaded with the same alarm
outside of genocide literature: dehumanization does not necessitate an individual’s mistreatment,
abuse, or murder, but simply renders it more tolerable in the eyes of the dehumanizer. I contend
that such misplaced emphasis on dehumanization—correctly identified by previous genocide
scholars—is due to the blurring of the permissibility of violence and killing (as enabled and
signalled by dehumanization), with an apparent imperative to kill. This is not to contest that
dehumanization is an important part of the genocidal process; rather, that existing genocide early
warning frameworks largely fail to distinguish between an allowable action, and a requisite action.
Indeed, it is reasonable to conceptualize dehumanization as having degrees,49 yet even in its most
absolute form where the individual is considered to be fundamentally inhuman and ejected from
the sphere of equal moral standing, dehumanization still does not necessitate killing. This would
then lend a thought process to whether there can be variants of dehumanization; however, even
if this early warning is assigned a status of dehumanization variant, or belonging to the family
of dehumanization, a novel concept that speaks directly to when killing is seen as a necessity in
genocide is still required. Thus, there is space for developing such an early warning. In opening this
research agenda, I propose the concept of toxification—a concept that eclipses the perception of
victims as simply inhuman, and flags that perpetrators see the victims’ destruction as a necessity.
An Emerging Research Agenda: Toxification and an Engagement with Social Theory
By way of engaging with Mary Douglas’ social theory regarding pollution and Julia Kristeva’s the
abject, this section offer an embryonic conceptual framework that articulates when perpetrators
believe the complete elimination of a targeted group is a necessity. According to Kristeva, the abject
refers to the response to the blurring or loss of identity between the self and the other. While the
actor of the ethic must be engaged in the “perpetual undoing of the said”50 and “must of necessity
be ready to be afflicted by the performance of the other,”51 the other must remain exactly that: a
stranger which unsettles, disrupts and disturbs oneself.52 Once the meaningful difference between
the self and the other disintegrates, and the self is no longer recognizable as distinct against that
which its own identity is forged, Kristeva states that the human reaction is typically of horror, exile,
and disgust.53 While this conceptualization is helpful in explaining genocide perpetrators’ and
populations’ reactions to certain groups, it sits uncomfortably with the idea of dehumanization that
clearly articulates the difference between us and them: we are human; they are not. Nevertheless,
Kristeva’s analysis highlight that fear, horror and disgust are important to and disgust, and by
extension, often warrant an attempt to distance oneself from the source of that makes one’s identity
uncertain.
Douglas’ analysis of pollution is helpful for understanding genocide early warning signs,
because it sheds light on the relationship between order and disorder within a pre-conceived
system of “tidily organized”54 ideas and values, and the way in which dirt and uncleanliness is
thought to assault this uniformity. According to Douglas, “dirt is essentially disorder;”55 thus, if
a group is regarded as polluting a society, then they are seen to be spoiling patterns that a group
wishes to preserve or achieve. So, it is understandable that there is a perceived necessity to remove
such contaminating elements so as to maintain (or achieve) consistency.56 However, while concepts
such as hygiene, dirt and uncleanliness do incite a yuk response and warrant a degree of urgency,
they do not speak to life and death situations. I submit that would-be targets for genocide are
regarded by the perpetrators to be more than simply a “matter out of place”57—something that
offends order and stimulates a desire to re-negotiate patterns of existence to ensure uniformity, or
“positively re-ordering our environment, making it conform to an idea,”58 therein giving “form to
formlessness.”59 This paper builds atop of these ideas of contamination and pollution that spoils
patterns to offer a concept that requires the specific response of extermination in the context of
genocide: toxification.
Toxification is the cognitive perception of the target group as fundamentally lethal to the
furtherance of the perpetrators’ survival and society: the group is perceived to be not simply
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inhuman or inferior, as with dehumanization, but as a toxic presence that must be cauterized and
destroyed. This noxiousness is regarded as irreconcilable, immutable and inextricable, and so
cannot be remedied by any means other than extermination: essentially, toxicity incarnate.60 Owing
to this, slaughter is necessarily extended to women and children: “Kill and scalp all, little and big…
Nits make lice.”61 The term toxic is used not to refer specifically to quasi-medical terminology, but
to emphasize its irremediable status.
I offer toxification as the early warning sign that could better signal the onset of genocide
than dehumanization. This is because it signals the stimulation of two of the most fundamental
and entwined human emotions among would-be perpetrators: fear, and the survival instinct.
The perpetrator’s existence is held as a zero-sum game, wherein it can only be guaranteed at the
expense of the victims’. Massacre becomes analogous to self-preservation, and killing blurs with
purifying, sanitising and disinfecting a society of a mortiferious infection.62 Toxification flags that
the perpetrators see genocide as a logical and just method of guaranteeing survival undertaken
“by an innocent and injured party.”63 As aptly put by Straus, “particular circumstances can cause
people to commit harm they might not otherwise have been predisposed to commit”64—I propose
that toxification could be the early warning sign that signals such a manipulation of individuals’
perception of self-defence.
There are two strains of toxification identifiable prior to genocide. First, the victim group
is conceived to be toxic to the ideal; that is, toxic to the furtherance of human civilization, the
perpetrators’ ideational reality or utopia, or the body politic.65 Victims are portrayed as poisonous
deformations in society, the image of human progression, or as infectious contagions in the body
politic of the perpetrators. The body politic refers to the unification and embodiment of the nation’s
sovereignty and people in common will and blood: that which affects the body politic, affects
its people.66 For instance, medical rhetoric, metaphors and discourse encompassing pathology,
terminal cancerous growths, blood-sucking parasites, diseases, viruses, bacilli, leprosy, syphilis,
tuberculosis and microbes used to describe the victim group is demonstrative of such toxification.
It is this process, whereby victims are branded as necessarily fatal and equaling death for the
body politic and/or the perpetrators’ society and future that signals the need for extermination.67
In this instance, toxification propagated in the form of toxic to the ideal rests more with abstract
conceptualizations of survival. Second, the victims are depicted as toxic to the self: the perpetrators
become convinced that the victims will, without fail and given the chance, murder the perpetrators.
As aforesaid, victims are immune to persuasion, reason, or affection, and so cannot be reconciled—
extermination becomes seen as the perpetrators’ only option. Toxification in the form of toxic to
the self signals that perpetrators subscribe to a kill before being killed zero-sum logic. Thus, unlike
toxic to the ideal, death is not abstract, and the collective is not toxic to the furtherance of a utopia;
instead, perpetrators are genuinely convinced that they themselves and their families will be
annihilated if no action is taken against the target group.
It is important to note that research noting the perceived lethality or toxicity of genocide victims
is not sparse; in fact, the identification of victims being dangerous or lethal to the perpetrators
is prolific in genocide literature, and serves to reinforce the need for an early warning sign that
coherently speaks to this observation, such as toxification.68 Therefore, as an emerging research
agenda, priority here rests with illustrating how toxification operationalizes to give the reader a
better grasp of how the concept can be understood in practice. To do so, the next sections turn to
the Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide of 1994 as examples of toxification, and how it is distinct
from dehumanization.
The Holocaust: Illustrating Toxic to the Ideal
The purpose of looking to the Holocaust is to illustrate the toxification strain toxic to the ideal;
specifically, with its focus on the body politic, the Aryan utopia and the irreconcilable and inevitable
lethality the Jewish population was thought to pose to the Third Reich.69 The dehumanization of
the Jewish population allowed for policies of discrimination, bigotry and prejudice as early as the
1920s. Yet, closer to the Final Solution, such rhetoric and cognitive perceptions of Jewish people
began to incorporate assignments of toxicity, most notably as nocuous maladies to the German
Volkskörper and the Third Reich. The Nazi ideology affirmed that the Aryan is the Prometheus
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of mankind, and that any individuals who fell foul of this model—such as Jews, Gypsies, Slavs,
Poles, homosexuals, hereditarily determined a-socials, and the mentally and physically deficient
(that is, people suffering from: congenital feeblemindedness, schizophrenia, severe hereditary
physical deformity, severe alcoholism on a discretionary basis, hereditary blindness and manic
depression)70—constituted nefarious and noxious obstructions to achieving an ideational utopia.71
Propaganda disseminated by the Nazi regime72 sought to convince the German73 population that
preserving the fehlerhaften und defekten (deficient and defective) and the degenerate and depraved
was to allow false humanity to intoxicate the Aryan ideal.74 For instance, Adolf Hitler cited
fictitious “historical evidence…[which] shows with terrifying clarity, that in every mingling of
Aryan blood (Blutsvermengung des Ariers) with that of lower peoples, the result was always the end
of the cultured people.”75 Similarly, and further illustrating how toxification can be understood in
practice, Jewish people were depicted in Nazi propaganda as subversive spongers penetrating the
Blutkreislauf unseres Volkes (the bloodstream of our people).76 Jewish people were regarded as the
Erkrankung von Volkskörper (disease of the body politic), the Volkerparasit (parasite of the people),
and Die Sünden wider das Blut (the sin against the blood), corroding the body politic.77 That is,
Jewish people were seen as not simply inhuman, but as “maggots feeding on a rotting corpse, the
parasites that had to be surgically removed…a plague worse than the Black Death, the sponger who
spreads like a noxious bacillus and then kills his host.”78 Likewise, the infamous child storybook
Der Giftpilz (The Poisonous Mushroom), wherein Jews are described as poisonous mushrooms
and the “incarnation of everything evil and soulless”79 is also an illustration of toxification.80 These
examples of discourse prior to and during the Holocaust are loaded with connotations that clearly
transgress the line of regarding individuals as inhuman and existing outside the sphere of equal
moral standing; rather, victims were regarded by the perpetrators as being toxic and fundamentally
lethal.81 By extension, then, the recognition of an entity being toxic introduces an element of
necessity to get rid of that which poses an irreconcilable threat. 82 Fritz Klein, a physician at the
Auschwitz concentration camp, reported that just as he would “remove a gangrenous appendix
from a diseased body” he removed Jews “as gangrenous appendix in the body of mankind.”83 By
this, Klein saw the extermination of the Jewish people “as a therapeutic imperative [out of] respect
for human life.”84 During the genocide, and reflecting on the systematic carnage of the Jew people,
Heinrich Himmler, Reichsführer of the Schutzstaffel (SS), stated that, “we [speaking on behalf of
the German people] have stayed decent…we have suffered no harm to our inner being, our soul,
our character.”85 These reports shed light on the perspective of annihilation of the Jewish race as
a necessity because of their apparent toxicity. The purpose of looking at the Holocaust was to
demonstrate how toxification as toxic to the ideal could be understood in practice. It highlighted
that there is a distinction between regarding individuals as underserving of being included in
the human universe of moral obligation, and regarding them as something toxic or lethal that
necessitates their extermination—the latter, despite being recognized in genocide literature, is often
overlooked as a useful early warning sign distinct from dehumanization. While the Holocaust
illustrates toxic to the ideal, the Rwandan genocide can be looked to as an example of toxification
as toxic to the self.
The Rwandan Genocide: Illustrating Toxic to the Self
In 1994, via the medium of Kangura, broadcasts from Radio Rwanda, and community meetings,
Tutsis were labelled inyenzi (cockroaches), ibinhindugemb (heinous monsters without a head or tail),
and devils, which consumed the organs and innards of Hutus.86 Although this initially appears
to be dehumanization, the labels are loaded with toxic and lethal connotations. For instance, a
cockroach is not just inhuman: cockroaches are disease-disseminating agents, which hoard and
transfer illnesses that are lethal to humans, such as salmonella, staphylococcus and streptococcus.
Similarly, such use of the terms monsters, demons or devils suggests that Tutsis were regarded as
not simply inhuman entities to be excluded from the sphere of equal moral standing, but something
lethal to the survival of Hutus. Such toxicity was described to be inextricable to each Tutsi and is
epitomised in a March 1993 Kangura article: “A cockroach cannot give birth to a butterfly. It is true.
A cockroach gives birth to another cockroach… the history of Rwanda shows us clearly that a Tutsi
stays always exactly the same that he has never changed… They are all linked…their evilness in
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the same.”87 Toxification of this kind was unabatedly dispersed throughout Rwanda prior to the
1994 genocide.88 This language points to more than just allowing the mistreatment of individuals
held to be sub- or less-than human; it signals the creation of a security dilemma in the minds of the
perpetrators, wherein the exigencies of survival triumphed a zero-sum game: kill, or be killed.89
A Hutu perpetrator of the genocide articulated this perception: “we thought if we killed them all,
they would not have the power to kill us.”90 Another participant stated that the Tutsi “had become
a threat greater than all we had experience together… That’s how we reasoned and we killed at
the time.”91 This rhetoric illustrates the toxic to the self strain of toxification, which signals the
genuine subscription to a kill before being killed logic held by perpetrators: it was, in the minds
of the Hutu, “a war of self defense”92 against a toxic presence. This conviction in a group being
held as toxic to the self can also account for individuals who do not join perpetrators ameliorating
the toxic threat: for instance, Hutu extremists also murdered icyitso (accomplices)—that is, Hutu
moderates who refused to partake in massacre, because (by not partaking in the extermination of
the inyenzi) they were seen to be allowing Tutsis to continue posing a toxic threat to every other
Hutu. Consequently, by way of Tutsi complicity and sympathy, Hutu moderates were branded as
equally lethal and eliminated as such.93 In sum, the dehumanization of Tutsis as omnipresent and
Unwanzi ni umwe ni umusti (the enemy is one) played an unequivocal role in grooming perpetrators
for carnage by no longer regarding the Tutsis as human, thereby numbing the abhorrence to killing
fellow humans and regarding it as more tolerable.94 The purpose of this review of the Rwandan
genocide, however, was to illustrate the concept of toxification as toxic to the self—something
which sits as distinct from dehumanization. This toxic rhetoric moved beyond seeing killing as
allowable, and suggests that—in the eyes of the Hutu extremists—there was “no alternative but to
annihilate”95 the Tutsi in their entirety.96
Other Cases that Illustrate Toxification
The above illustrative examples were included to demonstrate how toxification can be understood in
practice. The selection of the Holocaust and 1994 Rwandan genocide was on the basis that they best
illustrate toxification in practice; it is however appropriate to give brief attention to other twentieth
century genocides so as to flag toxification is not specific to these instances. For example, in the
context of the Armenian genocide, Pan-Turkish propagandists described Armenians as “invasive
infection in Muslim Turkish society”97 and “parasites outside the confines of his homeland, sucking
off the marrow of the people of the host country,”98 before moving onto another host country.99
In 1915, Rear Admiral Wilhelm Souchon stated: “It will be salvation for Turkey when it has done
away with the last Armenian; it will then be rid of subversive bloodsuckers.”100 Likewise, Mehmed
Reshid—a then Turkish physician and later the governor of Diyarbekir—apparently asked
rhetorically “Isn’t it the duty of a doctor to destroy these microbes?”101
Further illustrating toxic to the ideal, the Cambodian genocide has clear rhetoric that moves
beyond marking difference—us versus them—and dehumanization. As Hinton identifies, “the
goal of the Khmer Rouge was, as one Khmer saying held, ‘to completely annihilate diseases of
consciousness’,”102 that is, to exterminate those “hidden enemies burrowing from within”103 who
Pol Pot regarded as having a “sickness of consciousness”104 that was toxic to the Great Leap
Forward, the utopia as desired by the Khmer Rouge perpetrators. The inclusion of these brief (and,
indeed, shallow) engagements with alternative twentieth century genocides was to demonstrate
that toxification is by no means distinct to the Holocaust and Rwanda. However, further robust
empirical studies are needed to demonstrate conclusively that toxification is a more telling early
warning sign for genocide than dehumanization.
Conclusion
Dehumanization is often considered to be an alarming early warning sign for genocide. However,
while the definition of dehumanization is consistent across genocide and broader dehumanization
literature, a broader literature review unveils that dehumanization occurs in a variety of instances—
many of which occur in everyday, social interaction that do not lead to, or are associated with
violence or conflict. Accordingly, although dehumanization plays a role in grooming perpetrators
into believing discrimination, violence and killing particular individuals is permissible because
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they are no longer human, a more indicative early warning sign is one that articulates when killing
is seen by the perpetrators as a necessity. This paper is an emerging research agenda that offers
toxification as such an early warning. Toxification refers to the cognitive perception of the target
group as not merely inhuman, but as toxic to the self, or toxic to the ideal; consequently, the victim
group must be purged for the security the perpetrators’ society. Whereas dehumanization suggests
that slaughtering certain individuals may be tolerable, I submit that toxification perhaps points to
the more sinister process specific to genocide—that is, the necessity to kill. The purpose here was
to simply introduce the concept of toxification and enhance the reader’s understanding of how the
concept can work in practice by looking to two twentieth century genocides as the main illustrative
examples, and giving brief attention to two additional cases. This lays the foundations for more
robust empirical studies that examine other genocides for similar rhetoric, and begin to answer
the question posed in the title of this paper. By providing an emerging research agenda into the
complexities of dehumanization as an early warning sign for genocide and offering toxification as
perhaps a better alternative, I hope to have contributed one more piece to the perplexing puzzle
that is the prevention of genocide.
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Abstract: This article deals with the underlining aspects of Othering within the genocidal process of the Armenian
genocide. It will emphasize that Othering is closely related to another process called Selfing, which gives an
insight on the genocidal behavior of perpetrators. The article tries to combine these analytical processes with
physical actions, and will thereby argue that these physical actions do not stand by themselves, but are indeed
cultural expressions of Othering and Selfing; and that these processes are therefore not mere social imagnaire
or abstract notions, but physical and thereby observable actions that gives an insight in genocidal intent. These
abstract notions or cultural expressions of Othering and Selfing, which by themselves again will be expressed
in the enormity of violence and the different dimensions of violence, have the underlining message that one can
only solidify a “Self” by destroying the “Other” in all its mechanisms: cultural, social and physical.
Keywords: genocidal process, anthropology of violence, Othering, Selfing, identification processes, genocidal
intent, Armenian genocide, social imaginaire, symbolism of violence
Introduction: From the Abstract to the Concrete
Othering is considered a key element within the genocidal process. Alexander Hinton distinguishes
between “essentializing Others” and “annihilating Others,” where essentializing Others is creating
dichotomies where Others are considered filthy, impure even animalistic, and are henceforth
symbolically essentially different and separate from the in-group. Annihilating Others is the
literal and physical destruction of the out-group.1 Between these two processes we also have social
destruction: the social deprivation and destruction of social and cultural indicators of the group that
has been targeted. What is of importance here is that a dominant culture group, facing a social and
political crisis, looks inward to establish a new sense of Self by inventing an Other.2 Dichotomies
are created. Images are created, where the Other has no further linkage with main dominant culture
and can therefore be severed. This implies that genocide is not born out of feelings of superiority,
but quite the contrary, of feelings of inferiority. The sense of self-superiority is only projected on
the persecuted group.3 The dominant culture group becomes, as it were, “predatory.”4 It feels itself
targeted. By looking inwards in smaller and smaller circles, these Others become an internal threat
that has to be cleansed and purified. It is only through this purification process and destruction,
and eliminating within this a metaphorical and internal threat, that the “new identity” can exist.5
Jacques Sémelin emphasises that these identity crisis “are mainly born out of a mental process.”6
That both the new identity and the internal threat are culturally and socially created myths. The
notion of social and physical destructiveness lies, in his opinion, in the sociale imaginaire7: a complex
network of ideas, imagery, values and symbols. It is here where the genocidal process starts. Not in
the acts, but in thoughts and ideas, especially ideas where identity is at the basis, so that “identity
supplies the framework within which the process of violence will take shape.”8 Genocide is
therefore not only a physical warfare, but also symbolic and mythological warfare. It is war aimed
at the destruction of identities for self preservation and self-existence.
Even though this gives us a starting point to understand the beginning of the genocidal
process and how Others are essentialized as a threat,9 or dehumanized to such an extent that they
are placed outside the realm of humanity,10 it does not explain how the sociale imaginaire becomes
physical acts. This is a gulf that Claude Lanzmann considered the distance between “the desire to
kill and the act itself.”11 It is this gulf that I am interested in. How does this sociale imaginaire, which
is mythological, abstract and intangible, become a physical act? How come specific target groups
falls victim to willing executioners?
Even though there are a myriad of answers to the last question—economic motivations,
jealousy, local feuds—my focus will be on the reconstruction of identity. Building on Gerd
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Baumann’s concept of grammatical structures, I will first argue that within Othering there is also a
process of Selfing. Secondly, I argue that this process does not occur in exceptional circumstances,
but is indeed a common day identification practice. Thirdly, this means that the imagery and the
ideas used are not in themselves new ideas, but old ones remanufactured. And, fourthly, I argue,
there is physicality embedded in Othering that becomes more overtly present during warfare in
general, and genocide in particular.
Rather than criticizing the current theories of Othering, this article attempts to add another
dimension to an already complicated and abstract mechanism that, hopefully, will make Othering
more tangible and visible by using the Armenian genocide as a case-study. My argument is that the
social imaginiaire, which is at the heart of the genocidal process, becomes solidified in increasingly
physical acts, which Ervin Staub considers “the continuum of destruction.”12 This solidification
process has only one aim: to create a “new Self.” More over, this solidification process, as I will
argue, bridges the gulf which Claude Lanzmann referred to as “the desire to kill and the act
itself.” Understood in such terms, we will see that cultural genocide and cultural destruction are
actually extensive parts of the genocidal process, and are not a specific category by themselves,
or a dichotomy of the genocide definition. Cultural destruction is one way, in a myriad of ways,
to destroy the Other. Genocide is from this point of view not necessarily a war against a specific
targeted group, but a war against identity (a symbolic notion) from which a specific targeted group
is derived.
The Armenian genocide is an ideal case study to examine the theory of grammatical structures
because in essence the genocide was based on a national, and not overtly religious, ethnic, or even
racial ideology. Its ideology was based on citizenship, land, mythology and geographic settings
and not vague notions as ethnicity or racial differences in blood. The leaders of the Commitee of
Unification and Progress (CUP) and the three Pasha’s (leaders) that ruled the Ottoman Empire
from 1913 onward, were highly secular and only used religion to mobilize citizens. If we use the
same mechanisms of Othering and Selfing and place them within an ethnic genocide, which is from
an anthropological point of view a problematic one—for ethnicity is based on cultural notions and
belief systems which are in essence always fluid and in a state of flux13—it would be interesting
to see how these mechanisms of Othering and Selfing will be solidified. Or to state it differently:
which connotations the perpetrators will attach to themselves and to the Others, for this will say a
lot how they will define their ethnic identity, and show how the genocidal violence will develop.
For in the end, using Baumann, the same mechanisms of Othering and Selfing will be at play.
And here also lies, in my opinion, the powerful message of Baumann: do not focus on identities,
but on identification processes. “In replacing the word ‘identities’ with the word ‘identification’
… we have taken a liberating analytical step.”14 These processes never stop. They do not occur
only in highly political situations or settings, but are indeed common identification practices that
people use on a day-to-day basis. It is during genocide that one of these identification processes, or
grammars, as Baumann called them, will become genocidal. It will become the primary mechanism
in which people will try to create a cohesive sense of Self.
It’s important to notice, that in here I differ with the interpretation, and further more, the
implementation of these identification grammars from Baumann himself. Baumann states that
genocide occurs when all forms of identification processes disintegrate.15 I do not think that they
do, but rather that one process becomes more prominent and violent than other identification
processes, with only one goal: to solidify the Self. This is important, for if we can decipher the
cultural expressions and symbolisms behind the violence—either if this violence is aimed at cultural
destruction and/or physical destruction—we can decipher the ideology behind the violence (may
this be racial, religious, national or ethnical), and we can show the genocidal intent within the acts
of violence itself. The violence becomes the vehicle, so to speak, in which we can trace back the
intentions, but also the mental framework of the perpetrators.
The Process of Othering: A Common Day Practice
Gerd Baumann’s The Multicultural Riddle deals with the contextual nature of identity or, in fact,
identities.16 He claims that individuals adapt different identities throughout the day according
to the situation that an individual is in. He gives the example of a fictional office worker who
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uses several identities in a single day. With every person with whom he interacts, he tries to find
mutual characteristics and taps, depending on the context, various symbols ranging from religious
identities to geographical and class identities. With every step his identity is being determined by
the context and forms, both for himself and the person he is interacting with, a new framework
of familiarity.17 Individuals therefore do not abide by one categorical identity. They do not see
themselves solely as a national, ethnical, racial or religious person. Instead, they also use kinship,
class, professional titles, gender, or many others, as categorical identities that are adaptable within
a given situation. Individuals are agents who choose their identities within a context.18 Baumann
therefore argues that we should not study the “Turks in Berlin” and “the Sikhs in New York,” but
the process of identification itself.19
In Grammars of Identity, Baumann and Andre Gingrich, provide a structural answer to
Baumann’s own question how identities are created or how we should study these processes.20
According to Baumann, we can divide the identification processes in three different dimensions or
grammars: “baby-grammar,” “segmentation,” and “encompassment.”21 The focus in my article will
be on baby-grammar for this grammar is, as I will argue, central in the genocidal process.22 Babygrammar, as the word already suggests, is a primary form of identification and can be interpreted
as a cultural language where groups distinguish themselves in a terminology of us versus them.
The in-group connects both positive and negative connotations to the out-group on several levels. It
is especially during moments in crisis and moments which Abram de Swaan calls dyscivilisation23
that baby-grammar, as an identification process becomes more prominent and aggressive.24 The
mechanism of baby-grammar does not only include Othering, but more importantly also Selfing as
shown in the underneath scheme:25
Table 1: The Grammar of Oriantalization or Reverse Mirror-Imaging
Occident Positive
•
rational
•
enlightened
•
technological

Orient Negative
•
irrational
•
superstitious
•
backward

Occident Negative
•
calculating
•
sober
•
materialist

Orient Positive
•
spontaneous
•
luxuriant
•
mystical

The analytical importance of this approach is that Othering, or baby-grammar, is always linked
with reverse mirroring. It is a dialectic process. Each time we attach a connotation to the Other, we
are in essence creating an imaginary Self. If we, for example, perceive the Other as spontaneous,
we are implying that we think of ourselves as calculating (negative self-connotation). If we think
of the Other as backwards, then we consider ourselves progressive or technologically advanced
(positive self-connotation). We do not only do this during a crisis, but continuously. It is through
this process of mirroring where we draw fictitious lines between groups. According to Baumann
all the grammatical structures of identification unravels through the genocidal process:
If the three grammars are truly useful in distinguishing the different starting-points and
consequences of selfings- and otherings, then we must look for cases in which our three
grammars hypothesis can pre-specify its own criteria of falsification and defeat. Everyone
knows such examples, and they are easy to find under key words such as genocide, ethnocide,
political, racial or religious extermination or annihilation. Each of these spells a breakdown
of all three grammars and a return to the anti-grammar of: “we are good, so they are bad”
with the genocidal conclusion: “we must live, so they must die.”26

By placing genocide as a form of anti-grammar, however, we are placing genocidal behavior outside
the identification process. Genocide becomes something primordial: disconnected from day-to-day
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forms of identification. By doing so, we disregard the fact that ideas of ourselves and Others spring
from the same day-to-day identification processes even during genocide, and that Othering and
Selfing is of importance within the genocidal continuum. During the genocidal process, and during
moments of crisis and decivilization, baby-grammar does not disappear, but becomes the central
form of grammar where ideas of Self are established. In this sense we are, within the genocidal
process, not only essentializing Others, but also creating an essentializing Self. There is no antigrammar. The baby-grammar enhances increasingly the negative connotations of Others and the
positive connotations of ourselves.
Identity entrepreneurs are of extreme importance in this process.27 They are the actors who
forge, often based on existing ideologies or existing physical and social scientific theories, a narrative
of the new Self. That this new Self is not new in the most narrow interpretation of the word—but is
a reconstruction based on existing identities, imagery, mental frameworks, ideologies and scientific
theories—makes the role of identity entrepreneurs that much more important. The narrative of the
new Self is often based on loose and selective populist readings of newspapers and magazines,
literature, popular theories, and folklore. Yet these identity myths are powerful partly because
they are built on already existing national themes and images, and therefore familiar, and partly
because the so-called scientific basis gives the reconstructed ideas, and the (new) political elite,
enough ideological weight for implementation. It gives the illusion, as it were, that the narrative
of the new Self is grounded, that the new Self naturally exists. They use baby-grammar to the
fullest extent. They continuously mirror themselves to Others within society. First they will mirror
themselves to the old elite, then to external enemies, and then to the so-called internal enemies. An
analysis of Othering therefore should start with identity entrepreneurs.
A Deeper Analysis in Practice: The Building of Turkish Nationalism and the Pathological
Fixation on Identity
Ziya Gökalp was one of the main identity entrepreneurs of the Turkish National identity. He is
also one of the most controversial. Some consider him the intellectual mastermind of the Armenian
genocide, while others celebrate his contribution to the current Turkish identity after 1923.28 Gökalp
was born in 1876 in Diyarbakir and was one of the founders of the CUP. He was intellectually
influenced by Spencer and Durkheim and sought a way to combine the Eastern ideology of the
Ottoman Empire and the Western canon of thought.29 Uriel Heyd concludes that the writings of
Gökalp illustrate the major inner problems of modern Turkish nationalism: “of how to regain
national self-respect and self-confidence which had been so deeply shaken by the continues decline
of the Ottoman power and prestige vis-à-vis the West.”30
Already before the first coup in 1908, the Pan-Islam ideology, which envisioned a Great nation
of Islam, was questioned. Could the Ottoman Empire keep expanding? According to intellectual
Yusuf Akҫura, who published an influential article in 1904 called “Three Types of Policies” this
was impossible. He contrasted the Islamism with Turkism and argued “that Islamism was doomed
to failure and that only Turkism had a chance of political success ... Ethnic Turkish people living
in the Caucasus, Crimea and Central Asia had to be liberated from Russian rule.”31 The Ottoman
Empire should not focus on a Great Nation of Islam, therefore, but on its Turkish ethnic people.
What makes this article important is that it shows openly that the Ottoman intelligentsia were
looking inward for explanations for the Ottoman decline. It also shows openly that the West and
Russia were seen as great enemies (as international Others) and that only an expansion of the
Ottoman Empire could answer these international threats. Or, to phrase it differently, the Ottoman
ideology and identity had to be reconfigured. The Pan-Islam could no longer be its basis. If the
focus of identity changed, the article suggests, the Ottoman Empire could be restored to its former
grandeur.
In this article we see an expression of the threat of the psychological Self. This Self is threatened
by the Great Powers in Europe, but also internally by the Pan-Islam ideology. We also see how this
threat can be lifted, by reformulating the Ottoman identity and by regaining the former stature
of the Ottoman Empire. This threat is not lifted by reconfiguring the borders or stopping the
expansion policies. Rather, the Ottoman self-concept can only be saved when the Empire grows.
Gökalp was undoubtedly influenced by this article and, as the intellectual and ideological founder
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of the CUP, he was very much aware that “the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 affected the politics
of the Ottoman Empire and that new values had to be created in all spheres of national life.”32 In
many of his writings he therefore tried to distance himself from the former elite and intelligentsia:
There is in our country a class, the so-called Levantines and Cosmopolitans, who try to adopt
the aesthetic, moral, philosophical tastes, and entire customs, ceremonies and behaviour
of the West rather than its scientific methods and industrial techniques. That is, they try
erroneously to imitate the cultures of other nations under the name of civilization.33

What is important in this quote is that he creates a difference between the old Ottoman intelligentsia
and the new intelligentsia, by focusing on what he sees as the neglected so called Turkish culture.
As Uriel Heyd’s analysis, “he wanted his countryman to be rooted first of all in Turkish culture and
only afterwards to adapt Western civilization.”34
Just like Akҫura, Gökalp looked inward on restructuring identity. However, in contrast
with Akҫura, Gökalp did not dismiss Pan-Islam outright (even though he was critical of the old
elite and distanted himself from the Pan-Islam ideology), but implicitly sought a synergy of the
Pan-Islamism and a new Turkish identity. It is therefore, from an anthropological point of view,
important to understand that he did not create new concepts or new cultural frameworks, but
reused, rephrased, and rearranged old ones. His vision of the Turkish National identity was, in
fact, based on the Pan-Islam ideology of the old Ottoman Empire and (especially in the beginning
of his writings) on the Islamic tradition of a fraternity and equality of believers. This changed
in the course of the political developments between 1908 and 1913. Where he first envisioned a
multinational State with different communities and separate nationalities, he afterwards concluded
that “only a State consisting of one nation can exist.”35 The binding factor was Islam. He considered
“Islam as the foundation of the Turkish culture.”36
To understand his approach on culture, we have to take a look at his ideas which were
inspired by Durkheim. To Durkheim society was an entity, with its own collective conscious.37
Each society had its own history, its own trajectory and its own functions. The aim of society was
social cohesion. Gökalp adapted these ideas. To him society passed historically through several
stages, from a) primitive or tribal to b) a society based on ethnical affinity, to c) a society with a
common religion, to finally d) a society united by culture. It is the cultural heritage rather than
political will or affiliation that builds a nation. Gökalp definition of a nation is therefore: “a society
consisting of people who speak the same language, have had the same education and are united
in their religious, moral and aesthetic ideals.”38 Gökalp therefore makes religion a basic aspect of
culture, a primordial phase of culture, and a first step in society’s progression.
We see in Gökalp’s intellectual thoughts, therefore, a primordial approach, where culture
encapsulates all the previous steps. This is a very important emphasis and difference with the PanIslam. Where in Pan-Islam a great nation of Islam was envisioned, this religion was not necessarily
primordial. For this reason, different religions could co-exist side by side. In the Pan-Turkish or
later Pan-Turan ideology, however, this was impossible. Religion was a basic feature of the Turkish
national and ethnic identity. When a great Turkish national state was envisioned, this excluded
non-Muslims.39 We see this returning in some of his early writings. In one of his essays, Gökalp
writes:
that non-Muslim communities had no part of the political life of the Empire and were
exempt from military service and that they therefore could concentrate their attention on
their economic interests and, thanks to the large measure of autonomy granted to them by
the Turks, on the development of their social life.40

What is interesting in this statement is the exclusive role he gives to non-Muslims in society. NonMuslims were not burdened by political responsibilities and could therefore pursue economic
goals. And, he hereby immediately contextualizes the prosperous position of Christian minorities
in some villages and provinces, and combines this with their lack of political commitment. This
status quo was tolerated (through aman in the Pan-Islam ideology and the millet-system) by the
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Ottomans. Non-Muslims were therefore not only outside society, they were also parasitic and it
was the old Ottoman intelligentsia that had let this happen.
In the above statement of Gökalp we see identity played out on several levels. First he creates
a schism with the old Ottoman intelligentsia and the new Ottoman intelligentsia; second he places
the Turks in opposition of the Non-Muslims and, by doing so, intertwines Turkism with Islamism
(contrary to Akҫura). The Turk is furthermore burdened with the political future of society, while
the non-Muslim is not. The non-Muslim is therefore not a part of the political entity. Here again we
see the threat of the psychological Self; a Self that was not only endangered by external enemies,
but also by the old Ottoman intelligentsia and by other groups who had created a home within the
Ottoman Empire. The object of Turkism was for Gökalp “to seek the (Turkish) national culture (milî
harsi aramak), to bring to light what was hidden in the soul of the nation.”41 The individual was in the
ideological framework of Gökalp subordinate to the State. This is a theme we can find in his poetry:
What is duty? A voice that comes down from the throne of God.
Reverberating the consciousness of my nation.
I am a soldier, it is my commander,
I obey without a question all its orders
With closed eyes
I carry out my duty.42

While the crisis between 1908 and 1913 intensified, nationalism deepened. In 1911, during a
Congress, the CUP came with the following statement:
In our opinion, it is the aim of the Committee of Union and Progress to establish a united and
progressive Ottomanism … The Committee of Union and Progress considers the Islam the
basis of Ottomanism and attributes the existence to this spiritual force.43

Here we see how the ideas of Gökalp, and his ideological framework, become the central piece
of the new CUP policy. Embedded within this statement, there is an element of a self-fulfilling
prophecy. By stating and restating, through writings, policies, laws and decrees, that the problems
of the Ottoman Empire lie with the minorities within the State and the enemies outside the State, the
minorities in extent become a real threat as identity is reshaped to counter post an imaginary Other.
An article published on the 4th of August 1911 in the periodical Genҫ Kalemler, after the Italian
invasion of Tripoli, claimed that the Europeans’ goal was “to swallow us.” The article went on to
claim that the Europeans “were crushing the peoples in the East, who trampled the humanity of the
East underfoot, and who engaged in civilized brigandage which was anything but compassionate
and merciful, and which desired to imprison and curse all who were not like themselves.”44 This
article demonstrates how the fear of the physical and psychological Selves increases, and also how
the Ottomans use baby-grammar to define Europeans as inhuman and uncompassionate.
The images that Ottoman nationalists used after 1908 became highly pathological, in the sense
that they did not come from a positive self-image, but from a negative self-image built upon images
of victimization. First, as the work of Gökalp shows, the Turks are victims of the old Ottoman elite
(the Ottoman Other). Secondly, they are victims of the inhuman and uncompassionate Europeans
(the international Other). And, thirdly, they are the victims of minorities within (the internal Other),
who had become prosperous in the old millet-system but did not carry any political responsibility.
In each step of the political crisis, Ottoman nationalists can be seen trying to alleviate these three
threats to the psychological Self by attaching negative connotations to the different categories of
Others (Ottoman, international or internal) and, at the same time, bloating and expanding their
own self-image and self-esteem by a false sense of superiority.
The fragility of the self image became crucial during the Balkan wars, where the loss of
European territory and possessions had devastating effects. The dream of a rejuvenated and
great Ottoman empire shattered. The war became a national shame, as the Ottomans felt that they
no longer played a role within the International and European arena. This defeat was handled
in the same way as the whole ideological crisis of the Ottoman Empire between 1908 and 1914
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was handled: by turning inward, essentializing Others, and essentializing the Self. This becomes
obvious in the poem Esnaf Destam which Gökalp wrote after the Balkan wars:
We were defeated because we were so backward
To take revenge, we shall adopt the enemy’s science
We shall learn his skill, steal his methods
On progress we will set our heart
We shall skip five hundred years
And not stand still. Little time is left.45

In this poem we see the victimization and the fragile self-concept—the Ottomans were backwards
compared to the Europeans. We also see, after the first line, that this victimization is not a source
of introspection. To the contrary, the focus and emphasis is on revenge, on taking a step forward—
even five hundred years. There is a sense of threat and urgency in this poem, as if the Ottoman is at
the point of being obliterated if it does not respond quickly to the threats. The aim is to destroy the
Other before it destroys you. Backwards is juxtaposed with an internal superiority: the Ottoman
can skip five hundred years.
The threat of the psychological Self is often repeated by the perpetrators of genocidal violence.
Tone Bringa states (referring to Roger Cohen) that genocide was the most overused word in
Milošević’s vocabulary. Milošević’ kept repeating the atrocities that were committed against the
Serbians during the Second World War. The culprits were poturice; “those who had become Turks.”
(Those who converted to the Islam.) They were seen as internal enemies and, in some contexts,
poturice was even a synonym for “traitor.”46 Similarly, Christopher C. Taylor points out that before
the Rwanda genocide Tutsi’s were depicted as invaders from Ethiopia. Tutsi’s were intelligent
(hamite) invaders, who conquered the slow-witted (bantu) Hutu’s.47 The massacres on Hutu’s in
Burundi in (1972) were used as a political example of what the Tutsis, if they had the chance, were
capable of doing.48 The larger point is that in these narratives there is an expression and articulation
of a need for a preemptive strike. The enemy from within should be stopped before it engulfs,
destroys or even, to paraphrase the author in Genҫ Kalemler, “swallows” the dominant culture.
The Self is in an immediate and urgent danger and can only strike outward. This is worded
by Gökalp in one of his writings, right before the First World War: “The enemy’s country shall
be laid to waste; Turkey shall grow into Turan with haste.”49 The emphasis of course, in these
sentences, is on Turan; the great Turkish Empire. In the narratives of the CUP leaders there was no
longer a difference between the European Other (the external) and the Christian Other (the enemy
within); the latter was the extension of the first. This is best shown by a statement Talaat made to
Ambassador Morgenthau, later quoted in Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story in 1918, after Talaat had
heard of the massacres on the Armenians:
These different blocs in the Turkish Empire … always conspired against Turkey; because of
the hostility of these native peoples, Turkey has lost province after province – Greece, Serbia,
Rumania, Bulgaria. Bosnia Herzigovina, Egypt and Tripoli. In this way, the Turkish Empire
has dwindled almost to nothing.50

In this statement we clearly see that the Christian minorities were held responsible for the great
losses of the Ottoman Empire. This is further exemplified by a statement of diplomat Galip
Söylemezoğlu in his memoirs:
A number of crimes were perpetrated during the war ... These crimes occurred for a number
of reasons ... I only remember that 350 000 Muslims were murdered during the Balkan War.51

Here we see how the Balkan Wars legitimized the violence against the Christians. This violence
was for survival. It was to purify the nation-state from foreign elements. These foreign elements
were at this point in the process, completely dehumanized. They were no longer human beings, or
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identities, they were, to quote Kuşҫubaşi Eşref, who played a vital role in the cleansings and was a
gendarme in the Special Organization: “internal tumors that needed to be cleaned.”52 Here we see
the baby-grammar in the most direct form. Christian minorities were no longer seen as humans,
they were tumors collaborating with the external enemy and therefore had to be murdered. But
how can this sociale imaginaire become physical acts? How can thoughts turn fatal? To understand
this we have to look at how violence progresses.
From Ideology to Action
Both Arthur Kleinman and Nancy Scheper-Hughes argue that there are everyday forms of violence.
Scheper-Hughes even considers that genocidal tendencies are an endemic feature of modernity.53
To her peace-time crimes, like inequality, social sentiments and institutions that support inequality
can erupt in genocidal violence. Even though I think that this approach blurs the exceptional nature
of genocide, it does place violence in a broader context. Violence is not only physical, but also
symbolic. Stigmatising individuals, excluding them from social and political bodies can indeed be
considered as violent acts.
We have to keep in mind that the ideology that Gökalp manufactured was not entirely new;
they were not new ideas created outside the habitus of the Ottoman culture. In many ways they
were an extension of the already existing culture and ideology. They only magnified and rephrased
other aspects. Inequality and discrimination were not unknown to the old Ottoman hierarchical
structure, they were an integral part of it. It is important to underline this for it explains that the
perpetrators of genocide didn’t had to learn and internalize new cultural constructs and concepts,
but only different emphasises of old concepts. By this the social imagery of Others is not that
unfamiliar. When it is used in propaganda, and made available to a greater audience, Sémelin
warns us that we should not approach propaganda only as a technical tool. Propaganda is first
and utmost a “universe of meaning for all.”54 What Sémelin implies by this is, is that propaganda
is not only a mechanism to persuade or indoctrinate a population, but that there is a more dialectic
relationship where the populous are using the propaganda (and therefore also the new concepts)
to give meaning and direction to their lives. They do not follow the power holders blindly. The
power holders are answering the fears and insecurities of day to day experiences.
Kai Ambos,55 as well as Ugur Üngör and Mehmet Polatel,56 therefore distinguish three different
levels of perpetrators: high level perpetrators, mid level perpetrators and low level perpetrators,
also considered foot soldiers or in the case of the Armenian genocide civilians and gendarmes.
The high level perpetrators create the ideological framework in which genocidal violence gets
sanctified. The mid level perpetrators are the bureaucrats; the ones that implements, oversees the
laws and decrees and implementations. The low level perpetrators are the ones that commit the
violence itself.
My point is that on each level the ideas of Others and Self are to a high extent internalized. This
has to do on one hand with the familiarity of the ideas, but also with the implementation and the
institutionalization of the ideological framework itself. With each step that an ideological concept
gets translated into a law, a decree or an action, the framework becomes as it were tangible. The
ideological concepts become concrete. They are no longer imaginary constructs, but physical and
symbolic constructs, which become—because they get repeated and translated in physical acts—
normalized. We could compare this with the continuum of destruction mentioned by Staub.57
One action of institutionalization can lead to psychological changes where further and extreme
actions of institutionalizations become normal. The ideas of Others, which are first abstractions
and thoughts, slowly get integrated into the state apparatus and by doing so become more real. In
this sense the first steps of Turkification, are at the same time the first institutionalized steps where
images of Others and Selves are not only vocalized in an ideological framework but also textualized,
emphasised, essentialized and confirmed. Within the bureaucratic and state apparatus there is an
endless mechanism that recreates (and emphasises) Others as a distinct group over and over again.
Through bureaucratic measures the Other becomes an absolute outsider, an institutionalized Other
who is no longer part of the nation-state.
Power over the body is of special importance here. It is, in the most literal sense, the ultimate
power one has over another. This power goes further than bureaucratic and institutional power;
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it is the power over personhood.58 In this sense violence is the ultimate method of making babygrammar physical, tangible, visible. The hegemony of ideas is not just internalized in the minds of
perpetrators and even the victimized group, but even more, it becomes (literally) inscribed in the
body. It is the ultimate confirmation of the existence of the superior Self. Indeed it is the physical
outcome, as I will argue, of reverse mirroring.
Within the Acts of Violence: Baby-Grammar as a Physical Expression
Anton Blok argues that violence, no matter how senseless, always carries a meaning. That violence
as a cultural category or construction should be understood in the first place as a symbolic activity
and therefore meaningful behaviour.59 It is by analyzing violence we can start to establish the
cultural intent of the perpetrators.
In the memoirs of Hampartzoum Chitjian, there are clear depictions of the several stages of
the genocidal process.60 In 1912 he observes, as a child, the first stages of symbolic and institutional
violence: “From the very beginning our Christian names were changed to secular names by the
new teachers. Kasper became Massis and I became Papken.”61 Here we start to see the first steps of
the phases identification, but also in an indirect way classification and symbolization. By changing
the students’ names it became clear who was and who was not a Turk. However, there is another
discourse underneath this action; by changing the name, the Christian name became subordinated
to the non-Christian name. The Christians were made an Other.
At the same time the Turkification at schools increased:
Within a few days we slowly realized what their intentions were for us. They began a very
deliberate plan to convert us. We were to become Turkified. The very first thing they did
was to change our Armenian names into Turkish names ... Next day they demanded we no
longer speak Armenian. They insisted we speak only in Turkish.62

What we see here are a few very crucial elements. Changing names into secular names is not
enough; they have to be changed into Turkish. There is also a refocus on language; not only names
became subordinated to the Turkish hegemony, but also the language and even the interpretation
of history itself:
Next they started to teach us their Turkish history. We were taught to say in Turkish:
“Freedom, Liberty, Fraternity – long live the people
We are Ottoman, we are brothers, our customs are ancient
We must devote our lives as a gift towards our country
We are Ottomans, we are brothers.”63

One had to abide by the new national identity. All Ottomans are brothers, their customs
are ancient. Lives should be devoted as a gift to the country. This implies that if one was not an
Ottoman (and keep in mind here that definition of Ottoman was more primordial than at the start
of the revolution of 1908), one was not a brother and if one did not follow the ancient customs, they
were therefore an outsider. What being an Ottoman meant was expressed in the following actions:
“The last thing they tried to change was our faith in Christianity. We had to memorize and recite
in Turkish: Mohamed is a saint and his teachings are correct.”64 To be Turkish therefore meant
that one had to a) speak the language, b) carry a Turkish name, c) abide to Ottoman interpretation
of history, d) follow supposedly ancient customs and e) convert to the Islam. Here we see the
theoretical and ideological framework of Gökalp expressed in the modes of (symbolic) violence. In
each step the personal identity became subordinated by the Nationalistic identity of the CUP and
the Other got more and more institutionalized.
We see from this point onward how the violence increases:
Three weeks later without warning ... three gendarmes entered the Protestant Church
before we were taken out to pillage for the day. Without a word they promptly started to
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separate boys according to their physical size and age … as it turned out, the older boys
were separated from the group because they were designated to be killed on that day. The
Turks knew the older boys were not going to convert and become Turk and therefore would
continue to be a threat.65

What makes this eyewitness statement so significant is that the individuals who could not convert,
or who were considered too old to convert, were a threat to the Turkish identity. Here we see
how the imagined threat of the self-concept is expressed in physical action. Here we also see that
identity was the focus of the violence. Older boys that could not convert were killed. It was not
necessarily the boys themselves that were being targeted—for the younger boys were kept alive—
but the Armenian (and or Christian) identity. The removal of material possessions, as the following
eyewitness account shows, is of great importance during the violence:
I saw them go: an endless procession, accompanied by gendarmes, who spurred the crowds
on with sticks. Scantily clad, exhausted they dragged on. Elderly women had collapsed from
exhaustion, but had to carry on; they did not want to get acquainted with the threatening
sticks of the gendarmes. The Turkish do not allow them to carry a single item of clothing or
a mule or a goat. All that they possessed was sold for next to nothing.66

If we consider the economical position of Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire, this violence
had a strong symbolic nature. The social status of Christians was often based on their economical
position. Taking away material possession therefore is not only taking away their wealth, but also
their social status and economic identity. At the same time Christian Churches (another important
local identity indicator) were being destroyed:
... the Turkish government, the Mulhallemi, and the Kurds were openly encouraged to set
their whole plan in action with respect to disposing of all the [East and West] Syriacs in the
area. They surrounded Midyat from all sides in vast numbers and started indiscriminate
killings of the Syriacs, destroying their houses, churches, monasteries, and palaces.67

What makes this statement important is that the killing itself was not enough. Churches and houses
also had to be destroyed, as if the landscape itself had to be cleansed (purified) from Christian
elements. Here we see that not just people, but more importantly, identity was being targeted.
When houses were not destroyed, they were repossessed by Muslims:
Oh, my Der baba, wherever we went, they threw us out. Through the windows we would
enter the houses left empty by Armenians and sleep there at night, but now those houses are
filled with Turkish refugees.68

What makes this act so symbolic is that the Turkish refugees are in fact Muslim refugees from the
Balkan wars. As Üngör points out, the deportations went both ways.69 The Christian minorities
were deported outwards, while the Muslim refugees from the Balkan were deported inwards.
The Armenian and Syriac houses were to be used as accommodation for the homeless refugees.
If we combine this with the importance, that the Balkan wars had, on the identity crisis of the
Ottoman Empire, the movement of Muslim refugees was not only economically motivated, but
also symbolic. The Muslims were literally claiming possession of their land. It is in this point in the
memoires and eyewitness account that the details of the atrocities become more graphic, but also
in the same instant more fragmented and circumventive. The most horrifying scenes are described,
but often disassociated. There is a reason for this and this has to do with the explicit nature of the
violence itself. It is impossible to capture these horrors in texts; violence goes beyond words and
meaning; language doesn’t translate what aspired. Michael Taussig speaks of “space of death;”70
Sasanka Perera calls it the “shadow of death.” 71 Regardless, it is the moment that culture unravels,
that all cultural and social meanings within the acts of violence are lost:
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space of death is pre-eminently a space of transformation: through experience of coming close
to death there will be a more vivid sense of life; through fear there can come not only growth
in self-consciousness but also fragmentation, then loss of self conforming to authority.72

The space of death is a moment during the experience of violence, where there are no words, where
culture disintegrates, where the victim is very much aware of his physical being and the loss of
control over his or her own self-determination and destiny. At that moment the victim is nothing
more than blood, brains and bones,73 a physical vessel that can be tortured or killed to the likings of
the aggressors. Language cannot fill this experiential space. There are no cultural frameworks that
can give meaning, definition or direction; there is only the experience of fear and the realization of
death itself.
This is also the moment where violence in the most physical form gets inscribed in the mind
and in the (social) body of the victimized group. This is the experience that direct survivors cannot
convey; where only loose images get communicated; often non-discursive and through silence.
At the same instant however, this moment is symbolically important; especially if we put it in
the continuum of the identity crisis of the perpetrators. It is here where the dominance of the
perpetrator is the most visible and acute; it is here where the experiential world of the aggressor
in fact becomes the experiential world of the victim; where the Other is not just imaginary in the
social fabric of the perpetrators world, but where the Other is physically constructed.
Henry Riggs, an American missionary, speaks of the horror of starvation, near Harpoot, where
caravan routes converged and the Ottomans created a camp:
As we reached the edge of the camp, an unforgettable scene occurred. Seeing us coming, the
people thronged about us, each trying to get within reach, and all crying out with the pitiful
fierceness of starvation, “Bread! Bread! Bread!” Each one was thinking of their own hunger,
or of her children, so they jostled each other as they surged about us ... more like starving
animals than human beings.74

In the above description we see the powerlessness of the narrator. We also see something else,
something that is not easily captured in words: how the experience of starvation, disease and
exhaustion disintegrates the collective identity; that only fear survives. People fight for bread.
People fight for life. All other identity indicators are stripped away. For those who did not die of
disease, exhaustion or starvation, there was often a worse fate:
Many caravans arrived at Midyat; and they were filled with women and children. They were
taken to the mosque’s yard. The yard would become overcrowded. To reduce the number of
hostages, the Turkish forces gathered the boys, around 500-600. They told them to lie down,
face down. Then they took some thick sticks and beat them on the head. Then some 40 to
50 Turkish soldiers riding horses rode back and forth over the boys’ heads until they died.75

This violence carries multiple symbols. The public display of violence emphasis the inferiority of
the Christian victims to the dominant hegemony. It also meant to depersonalize the victims; to
make them puppets in the hands of the power holders. At the same time the disregard in which
the bodies were spread out and displayed, also carried a warning for spectators and bystanders:
[the corpses] were laid in such a position as to expose their persons to the ridicule of passers
by, and on the abdomen of each was cast a large stone. They had evidently been murdered
there at the noon hour and then the brutal guards had stopped to leave behind them the
signs not only of violence but of mockery and insult.76

Humiliation in life had to be perpetuated after death. The mockery and inferiority had to inscribed
literally in the physical but also in the social and even geographical body; the deaths had to be
visible, and where they were invisible, there were often sanitarian and not humanitarian reasons
to do so:
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The corpses of tens of thousands of Armenians had been buried – not as the sacred obligation
finally due to all mankind, civilized or savage, since prehistoric times. Rather, these corpses
had been buried by Muslim labourers sent by the government simply to “cleanse the
environment” of the pollution caused by tens of thousand of rotten and decomposed bodies.77

In the above statement the victims are not only placed outside the new Turkish nation-state, but
also outside time. They weren’t given the same rights of the prehistoric ancestors of all human
kind.
There is another dimension of the violence that we have to address, and which has only been
implicitly present in the above statements and this is the sexualisation of violence. One eyewitness
account speaks of “raping women and young girls in front of everybody” and of “pregnant women
being killed after their babies were taken from their bellies.”78 Others describe how girls were taken
to harems or were raped before they were killed. There was also violence aimed at genitals: “The
male corpses are in many cases hideously mutilated (sexual organs cut off, and so on), the female
corpses are ripped open.”79 Or, as Danielyan writes, “In Dilman ... we saw the traces of boundless
brutality, glowing skewers were run through genitals of both women and men, and they were put
to death this way.”80 The sexualisation is a reoccurring theme in all warfare, but more specifically
present during ethnic cleansings.81 Some of this violence is considered opportunistic and other
strategic, meaning that sexual violence occurs when “an armed group believes it to be an effective
form of terror against or punishment of a targeted group.”82 There is of course another dimension
of sexual violence, and this is the symbolic dimension. Raping a victim is the ultimate physical
dominance of the aggressor and the one that is subordinated. Raping is putting shame on women’s
bodies, and by doing so also on communities. It is a way to differentiate the dominant cultural
group from the Other.83 “Women thus become the embodied boundaries of the nation-state.”84
Controlling women is controlling the reproduction of identity. This does not explain however the
mutilation and the removal of men genitals, as the above quote shows. I think that in these instances
there is another mechanism of identity-destruction at play; it is the literal deprivation of the gender
identity of the victimized group and thereby enhancing the masculinity of the aggressors.
There are other symbolisms. The metaphors where victims resemble animals are the most often
used metaphors in the memoirs and eye witness accounts. The use of these metaphors by survivors
is of great importance. It shows how they experienced the violence as something inhuman and in
some cases animalistic. By killing the Armenians as animals, they were regressed as non-human
beings as the following eye-witness account shows:
Then I saw with my own eyes the Turks beating a fellow named Sahag, who had hid under
his wife’s dress. They were beating him with hammers, axes right in front of me and his wife.
He yelled to her to run away, that we are all going to die a “donkey death”.85

The term “donkey death” was referring to the act of cutting throats. It was a way of killing animals,
mostly in ceremonial settings.
If we summarize the symbolism and compare it to the mechanisms of baby-grammar and
reverse mirroring we come to an interesting observation. During each step in the continuum of
destruction the violence increases and a layer of identity is stripped from the victimized group.
First the obvious and primary identity markers, like names (kinship), language, (collective) history
and religion were destroyed. Then came the physical destruction and within these acts the violence
is symbolic; the victims are concentrated, overpowered, de-gendered, penetrated and in the end
dehumanized. Through the act of mirroring the identity layer that is stripped away, confirms at
the same instant the identity of the in-group. By destroying the names (kinship), for example, the
perpetrators are confirming and solidifying their own kinship and heritage. By destroying the
language of the out-group, the perpetrators are confirming the superiority of their own language.
By making the collective history of the out-group subordinated to the nationalistic tale, the
perpetrators are actually confirming their own history. By destroying the religion, the perpetrators
are confirming the superiority of their own religion. Within each step of the violence, the fixation
on identity for the in-group, is symbolically resolved, ending with the most gruesome acts by
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which the in-group confirms its power over reproduction, masculinity and humanity over the outgroup.
Arjun Appadurai86 emphasises the great importance of Death. Killing is an act where the
construction of “fake” identities demands the brutal “creation” of real people through violence:
“violent action can become one means of satisfying one’s sense of one’s categorical self.”87 In this I
agree with Appadurai. I think however that this process starts before the killing. It is not only death
that solidifies the categorical self, but each step of the violence is solidifying a layer of identity in
the minds of the perpetrator.
Vamik Volkan88 describes the development of individual identity to a group identity. His
approach is psycho-analytical. He describes how an individual first separates a subject from object
and establishes his ego, which Volkan describes as an “inner sense of sameness.”89 When this
ego is constructed, and the individual ages, more layers of identity are absorbed. An individual
becomes aware of his gender, his family and eventually his group identity and includes these,
into his self-representation. Although it would be too early to hypothesize, it is interesting and
thought provoking that within the acts of violence we see a similar process, but then in reverse.
First the obvious identity makers (language, names and churches) are destroyed, until the more
abstract identities, like gender and humanity, which are to a child more primary, are deprived
from the victimized group. By stripping away each layer of identity from the out-group, the ingroup solidifies and establishes its identity and more subconsciously, its own existence.
This is where genocidal violence differs from other acts of collective violence: where warfare
is used to meet political goals, political actions are used to repress a population and revolutions
are used to overthrow the current hegemony and power, genocidal violence is aimed at destroying
an identity. This destruction, from the point of view of the perpetrator at least, has to be complete
whether it is aimed at an ethnic, national, cultural, racial or even a political identity. This is the
reason why genocide is indiscriminately aimed at civilians and generally includes cultural genocide
and ethnic cleansing. The goal of the violence is pure annihilation. Genocide is successful when
a specific group no longer exists, or even more than that, if not only the nation-state but also the
national history is cleansed from this “foreign element.”
Concluding Remarks
It was my goal in this article to bridge the gulf that Claude Lanzmann considered the distance
between “the desire to kill and the act itself.”90 The answer that I provided lies in the grammatical
structures of Baumann. Its thereby important to note that a sense of belonging is a primary and
basic need for human beings. This belonging can be attached to a family or a tribe, but can also be
attached to more abstract notions as religion, ethnicity, race or nationality. This sense of belonging
can be so strong, so derivative, that people are willing to kill for it and die to protect it. Baumann
deciphers three structures in which identity takes shape. First he states that identities are always
in a state of flux and that studying identities themselves are, therefore, analytically speaking, not
all-telling or significant. It is interesting to study how people define themselves, but it does not give
us any insight in which way people define themselves. He answers this problem, which he considers
a “riddle,” by not focusing on identities, but on identification processes. His answer is thereby not
agency based, but structurally based.
Baumann deciphers three forms of identification processes. One is primordial however, a
process he terms baby-grammar. This is one of the basic forms how identities are created. Through
the baby-grammar identification process, individuals create dichotomies between themselves and
Others. It is my argument that this baby-grammar becomes the primary grammatical structure
during the genocidal processes, when more and more negative connotations are attached to Others,
to such an extent that they become essentialized and dehumanized, and the dominant culture group
establishes a more cohesive sense of Self. This is a cumulative process, similar to the continuum of
destruction. The Other, at first, is only constructed in ideologies and the sociale imaginaire. However,
the Other becomes more and more tangible through the act of institutionalization. The Other
is literally visualized in laws and decrees, through social institutions, until the Other no longer
becomes an imaginary Other, but an tangible Other that can be destroyed—a person who can be
killed. This is, as I have argued, by studying the Armenian genocide, the bridge between the gulf
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of “the desire to kill and the act itself.” On some subconscious level, this grammatical structure—
whether motivated to kill by economic gain, or personal jealousy, or any other reason on a micro
level—plays an enormous part in the incentives to commit genocide, and also the methods that are
used during the killing. To kill a group out of jealousy or economic gain, for example, the group
already has to be targeted and dehumanized. To slaughter them like animals and to torture them,
shows in the most basic form that they are no longer a part of the dominant culture group.
Through the whole machinery of destruction, we see how a layer of identity of the victimized
group is indeed stripped away, to solidify a similar layer into a new image of the Self. Once
again, these are subconscious actions, partly because the grammars of Baumann are dayto-day processes. They are not “abnormal” to the perpetrators. The institutionalization of
the Other has already taken such a shape, that killing the Other is no longer an abnormal
act, but even a communal duty to the dominant culture group. We create our identity
without realizing it, over and over again. This is the core of the genocidal process, and also
the reason why it is so dangerous and why ordinary men can commit horrendous acts;
the processes in which these acts take place, the mechanisms behind the acts, are actually
so daily, and grind into society so slowly, that stigmatizing and dehumanizing is normal
in our day-to-day behaviour. Baby grammar doesn’t become genocidal overnight, it is a
normal process which first gets formed, slowly turns aggressive, then gets institutionalized
and can then be expressed physically. In here I concur with the analysis of Emike OhnukiTierney and her definition of méconnaissance: actions on a micro level, even inspired by
different motivations, confirms the ideological beliefs or belief systems on a macro level91.
There is a dialectic between micro and macro behaviour, and not a dichotomy, and I believe
that the grammatical structure of baby grammar provides us an answer where we as social
scientists and social critics can actually see negative- and positive mirroring in its most
physical form.

This has certain implications for the study of violence and genocide. First, we can derive
meaning from the acts of violence and we can establish the genocidal intent, if we study the whole
machinery in which the violence takes shape. Secondly, study genocide from this perspective gives
insights into the genocide process that are useful to early warning systems to prevent genocidal
acts in the future. From the perspective outlined in this article, the most useful insight for these
early warning systems, is to focus on the point when ideologies and ideas of Others are turned into
actual laws and decrees. In the end, violence, and the act of violence itself tells a story.
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89 Vamik D. Volkan, “Individual and Large-Group Identity,” 459.
90 Claude Lanzmann, “Les non lieux de la mémoire,” 20.
91 She even goes a step further and states that actions on a macro and global, from an ideological point of
view, and actions on a local is a wrong dichotomy. By studying the diaries of Kamikaze pilots, she comes
to the conclusion that even though the pilots may differ in their ideologies and thoughts, by becoming
a Kamikaze pilot and kill citizens they indirectly confirm the state ideology. This is what she considers
méconnaissance. Emiko Ohnuki-Thierney, Kamikaze, Cherry Blossoms and Nationalism: The Militarization
of Aesthetics in Japanese History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), 2–3, 249.
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The official wall of silence erected around the events that precipitated the sentencing to death
of what some commentators have approximated at 4 million people between the autumn of 1932
and the summer of 1933 in the Ukrainian socialist soviet republic and the Kuban region of southern
Russia—an area in the northern Caucasus that was densely populated by ethnic Ukrainians—only
began to crumble toward the end of the 1980s with the implementation of Gorbachev’s Perestoika.
Further, it was only following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the subsequent emergence
of various official documentation, once hidden, and harrowing personal accounts, once whispered,
relating to what has come to be viewed by some as the most notorious of the pan-Soviet famines
during the period of the early 1930s that a burgeoning body of scholarly literature began to
appear. Subsequently termed the Holodomor, the literature on this famine has sought to analyze
the political antecedents and those exacerbating factors that further deepened the severity of the
famine felt by ethnic Ukrainians, and crucially the positioning of the Stalinist regime.
Klid and Motyl’s carefully crafted compilation is an attempt, which is wholly achieved,
to piece together in one place for both experts and the layperson alike excerpts of some of the
most prominent scholarly literature and official documentation along with eyewitness accounts
and testimonies dealing directly with the Holodomor. To that effect, following a comprehensive
introductory chapter presented by Klid and Motyl, the editors then lay out their volume in six
pertinently themed sections. Beginning with excerpts from scholarship on the Holodomor, given
the debate concerning the applicability of the charge of genocide to this famine, the documents that
follow the scholarship section contain various legal evaluations and resolutions that have emerged
directly related to the interpretation of the Holodomor as genocide. The complementary third and
fourth sections contain eyewitness accounts. The former contains accounts provided by journalists
and traveler writers of the time, in addition to those given by individuals within the Stalinist
regime at various levels of its hierarchy. The latter section is wholly dedicated to detailing the
accounts of survivors. The fifth section of the volume, simply entitled “Documents” is comprised
of both official Soviet archival records along with foreign government documentation. To end,
the editors dedicate the sixth section to a vast array of literary works that has emerged dealing
with this famine. Much of the initial benefit, therefore, of this work emanates from the diversity
and richness of the excerpts chosen, thanks in large part to the skillful navigation of the editors
of the myriad political and linguistic constraints previously associated with the accessibility of
the documentation. The resultant effect of which makes this a highly credible and indispensible
sourcebook for the intended interdisciplinary audience of newcomers and experts.
Emphasis must be given, however, to the dual overarching impetus for this work as laid out
by the editors in the introductory pages, which is both one of scholarship and one of specifically
advancing the interpretation of the “Holodomor as genocide” (xxxi). Noting their belief that
this interpretation will prevail through an appeal to “the normative and the political zeitigeist,”
the editors note the likely probability of those “neutral” among the readership accepting this
interpretation, while characterizing those who refute it as “diehard skeptic[s]” or as having “a
political agenda” (xxxi). Lest one forget that the application of the term genocide has been equally
advanced for intended political purposes. Relevant today in light of the crisis that continues to rage
Laura C. Collins, “Book Review: Bohdan Klid and Alexander J. Motyl, compilers and eds, (2012) The Holodomor Reader: A Sourcebook
on the Famine of 1932–1933 in Ukraine, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press: Edmonton” Genocide Studies and Prevention 9,
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in Ukraine, it is noteworthy to reflect, therefore, on the potential for the politicization of the term
genocide, as applied to the Holodomor to obscure the advancement of interdisciplinary scholarship
and an understanding of the antecedents and aggravating factors, in conjunction with the role of
the Soviet regime.
That said, however, the attention with which the editors have paid to compiling the first section
of their sourcebook dedicated to scholarship merits highlighting. The preliminary section starts by
tracing the two dominant schools of thought that have emerged dealing with the Holodomor. This
first school of thought comprises of works concluding that this famine may be viewed through the
prism of genocide as a result of the policies implemented by the Stalinist regime stemming from
the early 1930s. These works point to the fact that the policies had as their intent from their initial
conception a dual purpose. First, the Stalinist regime sought to dismantle the particularly entrenched
peasant resistance to the policy of forced collectivization and its associated grain procurement
campaign in the Ukrainian socialist soviet republic and the Kuban region where there was a deep
culture of individual farming traditions. Second, the specter of Ukrainian nationalism, the core of
which was found in within the peasantry–the “kulaks,” was perceived by the Bolsheviks as one of
the most powerful factors that had the potential to thwart the transformative vision Stalin had for
his communist empire. To that effect, Stalin, in the early 1930s set forth a plan intended to destroy
the Ukrainian nation through decimation of the peasantry. In contrast, while the second school of
thought neither dismisses the criminality nor the pervasive nature of the famine in the Ukrainian
socialist soviet republic and the Kuban, these works do not categorize the events as genocide, but
rather conclude that this famine cannot be viewed as distinct from the complex matrix of the panSoviet experience of famines between 1931-1933, that were impacted by several factors.
Most pertinently, however, the beginning section of Klid and Motyl’s sourcebook also
introduces a third subsection of literature pertaining to more recent scholarship that has endeavored
to refine and bridge traditional debates and insights in light of newly disclosed documentation.
The centrality of the indisputable national dimension of the famine in the Ukrainian socialist
soviet republic and the Kuban region, which is prominent in other scholarship is further brought
to the fore by these works, but also, as an excerpt from the work of Italian scholar Andrea Graziosi
pertinently conveys, it is through comparison with the other Soviet famines taking place at the
same time that the distinct and changing character of the Ukrainian case of starvation, particularly
from the autumn of 1932 onwards, becomes apparent. From this point, starvation, which was
already somewhat present in the both areas was wielded as a weapon by the Stalinist regime to
destroy the Ukrainian nation. (19-26).
The official soviet documentation contained within Klid and Motyl’s volume wholly serves
to reiterate the threat posed by the Ukrainian nation as perceived by Stalin and, therefore, the
urgent necessity of using any and all means possible to transform Ukraine into an exemplary
soviet republic, as an excerpt from Stalin to one of his associates, Kaganovich is testament (p. 239240). Moreover, the intended purpose of the unrelenting priority placed on the grain procurement
campaign throughout Ukraine and the Kuban and the intention to strip peasants of all remnants of
sustenance is also apparent as evidence in the correspondence sent by the Ukrainian Communist
Party Secretary Stansalv Kosior, which ordered an immediate relinquishing of “all available
reserves, including so-called sowing seed” for the purposes of reaching the grain procurement
levels (p.251).
The significance of this contribution, therefore, to the study of the Holodomor lies not only
within the pages of the compilation, which taken in sum capture the true horror of the months
between the autumn of 1932 and the summer of 1933, but also in the scholarship and academic
debates that they will likely stimulate across disciplines. Indeed, while the editors masterfully
achieve in creating an accessible book for newcomers to the subject, those immersed in scholarship
on the Holodomor or more broadly in the study of the history and politics of communism and
famines will benefit from previously inaccessible documentation. In sum, as a well written, multidimensional, and creative compilation of a most serious and under researched areas particularly
within scholarship on genocide, Kild and Motyl’s The Holodomor Reader: A Sourcebook on the Famine
of 1932–1933 in Ukraine, is a recommended reading that demands critical scholarly attention.
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Concept
Considering that violence is a prevalent phenomenon and omnipresent in the media, the glaring
lack of academic teaching addressing it is astonishing. Accordingly, there are presumably far more
courses on peace and conflict studies or genocide studies offered than courses dealing integratively
with the various types of violence. Integratively means to approach violence from a broad range
of vantage points: to take into account domestic violence as well as genocide and to do so with
reference to the insights of the respective relevant disciplines. It is exactly this transdisciplinary
approach that is chosen by Alex Alvarez and Ronet Bachman: “All violence is connected by a web
of actions and behaviors, ideas, perceptions, and justifications. While the individual dynamics of
specific violent behavior may vary somewhat, violent acts share a number of essential characteristics
that bind them together into what is sometimes called the unity of human aggression.“ (p. 3)
Their textbook, its language and structure, is obviously aimed at undergraduates and interested
laymen. In simple terms they explain comparatively complex phenomena and in doing so they
confront what they consider to be widely held misconceptions as, for example, the notion that the
larger number of perpetrators suffers from a form of psychological impairment. Observations such
as these as well as the overall design illustrate that advanced students, let alone researchers on
violence are not the main target group. The same impression may be derived from the cover that is
virtually dripping with blood and from the marketing blurb that is used to praise the revised new
edition of the book on the back cover. Likewise and typical for a textbook, questions and lists of
key terms are provided at the end of each section or else a list of works omitted. All these features
as well as the given examples and statistics (for instance on acts of crime), moreover, show that this
book was intended for the US audience.
Structure & Topics
The strong reference to the US also becomes apparent in the introduction with the heading
“As American as Apple Pie.“ Against the backdrop of the role violence plays in the US society,
it discusses definitional questions such as what violence is and, in a next step, how it can be
measured. The following chapters introduce various explanatory models derived from diverse
academic discourses. Chemical processes are as much taken into account as are psychological
explanations and a whole range of sociological approaches. For instance, brain injuries are
discussed, the role of the media, the accessibility of weapons as well as the influence of alcohol and
other drugs. Subsequently, Alvarez and Bachman tackle various types or else contexts of violence.
These comprise assault and murder, violence in the home, robbery, workplace violence, rape, mob
violence, terrorism and, finally, genocide. The book concludes with suggestions on how violence
may be prevented rendered from the vantage point of public health with a focus on teenagers in
the US.
Key Theses
The book is primarily interesting because despite its textbook structure it espouses some central
theses that are taken up repeatedly across all chapters. Most prominently, it claims that violence,
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no matter what its form, is always the result of a specific combination of causes originating from a
social, psychological and situational nature. This entails the recognition that the violence actually
executed is the result of processes that, at their beginning, are quite undetermined. Accordingly, it
can be understood to be the consequence of dynamic processes and conditions that may well have
had a different outcome. Due to this, frequently discussed causes and factors are analyzed for their
potential to fuel violence or to de-escalate. At this point, further basic factors come into play: that
of status and dominance (p. 29). The fight for social recognition is identified as an essential urge
triggering acts of violence—or acts of all kinds really—and is spelled out in the various contexts
of violence. This applies, for example, to murders. According to Alvarez and Bachman, these can
often be attributed to the fact that someone does not feel sufficiently respected or is offended (p.
30). This aspect continuously recurs in diverse statements, for example, when it is stated that an act
of violence is intended to save one’s face (p. 66) or to undo the subjective notion that an injustice
was committed (p. 89). Thus, emotions come into play that—as must be critically remarked—are
not systematically discussed. Likewise, modes of perception, interpretations of the social world
and their social framing should be discussed thoroughly since exactly this—how individuals
would like to be perceived, how they actually are perceived or believe to be perceived and how the
respective perspectives come into existence—according to the authors—is the key to every analysis
of violence. Nonetheless, as a matter of fact, a number of socio-theoretical concepts can be found
in the book. To give an example, Alvarez and Bachman discuss “script theory” in the context of
media audience research. According to this, media—such as films or video games—are not actual
causes for violence. Instead, the theory suggests that they influence the way people interpret and
perceive situations (p. 44). Exactly with this argument another important point is made: People
are shaped by their experiences. Depending on the degree, intensity and, most prominently,
positive connotations of violence as part of a person’s experience, the likelihood increases that new
acts of violence ensue. These excursions into theory are rather short and always reduced in their
complexity, which is probably due to the assumed audience. Hence, concepts such as perception
and interpretation are employed, yet not investigated in their complexity. However, these easy to
stomach references to social theories could be a promising strategy for their successful distribution.
After all, for instance the sociology of knowledge, figurational sociological considerations à la
Norbert Elias or symbolic interactionism are used as explanatory references.
These references, however, distinguish the intentionality and acts of violence: As it is emphasized
that violence is dynamic and a process, a specific viewpoint on the investigated phenomena can
be developed. Considering the example of murders, the authors argue, for instance, that these
frequently are the result of a “continuum of violence” (p. 79) and hardly ever a predetermined
aim. In addition, “this means that, like all social events, the outcome of the encounter depends
on the perception and behaviors of the actors involved” (p. 86). Accordingly, acts of violence are
not investigated as deeds done by evil people, but as social occurrences that follow the same rules
and the same patterns as other, non-violent encounters. This also holds true for terrorist—often
labelled as “evil” in the public US discourse—that is scrutinized by taking into account individual
behavior. Developments are recapitulated and trivial social aspects of daily life such as questions
of belonging, acceptance, prestige and the constructions of meaning, friendship, power and action
ability are once more mentioned as relevant factors (p. 238).
As the book is sensationally advertised, its content speaks a different, a de-dramatizing and
objectifying language. When the authors indulge in their passion for statistics, perhaps one or
the other reader might be inclined to skip over these passages. Yet, this would be a mistake since
the detailed investigation of how, for instance, data on “Homicide by Weapon Type” or “Rates of
Nonfatal Workplace Violence per 1.000 Employed Persons Age 16 or Older” are accumulated and
used, is extremely instructive. This is due to the fact that it sensitizes readers to deal with such
information—for instance on youth violence—critically as well as cautiously.
Genocide and Prevention
So, what does the book contribute to the central topics of the journal and, consequently, to the fields
of work of its readership—Genocide and Prevention? Researchers on genocide probably will not
learn as much although they might be impressed by the authors’ ability to safely lead their readers
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through the variety of explanatory models so that these are comparatively easy to understand. For
newcomers, however, the chapter provides a good and comparatively broad introduction to the
topic. At the outset, Alvarez and Bachman review definitional problems and introduce cases that
are commonly discussed as instances of genocides. In the following, different factors responsible
for these mass crimes are shortly discussed and eventually perpetrator types and then victims
and bystanders are outlined. After some consideration on international law and genocide the
chapter finishes with an assessment rendered in the form of the hope that the new definition of
international relations and law in the future “will help prevent” (p. 271) genocides. Actors such as
the Islamic State, which is pillaging Iraq and Syria, up until now have remained unimpressed by
the statement so that it may be assumed that this hope will remain unfulfilled.
From the point of view of genocide research, the section on prevention is, for the most part,
irrelevant because it focuses primarily on crime in the US or else on youth violence. To name but
one example: Organized school activities are mentioned as a means to reduce youth violence. That
makes sense, but, in the context of genocidal violence, it is probably only efficient to a certain
extent.
Problems
In spite of all these positive aspects, some critical remarks must be made. First of all, violence
is (almost) always conceived of as deviant and problematic—as is proved by the subtitle “The
enduring Problem.” Analyses of desirable or even required violence as it is practiced, for instance,
by soldiers, the police and in large-scale livestock farming, are missing. As a consequence, the
questions as to why violence as an option to act actually exists and why it does indeed not belong
to everybody’s repertoire of social actions are not answered. Alvarez and Bachman assume that all
humans have a disposition to use violence. Consequently, inhibiting and uninhibiting factors come
into play. The fact that a large number of people do not resort to violence—eaving aside symbolic
and structural violence—is not discussed.
The apparent intention to include as many different aspects as possible unfortunately entails
certain weaknesses. Robbery and bank robbery, for example, are of course related to violence.
However, no analysis of violence can be found in the discussion of these cases. It seems that they
are only included in the book because they are spectacular. The authors actually do not know
what to write about them and how to incorporate them. Also, as has been mentioned, principally
the reference to socio-theoretical concepts is a bonus even if the abbreviated versions are partly
distorted. Simultaneously, Alvarez and Bachman introduce a comparatively old body of theories.
Especially developments in the theory of action as well as practice theory, theories that are relevant
for the explanation of all kinds of actions, are not accounted for.
Nonetheless, those who teach in the field of violence studies, especially at introductory levels
in educational systems, or who as a layman is interested in the topic and lives in the US, will find
the book very rewarding.
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The search for predictors of genocide is integral to the efforts of scholar-activists to prevent
and ultimately end genocidal violence. Any set of such predictors necessarily presupposes, or at
least implies, a definite notion of what genocide is and a theory of how it takes place. In The Warning
Signs of Genocide: An Anthropological Perspective, authors E.N. Anderson and Barbara A. Anderson
attempt precisely this. They conceptualize genocide in terms similar to Rudolph Rummel’s concept
of democide, propose an etiological theory of genocide grounded in evolutionary psychology,
infer the warning signs of genocide in the making, and propose remedial measures for preventing
genocide while its conditions of possibility are still being established. They also offer their own list
of countries at risk of committing genocide, with some surprising inclusions. The book is flawed
and its argument is problematic in several ways, but it offers interesting insights along the way
and makes a worthwhile contribution to further attempts to formulate a preventative theory of
genocide.
Anderson and Anderson begin by recognizing that Ben Kiernan’s Blood and Soil and Stephen
Pinker’s The Better Angels of Our Nature, both of which appeared during the writing of this book,
serve as major interlocutors and indeed forced “the biggest rewriting projects the two of us have
ever had to undertake in our rather long professional lives!” (p. xii). Indeed, in one sense the
entire book reads, and succeeds best, as Rousseauian rebuttal of Pinker’s Hobbesian take on how
human nature contributes to violence. Anderson and Anderson argue forcefully that genocide
happens not because human nature is competitive and antisocial, but precisely because human
beings are innately sociable, solidary, and moral. Human beings, the authors argue, evolved to
live solidaristically in bands of fifty to one hundred and fifty individuals. As a result we have an
innate psychological disposition to cooperative group behaviour but also an innate psychological
capacity to fear anything which we perceive as a threat to our group, and to convert that fear
into hatred which motivates us to destroy the source of the threat. Individual fear and hatred,
however, cannot produce genocide, which requires a level of social organization and coordination
far in excess of that which obtained among our ancestors in the African savannah. For fear and
hatred to lead to genocide, first a group must be defined as Other in a rigid and stereotyped way,
then “opportunistic politicians” must exploit this situation by inflaming individual feelings to
make them the dominant feelings of the group as a whole. This collective hatred and fear are
institutionally reinforced when political leaders form a “thuggish band of enforcers,” which
may consist of armed gangs or paramilitaries or which may consist of the nation’s armed forces
as a whole. Finally, “when war or extreme unrest breaks out, insecure but autocratic elites use
such means to try to control the situation” (p. 119). The escalation of this use of violence against
designated social others to maintain autocratic power is what produces genocide.
On the basis of this model the authors make predictions about countries at various levels
of risk for genocide. Examples of “extreme immediate risk” are Congo-Brazzaville, DR Congo,
Egypt, Indonesia, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, and Sudan. Longer-term risks include Burundi,
China, Eritrea, Guatemala, Iran, Iraq, Mali, North Korea, and Pakistan. Beyond this, the authors
assess various levels of risk for Colombia, Central America, much of sub-Saharan Africa, Russia
and Eastern Europe, Turkey, and India, Bangladesh, and Nepal.
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Provocatively, Anderson and Anderson argue that conditions for genocide are emerging
within the United States itself. They argue that “fear-based ideas—hatred of women and minorities
and glorification of strength and bigness” have become central to American conservatism (p. 124);
this escalating collective fear and hatred, along with increasingly rigid out-group status assigned
to subordinate groups such as Hispanics, non-Hispanic illegal immigrants, labour unions, women,
homosexuals, and so on could become the basis for institutionalized collective hatred which could
lead to genocide.
The key point which Anderson and Anderson stress is that the roots of, and predictors for,
genocide lie not in ideology, whether of blood and soil, revolution, or anything else, but in a socially
shared emotion and the translation of that emotion into institutionalized violence.
The preventative measures that the book recommends focus on addressing the causes of fear
and hatred of social others and on preventing the calcification of individual feelings into collective
feelings and institutions. These measures revolve around five key concerns, of which the first,
“dealing with hatred and the political exploitation of it,” is the most directly justified by the book’s
theoretical model. If the roots of genocide lie in the social fears converted into group hatreds, it
follows logically that, for instance, education “to teach people to cope proactively with trouble and
to be independent thinkers” (p. 138) and to “stop defining groups as absolute, essential entities”
(p. 136) should be part of an effective prevention, as would some constructive engagement with
religion (p. 139). Other measures that the authors recommend, such as preventing economic
downturns and fostering democratic accountability, address the social circumstances that generate
social fears or that enable the political mobilization of fear and hatred by elites.
The authors’ recommendations are ambitious, even utopian, implying a wholesale
transformation of global society along social liberal lines. This broad reach exemplifies some of the
key strengths and weaknesses of the book. On the one hand, it is good to see explicit connections
made between genocide prevention and related projects like human rights, human security, and
multiculturalism. On the other hand, the authors make no attempt to explain which actors will
implement their recommendations or where the political will to do so will come from.
The book’s other contributions are similarly uneven. On the one hand, there are many specific
insights to be had, small and large. For example, the observation that “genocide often bears an
uncanny resemblance to domestic violence, and also to schoolyard bullying” (p. 4, see also pp.
87-88) suggests an interesting connection or isomorphism between social processes at micro and
macro scales. The same is true for the argument that “what has been called ‘dehumanization’ is
really a process of developing and consolidating group rejection or barriers” (p. 61), and for the
examination of the neurobiology of fear and its effects on rational judgment (p. 17-18). The general
proposition that genocide relies on the collective mobilization of particular emotional orientations
rather than on particular and characteristic ideological orientations opens up an interesting line of
inquiry into the relationship between genocidal projects and embodied dispositions.
On the other hand, the book offers no theoretically informed analysis of power, of difference,
of the modern nation-state or the modern world-system, or of any particular social institutions. In
this sense genocide appears entirely contingent: for contingent reasons such as a sudden loss of
status by a dominant group, individuals become fearful and prone to hate; and for additionally
contingent reasons some political leaders try to capitalize on this fear and hatred to their own
advantage; and for contingent reasons this succeeds and people buy in to a genocidal agenda.
One of the weakest parts of the book comes in its opening chapter. Anderson and Anderson
define ‘genocide’ very narrowly—as the “systematic, cold-blooded, bureaucratically administered
extermination of entire ethnic, religious, or political groups, by their own national governments,
in the absence of anything that a rational external observer could consider an adequate reason”
(p. 6). This model closely resembles Rudolph Rummel’s concept of ‘democide’, as the authors
acknowledge. But aside from a few brief and dismissive mentions, Anderson and Anderson ignore
the entire definitional debate of the past twenty years, including the entire line of scholarship
represented by Moses, Woolford, and others who argue for treating cultural extermination of
indigenous peoples as genocide. Martin Shaw’s pivotal What is Genocide? is nowhere discussed.
Lemkin’s definition is invoked as gospel but Lemkin’s writing are not examined and the authors
miss important aspects of what Lemkin had to say.
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Nor is there a substantive engagement with other social scientific models aimed at predicting
genocides. Gregory Stanton’s predictive model is referenced briefly in its 1996 articulation, but
his subsequent revision of that conception into a ten-stage model is not critiqued. Michael Mann’s
rigorous and detailed predictive model in The Dark Side of Democracy is not even mentioned despite
its obvious direct relevance to the authors’ project. Aside from Kiernan and Pinker, in fact, little
recent work is engaged with. As a result, the historical overview in Chapter 6 feels like it could
have been written twenty years ago, and Appendix I, “Statistics of Genocide, With Risk Factors,”
does not have the methodological rigour to live up to its subtitle.
Overall, however, Warning Signs of Genocide makes a very specific but worthwhile contribution
to genocide scholarship. The project of developing a theoretical model of genocide capable of
predicting the sociogenesis of genocidal violence in its early stages and prescribing effective
measures to halt or divert this process is large and complex, but such a project must account for the
interplay between objective social structures and subjective individual motivations. The argument
in Warning Signs of Genocide provides one piece of that puzzle. There are gaps in its scholarship,
one gets the sense that the authors don’t have a strong understanding of social or cultural theory,
and the conception of genocide is much too narrow. But Anderson and Anderson do succeed in
offering a plausible account of certain connections between human evolution, emotion, and social
structure. This account could be useful for a more robust and sociologically informed theory of
genocide.
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Evil is a challenging subject for the social sciences. It has traditionally been associated with
moral philosophy and theology, specifically with theodicy, which deals with the challenge of
reconciling God’s existence with the existence of evil. The social sciences emerged in the wake of
the Enlightenment as the self-reflexive study of modernity, and came to oppose recourse to the
explanation of events in terms of faith and belief. In large part, they were established in the service
of human progress and rationality, notions which were dealt a severe blow by the violence of the
20th century, a ‘century of genocide’1. The challenge that is posed by its legacy, and that much of
it was committed in the name of progress and rationality, has been reflected upon by numerous
social and political thinkers, including in some of genocide studies’ most influential works2. A
forerunner in this debate was Kurt Wolff, a major twentieth century contributor to the sociology of
knowledge. In his 1969 essay For a Sociology of Evil, Wolff stated that when considering the various
catastrophes of modernity—Auschwitz, the Gulags, Hiroshima, Vietnam—we find ourselves
caught in a ‘paralysing suspension between two impossible worlds: one in which we can no longer
believe, a world ordered by religious directives and moderations; and one which we cannot bear,
a world without these directives and moderations’3.
This ‘paralysing suspension’ characterises the tense relationship between the two characters at
the heart of Pawel Pawlikowski’s Ida, the title character Ida Lebenstein and her aunt, Wanda Gruz.
The former is an orphaned novitiate nun, on the verge of vowing a life of devotion to the Catholic
Church. The latter is a world-weary and disillusioned judge for the communist PZPR (Polish United
Worker’s Party), nicknamed ‘Red Wanda’ and responsible for dealing with “enemies of the state”.
Set against the austere background of the Polish People’s Republic in the 1960s, the film follows
their short interaction. At the beginning, Ida (known as Anna at this point) is told that she ought to
visit Wanda, her only remaining relative, before she makes her vows. Wanda informs “Anna” that
she is not who she thinks she is; her name is Ida Lebenstein and she is a Jew, whose parents and
brother were killed during World War II. Ida resolves to find her parents’ graves, only to be told
that they have no graves—“neither they nor any other Jews”—and that their bodies might be “in
the woods or in the lake”. Wanda warns Ida of the stakes of this venture into a dark past—“what if
you go there and discover there is no God?”—but decides to accompany her. The two women set
off to find out how their relatives died and where their bodies might be located.
As the pair travel deeper into the countryside, towards Piaski, the tone of the film becomes
increasingly disquieting. The area that they visit is less a gemeinschaft based on unity and
mutual understanding4 than one characterised by suspicion and secrecy. Questions about Jews
are sidestepped by the villagers. At the old family home of Ida’s mother and Wanda, a young
family insist that there is no record of a Jewish family ever living there. As the film progresses,
however, it is revealed that the bodies are located in the woods. The woods—dark and ghostly,
tangled yet desolate—constitute an apt metaphor for the film’s memorialisation (or lack thereof)
of the Holocaust. On their journey, the two characters do not confront any tombs or plaques
commemorating the dead of the kind director Pawlikowski remembers from his childhood in
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Warsaw, which he describes as a “city littered with ghosts.”5 Poland in the 1960s, as represented
here, was far removed from contemporary memorial culture. One is reminded of Primo Levi’s
thoughts on how his memoir, If This is a Man,6 “fell into oblivion for many years … because in all
of Europe those were difficult times of mourning and reconstruction and the public did not want
to return in memory to the painful years of the war that had just ended.”7
The Holocaust does more than haunt the film’s characters and setting; it haunts the film itself.
It is never confronted directly, remaining (alongside Stalinism) a menacing background presence.
There are no visual representations of death camps and Nazism, or reconstructions of overt violence
and suffering. It is sharply distinct, therefore, from Hollywood Holocaust films like Schindler’s List
and Life is Beautiful, and more broadly from other films about genocide such as Hotel Rwanda, films
that have attracted criticism for the trivialisation or aestheticisation of genocide8 . It thus occupies
an interesting space in the debate about the visual representation and memorialisation of atrocity
and genocide, in which films about the Holocaust occupy a central place. Ida is not marked by a
voyeuristic, spectatorial gaze, or a desire to find something ‘life-affirming’ in the aftermath of one
of the most violent episodes of human history9. Nor does it self-consciously attempt to act as what
Jeffrey Alexander calls a “bridge metaphor” that provides “the symbolic extension so necessary
if the trauma of the Jewish people were to become a trauma for all humankind.”10 Insofar as Ida
tackles the subject of the Holocaust (and Pawlikowski has tried to downplay its centrality)11, it does
so in a complex and ambiguous way.
Ambiguous too is the presentation of Polish-Jewish relations. Though Pawlikowski states that
Ida is principally about what it is to be Polish,12 the film cannot escape this thorny issue. This
was made clear in protests against the film by the Polish Anti-Defamation League, who argued
that the Ida unduly ignores the German occupation during World War II and suggests that Poles
(particularly peasants in rural communities) were responsible for the Holocaust.13 For Pawlikowski,
“when people say that Poles connived with the Nazis – well, some did, some didn’t. Some people,
quite a few, behaved atrociously. Others, quite a few, behaved with incredible courage. Most
just tried to survive, the whole country was a victim.”14 For some on the Polish left, however,
Ida has been attacked for its purported insinuation of the links between Judaism and Stalinism,15
particularly in the character of Wanda Gruz. As Pawlikowski would have it, Ida is an existential
film, not one that attempts to “tackle history.”16 That its success has resulted precisely in a tackling
of history in Poland is perhaps a testament to the films complexity and nuance.
Both Ida and Wanda find themselves in Kurt Wolff’s paralysing suspension, caught between
a world in which they cannot believe and a world which they cannot bear. For Wanda, the trip
hardens her disillusion with devotion to any form of transcendental principle, be it communism
or Catholicism. Attempting to find solace in alcohol, cigarettes and casual sex, Wanda struggles to
believe in anything at all and harangues Ida about her naïve religious devotion. For Ida, discovering
her identity and learning of her parents’ fate understandably leads to a questioning of faith. This
questioning is emphasised by the pair’s encounter with a jazz musician, a saxophonist with a
penchant for John Coltrane who symbolises for both Ida and Wanda, perhaps even for Poland, the
possibility of an alternative future marked by a gradual Westernization. Whether this is a desirable
future, however, is a moot question. This is a film about many things: identity, memory, religion,
jazz music, and more. It is, for our purposes, also a powerful treatise on living in the aftermath of
genocide and confronting evil.
Title of the Film: Ida; Director: Pawel Pawlikowski; Producers: Eric Abraham, Piotr Dzieciol, Ewa
Puszczynska; Screenplay: Pawel Pawlikowski, Rebecca Lenkiewicz; Stars: Agata Kulesza, Agata
Trzebuchowska, Dawid Ogrodnik; Cinematography: Ryszard Lenczewski, Lukasz Zal; Film Editor:
Jaroslaw Kaminski; Countries: Poland/Denmark/France/UK; Year of Release: 2014; Production
Company: Opus Film, Pheonix Film, Portobello Pictures. Duration: 82 minutes.
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Anna, Ole, Peter, and Fred “are members of the Emergencies Team, or The E-Team, a division
of Human Rights Watch … trained to deal with unfolding crises, document war crimes and report
them to the world”.1 Using a cinéma vérité approach, Ross Kauffman and Katy Chevigny, two
award-winning filmmakers, follow The E-Team in the field in Syria and Libya.
First, Anna and Ole are absorbed in reviewing the complex plan to smuggle them into Syria to
investigate and document the crimes being committed. They cross the border into Syria illegally,
and the camera filming them walks the viewer through images of ruined building and empty
streets—empty except for a couple of street vendors manning blueberries stands and a few children
running around. Then Anna and Ole walk into someone’s home to interview family members
about crimes they witnessed and/or relatives they lost. Destruction and despair are there to be seen.
In the middle of the interview a heavy sound of a passing plane, probably a jet bomber,
provokes commotion in the home, interrupting the interview, and everyone takes shelter; but the
camera keeps rolling to give us foggy images of scared movements and worried voices. Members
of the interviewees’ family lament: “What is our crime? What have we done [for bombs to be dropped
on our homes like this]?” The interview goes on in spite of the pain and fear visible in the face of
the interviewee. Question after question, the E-Team members do their possible best to establish
facts and responsibilities. This one scene highlights the work the investigators can do, sometimes
conducting multiple interviews about one and the same incident. E-team members have to answer
questions such as what exactly happened in one place, and why and how to conclude that, based
on their findings, a violation of international law has occurred. On other occasions, such as in the
scenes of bombs falling on the Syrian town of Azaz, Anna and Ole witness crimes being committed
at the same time that they are conducting investigations to ascertain who is responsible for the
destruction.
In the case of Libya, Peter and Fred arrived at the crime scenes after the killing of Gadhafi.
They came at the right time to witness large quantities of sophisticated weaponry abandoned in
the desert, and a sea of secret documents the Gadhafi regime was not able to destroy before its
demise. Peter’s expertise in weaponry allowed for the possibility of determining the provenance
of Gadhafi’s weapons. Additionally, Fred’s vast experience in tracking violations of human rights
helped Human Rights Watch conduct detailed analyses of the documentation left behind by
Gaddafi’s secret services.
The Emergencies Team enjoys a consistent following among mainstream newspapers and
television channels in the Global North. Filmmakers Ross Kauffman and Katy Chevigny take
viewers back to the Balkan Wars of the 1990s to explain the birth and subsequent success of The
Emergencies Team. In September 1998, Fred and his colleagues visited the Balkans to document
human rights violations. One evening Fred was informed about ongoing killings in the Gornje
Obrinje region in Kosovo. He was urged to go there and see for himself. Instead of following
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the tradition at Human Rights Watch to collect data and go back to New York and produce a
report, he wrote a press release, and shared it with the media. That story made headlines in major
newspapers in the United States of America and led decision makers, including the White House,
to take action to intervene and stop the killings in Kosovo. In 2002, Fred, by now considered the
Father of The Emergencies Team, testified in the Milošević case before the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague.
Kauffman and Chevigny’s research into the ICTY video archives and the particular material
they chose to use in this film serve the claim that cinéma vérité aims at projecting “something
that really happens, and the method by which the film was made—which defines a role for the
filmmaker in filming the scene as it unfolds—seems to ensure the authenticity of the scene.”2 The
encounter between Milošević and Fred during the court proceedings at the ICTY is not a natural
setting in itself. Courtrooms are arranged settings in which interactions and interventions are
more or less regulated in order for the judges to accomplish their tasks of hearing different parties
to trials. However, when Milošević intervenes to accuse that Human Rights Watch has shown
determination to have him arrested and tried, he provides Fred with a spontaneous opportunity
to defend the organization: “We do not start with an end result, or a conclusion, or an aim, and
then search for the facts that will lead to that conclusion. We start with research in the field that
leads us up to the end.” Furthermore, Milošević’s accusations against Human Rights Watch
awakened Fred’s attention to direct his candidness towards the judges and respond in the strongest
and clearest terms. The camera captured that spontaneous and strong appeal to provide one of
those rare scenes where cinéma vérité approaches succeed “in filming people without making them
appear manipulated or self-conscious.”3 In order to know more about what it was like to testify
against Milošević, Kauffman and Chevigny decide to interview Fred. While trying to formulate
his answer, Fred struggles to hide tears; he swallows them to clear his throat—one may say—and
declares: “I honestly felt like I had a responsibility that every person who told me their story, and
lived through this horrible experience, that I now owe them their moment in court. And this was a
chance to represent them.”
Other episodes allow critical views to be voiced when the E-Team members meet skeptics.
In Moscow, for example, Anna goes to launch the Human Rights Watch report on Syria, with the
hope of convincing the Russian government to stop supporting the Syrian government. According
to Human Rights Watch reports, the Syrian government is largely responsible for ongoing human
rights violations in the country. During the question-and-answer session, a journalist suggested
that Anna works for an organization that is not independent, but rather is an agent of American
imperialism. In another episode, and during a mission to investigate Human Rights violations in
Libya, a rebel leader tells Peter that his organization cannot be fully reliable because it changes
alliances as soon as the people it used to defend gain power. Such episodes prevent the film from
being a public relations production on behalf of Human Rights Watch. Instead, by allowing critical
voices to be heard in the film—thus highlighting the complexities of issues human rights defenders
face—Kauffman and Chevigny realize a powerful plaidoyer for the different organizations that
take risks to sound the alarm against violations of human rights.
An additional but equally important element that makes this film a success is the art of
capturing negotiations of normality in times of war. In the E-Team, the war does not manifest itself
through bombs and fighting in Syria or Libya. For Anna, Ole, Peter and Fred the war is experienced
during the investigating violations of human rights in the field, living among the victims, trying
to cope with life with them, but it does not end there. The war continues for them when these
investigators go back to Paris, Berlin, or any other city in the peaceful West. They carry the war
with them for as long as they keep working on a case. Their search for normality can best be
described through anthropologist Ivana Macek’s understanding of negotiating normality in times
of war and/or mass violence: “patching together a semblance of existence, living from day to day
on terms [one] could neither finally accept nor directly deny.”4
Macek was able to directly experience the siege of Sarajevo during which she collected data
about lives of people who were affected by the violence as the war went on. She observed that
people felt humiliated and ashamed because they could not live as decently as they used to, or
could not avoid depending on foreign aid in order to make it through the war.5 Yet they were

©2015

Genocide Studies and Prevention 9, no. 1 http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.9.1.1332

127

Film Review: E-Team

inventive and proud enough to create all sorts of ways and tools to ensure a life reminiscent of the
normality of the pre-war times.6
Humiliation, shame, inventiveness and pride happen in the lives of The E-team members as
well. When they succeed in exposing crimes they feel pride and show it. When they fail to garner
a desired attention, or when the camera records long moments of silence, and faces lost in some
thoughts, it is as if they are ashamed of not solving problems, or realizing that the victims do not
enjoy the luxury of escaping that madness while they will go back to Paris, New York, Berlin, or
Geneva.
Anna and Ole are not only teammates; they are also a married couple. At one occasion, their
wedding anniversary happens while they are in war torn Syria. Instead of giving in to the desolation
and destruction around them and postpone their celebration, they find ways to live as normally as
possible under the circumstances. Ole gets a haircut, Anna makes herself beautiful, and they wish
each other a happy anniversary. On another occasion, Ole and Anna are traveling inside Syria with
their local colleague and translator. He mentions to them that his wife is pregnant. The pregnancy
is still in its early stage but he is so excited that he counts every day that passes.
How could one possibly have a child at a time they are witnessing and/or witnessing mass
violence? Kauffman and Chevigny do not ask that question in the film, but they provided us with
a magnificent work that provokes that question in us. Therein lies the importance of their film:
helping us realize that we constantly negotiate going back and forth between conditions we can
neither completely accept nor completely refuse. With the E-Team, the picture of the unparalleled
human capacity to destroy provokes revolt; at the same time, one is baffled and inspired by the
picture of human ability to overcome war, mass violence, or genocide, and survive to give life—
again.
Title of the Film: E-Team; Directors: Katy Ross Kauffman and Chevigny; Producer: Marilyn Ness;
Cinematography: Rachel Beth Anderson, James Foley, Ross Kauffman; Film Editing: David Teague;
Country: USA; Year of Release: 2014; Production Company: Big Mouth Productions, Red Light
Films, in association with Impact Partners. Duration: 88 minutes.
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